WILLIAM D. LEAHY AND AMERICA'S IMPERIAL YEARS, 1893-1917.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation deals with American imperialism at the turn of the century as seen through the eyes of a young naval officer, William D. Leahy. Other works which have examined those years have dealt with strategic, political, or economic matters, or with famous naval figures of the times. This study, in contrast, focuses on the experiences of William D. Leahy, whose very "averageness" makes his early life an overlooked window through which the events of his day may be examined. During the first two decades of his half-century career, Leahy saw in action the first two of Admiral Mahan's "international principles"--cooperation in the Far East, and dominance in the Caribbean, Central America (and the Philippines). Leahy's experiences help to throw a new light on how American imperialism affected both the victims of America's policies and those who had to carry out those policies.

Chapter 1, "The Cutting Edge," is an introduction to the dissertation. Chapter 2, "A Typical Naval Cadet," examines Leahy's formative background and his education at the Naval Academy. Chapter 3, "Baptism of Fire," introduces him into the fighting Navy in the battle off Santiago, Cuba during the Spanish American War. Chapter 4, "Shanghai and Amoy,"follows Leahy's participation in the events of the Boxer Rebellion. Chapter 5, "The Philippines and After--Years of Growth" takes Leahy through the American conquest of the Philippines. Although the Philippines were technically in the Far East, the basic assumptions of American foreign policy toward dealing with weak, non-white nations resulted in an American policy of repression and subjugation of popular Filipino forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo. The result was the same as in Latin America--total, if disguised American political and economic hegemony. Chapter 5 then outlines his career during the peaceful years, 1901-1912, when he served at sea on the West Coast of the United States, and at Panama, followed by shore duty at the Naval Academy. In 1912, he again went to sea, serving on board the armored cruiser California. He again travelled to the Philippines, the orient, and South America. Chapter 6, "Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic," describes Leahy's participation in the American interventions in those small Caribbean nations. The final chapter, "The Force of Shared Assumptions," describes how his attitudes toward imperialism related to the general attitudes and assumptions of his times.

The central pattern in Leahy's reactions to American imperialism was a consistent duality between his conviction of America's absolute right to further her own economic and strategic position overseas, versus his compassion for the victims of American policies and his awareness of the unpopular nature of the regimes which were instituted by use of American naval ships and Marines. This duality between his ideas of "duty" and his conscience continued into the World War II era. Although convinced that Japan was an aggressor and a menace to American interests in the Far East, Leahy consistently opposed the use of inhumane weapons, especially the nuclear bombing of Japan. Yet, he concluded that, since international controls were not yet perfected, America had to have the most powerful arsenal of nuclear weapons.

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PREFACE

This dissertation re-examines the American imperialistic expansion which accelerated after the Spanish American War and continued through the first two decades of the twentieth century. The re-examination uses the experiences and thoughts of William D. Leahy as a vehicle. Leahy was, in those years, a young officer just beginning a fifty-year career. By using the life of Leahy, a rather average officer, rather than the usual choice of a renowned hero, a novel and useful viewpoint is introduced--that of the unsung agent of American imperialism on the cutting edge of America's expanding overseas frontier.

Leahy's experiences and observations in Asia and Latin America do not support the standard model promoted by American diplomatic historians of an American foreign policy which favored "independence for the whole New World," and "republican government for the new states." Rather, Leahy's experiences underline the fact that, for whatever reasons, American imperialistic policies in those areas where her economic and military power could operate unopposed by other major powers, were almost invariably used to impose unpopular, comprador regimes, or American military governments. Puppet governments were installed over unwilling majorities, and against the armed resistance of the popularly supported leaders of those countries. In the final analysis, in spite of his greater sensitivity, Leahy, who always followed the slogan "My country, right or wrong," was as effective an instrument of America's imperial growth as were his less sensitive shipmates.

This dissertation was completed while I studied at Yale as a participant in the Naval Postgraduate Education Program. I assume all responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment. The opinions contained herein are my own and are not to be construed as the official views of the Navy Department or as the views of the naval service at large.

I would like to thank Professor Gaddis Smith of Yale for his continued support and guidance during the completion of the dissertation and for influencing me toward the study of diplomatic history and foreign policy. Among many others who have been of assistance, I would like especially to thank Professor J. Kenneth McDonald, Chairman of the Department of Strategy of the Naval War College, Admiral Edwin B. Hooper and Dr. Dean Allard, of the Naval Historical Division in Washington, Mr. Harry Schwartz of the National Archives, and Dr. Paul Heffron of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. Others who have been most helpful are Mr. Herman Kahn of the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale and Professors John Blum, R. Hal Williams, C. Vann Woodward and John W. Blassingame of the Yale History faculty. I would especially like to thank the staffs of the Beineke and Sterling Memorial Libraries at Yale for their sustained assistance.

Finally I would like to thank Rear Admiral William H. Leahy, U.S. Navy (Retired) for his kind permission to use his father's papers and for the sustained and helpful interest which both he and his own son, Robert Beale Leahy, have shown in this work.

CHAPTER 1

THE CUTTING EDGE

American overseas expansion at the turn of the 20th century fed on and in turn sustained the growth of the American Navy. The literature and the history of that expansion is enormous, but has primarily been concerned with high policy--the politics and decision-making of political leaders in Washington or of the few generals and admirals who gained fame during the campaigns of the time.[1] Few historians, however, have described in detail the consequences of these policies from the point of view of the junior officers on the cutting edge of America's new imperialism, the

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[1]As examples, see Alfred Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, 1930); John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, Strategy and Diplomacy in United States Foreign Policy, 1879-1917 (New Haven, 1966); Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York, 1956); Ernest May, Imperial Democracy; the Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York, 1961); Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936); Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China 1890-1952 (Princeton, 1958); William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (New York, 1958); Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964); Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946); Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943); Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific; An Inner History of America-East Asian Relations (New York, 1967); Richard S. West, Jr., Admirals of the American Empire; The Combined Story of George Dewey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winfield Scott Schley, and William Thomas Sampson (Indianapolis, 1948); Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign (Washington, 1947); William A. Goode, With Sampson Through the War (New York, 1899); Winfield Scott Schley, Forty Five Years under the Flag (New York, 1904).

men who conned the ships, directed the landing parties, and dealt with the "natives" under orders from Washington. Without such studies the history of American expansion appears as an abstract phenomenon, a weighing of broad considerations, a debate over theories, all without contact with the people who were the real instruments and victims of American policies. In Washington a President, or a Secretary of State, often at the instigation of private American investors or economic interests, would dictate a policy or military action. What was it like to be an officer in the field--simultaneously at the receiving end of America's chain of command and the dishing-out end of American armed force?

This study follows the career of one such American naval officer, William D. Leahy, during the years of America's initial large-scale involvement in overseas expansion in the Pacific, the Far East, Central America and the Caribbean. Leahy's early career, which took him to all of the areas of American colonial expansion, provides a virtual travelogue of American imperialism.[2] Within a year after his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, he participated in the destruction of the Spanish naval force of Admiral Cervera at Santiago, Cuba the sea battle which completed the destruction of the Spanish fleet and empire and helped dramatize the rise of America as a colonial power. In the years following

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[2]William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, Volume I (New York, 1935), p. 67 defines "Imperialism" as "the rule or control, military or economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people over other similar groups, or...the disposition, urge or striving to establish such rule or control." Robin Winks, ed., British Imperialism, Gold, God, Glory (New York, 1963), p. 1 describes the usual connotation of the term being "one of abuse, a perjorative term synonomous with economic exploitation, racial prejudice, secret diplomacy, and war."

the battle of Santiago, Leahy's career rose with the worldwide expansion of American imperial and naval might. An intelligent but not brilliant officer of Anglo-Irish background and the most decent instincts, Leahy steadily advanced up the Navy seniority ladder.

Unlike many of the military and naval heroes whose naval careers have been analyzed by historians, Leahy was never a man marked for greatness by either personal brilliance, non-conformity, or dash. He was in no way an original thinker like Alfred Thayer Mahan, nor a brilliant iconoclast like Admiral William S. Sims of World War I fame. Rather, he was an ordinary man--the type usually overlooked by historians, yet whose very ordinariness can be used to gain a new view of the events of those times. During the early years of Leahy's career he served on ships on virtually every area of Asia and the Caribbean in which American imperialistic expansion was taking place. In Asia he was an on-the-scene witness to the strange mix of cooperation and competition which existed between the great powers and China. On the one hand, at Shanghai and during the Boxer rebellion of 1900, Leahy saw the western powers and Japan join forces to combat any Chinese threat and to keep China divided and weak. On the other hand, even Leahy noted that sometimes comical maneuvering between the western powers and Japan, for economic and military advantage over each other. In the Philippines and the nations of the Caribbean and Central America, Leahy saw how American naval and military power, under the protective cover of the Monroe Doctrine in the absence of any great power rivals operated to impose a succession of unpopular comprador regimes on the nations of the Caribbean.

This study is for the twofold purpose of gaining insight into Leahy's attitudes and ideas as a man and as a naval officer, and of viewing the growth of American imperialism through the eyes of an average, effective naval officer on the expanding rim of America's economic and military power. It is intended as the first part of what ultimately may be a full biography of Admiral Leahy. Leahy's career is of particular interest because he rose to command the entire American Naval establishment in the late 1930's. Later, the senior American military officer during World War II, he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and personal advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In these positions he was influential in American politico-military planning prior to and during the second World War. In the same positions under President Harry Truman until 1949, Admiral Leahy was also a key figure in helping to formulate the policies of the cold War. It is significant that many of Leahy's basic attitudes and assumptions toward American relations with other nations did not change appreciably during his fifty-year career. Nor did a dichotomy in his attitude toward the citizens of other nations change during his career. While always the able and willing centurian, Leahy, unlike many Americans of his time recognized the shared humanity of his opponents, and sincerely appreciated the problems and injustices which America's imperial policies often inflicted on the people of other lands.

His ideas and attitudes, in spite of his sensitivity to the plight of other peoples, included the standard American assumptions of the primacy of American economic and strategic interests especially in the western

hemisphere and the Caribbean, the conviction of a God-ordained higher destiny for the United States and its interests, and the superiority of American ways and western civilization over other economic and political systems. These assumptions served him as well leading the Navy of the 30's and under Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman as they had at the beginning of the 20th century. This may suggest that general American attitudes toward colonial expansion, especially at the expense of weaker non-white, non western peoples may have descended virtually intact from the turn of the century or earlier and may, indeed, extend into the present.

Family and social background were essential influences on Leahy's later attitudes. His early youth and schooling, through his Naval Academy years, and including his formative years in the American Fleet ingrained in him most of the standard ideological assumptions of his society and of the Navy of his time. By examining his environment and attitudes, this study will further the understanding of some of the political and social forces behind the Navy's role in the American expansionist era. On a longer view, the study will follow the development of the early career of an officer who later helped to initiate the Cold War, but who also insisted on maintaining separation between civil and military authority at the top levels of American politico-military planning with the military at all times firmly subordinated to civilian authority.

Forty years after the Battle of Santiago, Leahy completed a highly successful career as Chief of Naval Operations, the highest position in the Navy. He retired in 1939 and was assigned by Franklin Roosevelt,

first as Governor of Puerto Rico, and then to the sensitive post of U.S. Ambassador to the Petain government in Vichy France. He served in France from January 1941 until May 1942. Leahy was recalled from France in May 1942 to serve again in uniform, as Chief of Staff to Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. In that position, as the senior officer of all of the United States armed forces, he presided over the meetings of the American Joint Chiefs and of the combined U.S. British Chiefs of Staff when America hosted their meetings. He was at the same time, Roosevelt's personal advisor.[3]

Following Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, Leahy continued to perform his Chief of Staff and advisory functions for President Truman until his second and final retirement in 1949, after more than fifty years of active service for his country. His career can be used as a window through which many of the attitudes and assumptions behind American imperialism and navalism, may be examined and through which the possible continuity of earlier American attitudes with those of recent years may be discerned.

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[3] Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There, The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), pp. 1-5.

CHAPTER 2

A TYPICAL NAVAL CADET

The influences which operated during Leahy's boyhood and early life at the Naval Academy were like those of most of his contemporaries. He shared a background common not only to cadets at the Academy but throughout the ruling elites of the United States. Leahy's family was Episcopalian, Northern European, and middle class. Leahy spent his early years far from the sight of ocean water. He was born in Hampton, Iowa, a little town in Franklin County. Leahy's grandparents on both sides had been Irish immigrants who had ultimately settled in Wisconsin and worked themselves into comfortable middle class status. His mother's father had served for many years as treasurer of Dane County, Wisconsin.

His paternal grandparents claimed descent from Irish chiefs who had fought the English in the seventeenth century. They immigrated from Ireland in 1838 and moved to Wisconsin in 1849 from Roxbury, Massachusetts. One of their sons, William D. Leahy's uncle, John Edgar, who was educated in a log cabin in Dodge County, Wisconsin, spent almost four years at the state university, but did not graduate. He enlisted in Company C, 35th Wisconsin Infantry engaged in several Civil War battled, and then entered the lumber and shingle business on his return to Wisconsin in 1866. A Republican politician, he was a member of the Wausau, Wisconsin, City Council and School Board, mayor for three terms in succession and

was elected for a four year term in the State Senate in 1886. Another of William D. Leahy's uncles, Stephen, was a lawyer and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin.[1]

William D. Leahy's father, Michael Arthur, received his law degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1862 and served as a Captain in the 35th Wisconsin Infantry from 1862 to 1866. After marrying Rose Hamilton, he moved to Franklin County, Iowa, in 1868, where he first taught school and then opened a law office. He was elected to the State Legislature from Franklin County for several terms during which time, in 1875, his son William was born. In 1878 he entered into law partnership with Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, a man who had led several detachments of black Union Soldiers, including the 88th Colored Regiment, during the Civil War. Leahy was also the acknowledged leader of the Franklin County Greenback party. In 1889 the family settled in Ashland, Wisconsin, where he continued to practice law and engaged in the lumber business.[2] Inspired,

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[1]Handwritten Preface to Leahy Diary--information gleaned by William D. Leahy from "old letters." Leahy proudly noted that his father "was completely devoted to the ideals of American democracy"; History of Franklin and Cerro Gordo Counties, Iowa (Springfield, Ill., 1883), pp. 180-181; Theobald (Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin), to Thomas, December 28, 1972; "Leahy Appointment Brings Surge of Pride to Pioneer Hampton Residents," Courier, Waterloo, Iowa, November 25, 1940; "Native of Hampton Famed Navy Admiral," Hampton Recorder, October 31, 1929; The Blue Book of the State of Wisconsin, 1889, p. 407; "Biographical Sketches of State Senate, Twenty-First District," p. 497; Soldiers and Citizens' Album of Biographical Records, State of Wisconsin, 1888 (Madison, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 191-92; Reeve-Mallory to Thomas, November 15, 1972.

[2]History of Franklin and Cerro Gordo Counties, Iowa, pp. 180-81; History of Franklin County, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 208, notes Michael Leahy as a man of "literary tastes," and an attorney of "some force."

perhaps, by his soldier father and uncles, William D. Leahy had wanted from early youth to enter the Military Academy, but had turned to the Naval Academy when he found that no appointments were available at West Point.[3] His brother, Michael Arthur later followed in his footsteps to the Naval Academy.[4]

The sea and naval life were receiving favorable publicity from the press at the time of William Leahy's entry, especially from journals like the popular Youth's Companion, the most widely read magazine of its time among American youth. An article by crusty old Admiral David Porter was a typical description of life at the Naval Academy. The text was accompanied by dramatic drawings of the Naval Academy buildings, a huge mortar, cadets seated at the oars of twenty rowing boats, with great American naval ships in the background:

United States Naval Academy
And the Kind of Boys Wanted by the Navy
by Admiral David Porter

> ...What kind of boy does the government want....The government is a stern master, with no sympathy for anything outside the strict line of duty.
>
> The Naval Academy was established in order that the cadets should obtain, during their first year's course, the professional and general information to enable the government to utilize their services, particularly in time of war....
>
> A professor from Harvard University, who was really a member of the Annual Board of Examiners at Annapolis,

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[3] Daily News, Ashland (Wisconsin), August 1, 1848, Feature Page quoted a local speech given by Leahy.

[4] U.S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni (Annapolis, 1956), p. 186, shows that Michael Arthur Leahy graduated with the Naval Academy Class of 1908. He retired as Captain in 1947.

> pronounced the Academy course to be better learned, considering the variety of subjects studied, than at Cambridge....
>
> The position of officer in the Navy is accessible to any brave boy having the necessary physical and mental qualifications to meet it....[5]

When Leahy entered the Naval Academy in 1893, entrance was in the hands of Congressmen, each of whom was free to establish whatever initial selection criteria he desired to fill his quota, such as local competitive examinations.[6] Once chosen, the prospective Naval Cadets had to proceed to the Academy, where they took written and physical examinations, conducted both in May and September of the entering year.[7] Leahy took his examination in May, having received his appointment from Representative Thomas Lynch of the Ninth Wisconsin Congressional District.[8] Democratic Congressman Lynch was elected to Congress in March 1891 and served until March, 1895.[9] Leahy who saw himself as apolitical, was apparently not influenced by Lynch's Democratic leanings. In Leahy's graduating

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[5]David Porter, "United States Naval Academy and the Kind of Boys Wanted by the Navy," Youth's Companion, Vol. 16 (April 28, 1887), pp. 189-90.

[6]Park Benjamin (Naval Academy graduate, Class of 1867), The United States Naval Academy (New York, 1900), pp. 276, 357; Annual Register of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1893-94 (Washington, 1893), pp. 7, 67, 330.

[7]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 358-59; Annual Register, 1893-94, p. 67.

[8]Leahy Diary, p. 1; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 359; Annual Register, 1893-94, pp. 28-29, 67.

[9]Larry Gara, A Short History of Wisconsin (Madison, 1967), p. 172; Congressional Directory (Washington, 1893), p. 111; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), Senate Document 8, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 1318.

class, seventeen of the cadets listed themselves as "Democrats," twenty-six as "Republicans," while there were a few brave souls, one each, who chose the titles of "Populist," "Greenback," "Tammany," "Prohibitionist," and "Tillmanite." Leahy, faithful to what was to be his lifelong disdain for politics, alone had the distinction of listing himself under the title of "Popocrat."[10]

Park Benjamin, the historian of the Naval Academy, stated that, "Political pull stops at the threshold of the very first examination room at the Academy."[11] However, with the system of Congressional appointments to a limited number of spaces, the scramble for appointments prior to arrival at the Academy was often frantic and sometimes undignified. In addition to the Congressional appointments, the Secretary of the Navy could fill unused Congressional vacancies, while the President of the United States could appoint cadets at large, or from the entire United States, to a maximum of ten at the Academy at any one time."[12] These presidential appointments were often sought by desperate parents as a

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[10]U.S. Navy Academy, The Lucky Bag of the United States Naval Academy, Class of 1897 (Annapolis, Maryland, 1897), pp. 190-91; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 254-269, tells how, in contrast to the 1830's, post-civil war U.S. Military officers believed that politics and military officership did not mix. Huntington estimated that few officers ever cast ballots.

[11]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 358.

[12]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 359-362; U.S. Naval Academy Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Naval Academy, 1896 (Washington, 1896), Appendix, pp. 7-9.

last resort for entry into the Academy.[13]

During the years when Leahy was at the Naval Academy, the background of the cadets was remarkably uniform. In the first place, the ethnic makeup of the cadet body was such that the great majority were reported by the Academy Surgeon in 1895 to have been "blond or brown-haired, blue-eyed, Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic."[14] They were drawn predominantly from the commercial, industrial and professional classes and included few sons of working men or small farmers.[15]

Studies of the background and attitudes of future Army generals who attended the Military Academy during Leahy's era show that they were, like the Naval Academy Cadets, predominantly Protestant. Nearly half were, like Leahy, Episcopalians.[16] Only fourteen percent were the sons of professional military officers. To illustrate the homogeneity of the American elite of that time, the leaders of other professional groups

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[13] Admiral Halsey's Story, Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, USN and Lieutenant Commander J. Bryan, III, USNR (New York, 1947), pp. 3-4. Ralph B. Jordan, Born to Fight: The Life of Admiral Halsey (Philadelphia, 1946), tells of the difficulties encountered by the Halsey family in obtaining a Naval Academy appointment for their son in spite of the father's Naval Academy background.

[14] Surgeon Henry G. Beyer, "The Growth of U.S. Naval Cadets," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XXI (1895), p. 298, quoted in Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergency of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), p. 16.

[15] Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 10, 12, 16.

[16] William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite," Journal of Economic History, Vol. IX (November 1949), pp. 203-06, quoted in Richard Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals 1898-1940," unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1951, pp. 8-15.

in addition to the military group, shared a similar upper middle-class social, economic and religious background.[17] To a striking extent these leaders shared a religious, the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, upper-middle class heritage. Thus, to the extent that their origins shaped them, the attitudes of America's military leaders differed little from those possessed by other leaders.[18]

The entrance examination for the Naval Academy consisted of basic achievement and aptitude tests in mathematics, English, History and Geography. Candidates were expected to be able to read rapidly and write

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[17]William Miller, "American Lawyers in Business and Economics: Their Social Backgrounds and Early Training," Yale Law Journal (January 1951), p. 71, quoted in Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," p. 16.

[18]Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," pp. 8-17. The conclusion of Brown and Miller are in direct opposition to a thesis recently proposed by Peter Karsten. Karsten has attempted to prove the existence, during what he called the "Golden Age of Annapolis" of a unique and somewhat sinister "Naval Aristocracy." Karsten's conclusions were possible only by his ignoring the massive similarities, shown by Brown and Miller, in the background of all American ruling elites of the "Golden Age of Annapolis," from 1845 to 1925. Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy. Ronald Spector, Book Review of Peter Karsten's The Naval Aristocracy, United States Naval War College Review, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Sequence 239 (September-October, 1972), pp. 94-95. Spector criticized Karsten's open anti-Navy hostility, which resulted in Karsten's one-sided reading of some of the evidence to "prove" his "Naval Aristocracy" thesis. Karsten, a former Lieutenant in the Naval Reserve implies (note The Naval Aristocracy, p. 280) that his three years of service may have given him added insight into the "naval mind" over the work of civilian naval historians like Elting Marison. On the contrary, Elting E. Morison's work on Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston, 1942), although somewhat pro-Sims, in comparison with Karsten's work and conclusions appears, rather, to underline the old truth that historical writing does not depend as much upon personal background as it does upon adherence to objectivity; Dr. Paolo E. Coletta, review of The Naval Aristocracy, in The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 98, No. 12 (December 1972), also criticizes Karsten's one-sided reading of the sources and his slanting of evidence to "prove" the existence of a "naval aristocracy." Coletta, not unfairly, states that "given several alternative interpretations of the facts he garners, Karsten invariably chooses the one most damning of the Navy."

grammatically. The mathematics examination consisted of questions on weights and measures, arithmetic and basic algebra. The system of "prep school cramming" which had developed for preparing for the entrance examinations to Annapolis following appointment was somewhat of a scandal. Several one month preparatory schools had been set up at Annapolis which apparently had gained access to the testing methods and questions used at the Academy. Henry Williams, who entered the Academy in 1894, a year after Leahy entered, wrote that although the questions in arithmetic, geography and history were "elementary," it was virtually impossible for a boy who had not been drilled at the one-month prep schools to pass the examination, since the prep schools drilled the candidates on "all the questions that might be asked. For instance, it was necessary to know the location of practically every cape in the world, every bay...all the principal cities...the arithmetic examination consisted of long division ...a cramming session. That's all it was...for one month." The cramming situation grew so bad that in 1894 the Superintendent and the Board of Visitors for the Naval Academy recommended a relaxing of the tight rote learning requirements of the examination to allow for the entrance of more talented boys and to eliminate "comparatively stupid" candidates who were being literally crammed into the Academy.[19]

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[19] Admiral Henry Williams, USN (Retired), The Reminiscences of Admiral Henry Williams, USN (Ret.), Columbia University Oral History Research Office (New York, 1972), pp. 3-4; Annual Register, 1893-94, pp. 69-70; Report of the Board of Visitors, 1894, pp. 12-13; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 417-18.

Once the Cadets entered the Academy, studies emphasized technical subjects, with little time allotted to the serious study of history, or international events. The books used in those subject areas were generally shallow, and were crippled by an Anglo-Saxon orientation and an insistence on the old "hero" and "battle" kind of naval and general history. During Leahy's years at the Academy, Swinton's Outlines of the World's History, Labberton's Historical Atlas, MacClay's History of the United States Navy, were used at various times.[20]

Swinton's Outlines of the World's History began with an analysis of the "true racial framework" within which history had occurred. Swinton pronounced that, since "Caucasians," or the white race, were the "only true historical race," civilization was the unique product of that race. Swinton then concluded that "the history of the civilized world is the history of the Caucasian race." As if to prove his point Swinton then proceeded to write his World's History, with scarcely a mention of, for instance, Africa, China, or Japan.[21]

Eliot's History of the United States from 1492 to 1872, published in the same year (1874) as Swinton's book, has been criticized by one writer as defending "aristocratic institutions, such as the Anglican Church

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[20] Annual Register, 1894-94, 1894-95, 1895-96, 1896-97. William Swinton, Outlines of the World's History, Ancient, Medieval and Modern, with Special Relation to the History of Civilization and the Progress of Mankind (New York, 1874); Robert H. Labberton, Historical Atlas 3,800 B.C. to 1886 A.D. (Boston, 1891); Edgar Stanton MacClay, A History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1901 (New York, 1893-1901), 3 vols.

[21] Swinton, Outlines of the World's History, pp. 2-4.

of the pre-Revolutionary War era and the Society of the Cincinnati of the Federalist Age."[22] Eliot's work, however, was written on a somewhat more objective and less Anglo-centric basis than Swinton and many of the other works of the period. Eliot recognized that atrocities committed on the native inhabitants of America by various white groups, and his comments on the Society of the Cincinnati and the Anglican Church were more to describe than to defend those institutions.[23] Labberton's Historical Atlas, in silent acceptance of the Anglo-centric assumptions of the other works, does not even attempt to depict any historical events in China, Japan, or black Africa. Labberton's idea of the world 1000 B.C. includes only the Middle East, Egypt, and Israel. Japan and China show up only as parts of a diffuse "Empire of the Mongols...1400 A.D."

For those outsiders who did not meet the ethnic or other prejudices of the Naval Academy system, Cadet life was made intolerable. As one result, the Academy did not have any black, and few Jewish graduates, until World War II.[24] Like most of his contemporaries, Park Benjamin had no difficulty in justifying the exclusion or expulsion by hazing of Negroes and other unwanted elements.[25] In justifying the elimination of

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[22]Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, p. 427. (Karsten's note on E. Digby Baltzell's Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), pp. 392-95, 35.)

[23]Samuel Eliot, History of the United States from 1492 to 1872 (Boston, 1874), pp. 7, 15, 72, 145, 294-50, 258; Labberton, Historical Atlas, Plate V, part CXXXVII.

[24]Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, pp. 16, 217-18.

[25]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 284-97, 377-79, 388-90.

Negroes from the Academy, and in casting his vote against "legislating morality," Benjamin said:

> All race and political questions aside, the issue was presented of whether or not a Negro could take his place on the hierarchy of a warship and secure not only the necessary recognition from his immediate associates, but be able to maintain the discipline and enforce the respect necessary from the crew.

In comparing the problems of black Navy officers and of black Army officers, Benjamin rationalized:

> The conditions which would surround a Negro Naval Officer are widely different from those which bear upon his brother in the Army. Men are thrown into far closer companionship in the restricted quarters of the wardroom of a man-of-war than they are in any army post, and there are unwritten laws and customs of the naval service which may make life unbearable to any one whom for any reason, may be regarded as personally objectionable. Naval regulations may compel undesirable relationships, just as they may attempt to endorse proper deference and subordination from inferiors in rank and station, but they cannot insure that due respect and cheerful obedience without which it is impossible to maintain the intricate discipline of a man-of-war.[26]

Aside from the fact that the fears expressed by Benjamin have long since been proven to have been exaggerated, it never occurred to Benjamin and his contemporaries that Negroes, Jews, and all other American youths rated an equal chance to enter the Academy as a basic right--regardless of sentiment or consequences. Thus, hazing being conscienceless,was the most effective and fearsome threat against unwanted outsiders, especially against the few Negroes who managed to secure appointment to the Academy. Hazing played into the hands of those young men who, from immaturity, viciousness or personal frustration chose to play the bully. The general

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[26] Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 292-93, 461.

hazing situation grew so bad in 1907 that one student, James R. Branch was killed in a "class fight."[27]

Admiral William V. Pratt, who graduated from the Academy in the class of 1889, told how, to the discomfort of his conscience, a Jewish cadet had been mercilessly hazed out of the Academy.[28] In his own case, however, as in the case of most of the cadets, hazing represented apparently not much more or less than a kind of fraternity initiation. Pratt said, "Hazing did exist...but personally I never did much mind the mild form we were subjected to....On the contrary, I rather enjoyed it, preferring to be noticed."[29]

Thus, by the processes of selection, education, and example, the Naval Academy tended to produce officers who were conservative not only in a military, but in a political sense.[30] Leahy, like most of his contemporaries, was proud of his conservative nature and of his political

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[27]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 288-89, 301, 311, 332, 373. Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher (New York, 1954), pp. 20-26; Park Benjamin, "The Trouble at the Naval Academy," The Independent (New York, January 18, 1906), pp. 154-58; P. W. Moeller, The Naval Academy at Annapolis and Hazing; Or, the Vindication of an Honest Name (New York, 1884); Henry A. Wiley, An Admiral From Texas (Garden City, N.Y., 1934), pp. 14-23. Wiley related that, although he had been expelled from the Naval Academy for slapping and baiting a candidate for the Academy, he felt that he had "done no wrong." Wiley returned to the Academy only after the intervention of Senator Morgan of Alabama and Secretary of the Navy Whitney.

[28]Admiral William V. Pratt, "Autobiography," unpublished manuscript, co-authored with Felicia Hyde, in Papers of Admiral William V. Pratt, Class of 1849, at Naval Historical Division, Washington, D.C., pp. 5-7.

[29]Pratt, "Autobiography," pp. 5-7. To those who possess the desired background, hazing, of course, may serve as a form of "initiation rite," while to the outsider, it serves as an unofficial elimination device.

[30]Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, pp. 208-13, 203, 385.

"non-involvement."[31] Leahy continued this pattern throughout his career.[32] His conservatism was apparently shared by most of his contemporaries. Fifty years later, still only 5% of military officers identified themselves as "liberals" in a 1954 Pentagon survey cited by Morris Janowitz. This preponderance of conservative viewpoint in the officer population, especially in older Academy officers, is the reverse of the national American trend in which higher education usually produces a higher proportion of liberal thinkers. It is also based on an assumption in the military that only those who are seeking political change are "political."[33]

To accentuate the imbred nature of the Naval Academy of the late 19th century, Park Benjamin boasted of the uniformity of Academy instruction in 1900:

> In all its departments it is now mainly controlled by its own graduates....At the present time the proportion of non-graduates is only about twenty percent....The proportion of civilian instructors to those holding official rank is small, and averages for the entire school period a little less than twelve percent....The iron hand of discipline is everywhere exerted. There are no bolting of recitations, no cutting of chapel...no selection of what will be studied and what not.[34]

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[31] Leahy Diary.

[32] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), p. 236. Leahy, always a conservative, was dismayed on visiting Australia in 1900-01 at the strength and independence of the union movement there. Throughout his early years he maintained a patrician sympathy for the status quo. In 1912, he counted on the "conservative element," which he trusted, to reject the candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt who, although a friend of the Navy, was undignified and unpredictable.

[33] Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 236-39.

[34] Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 392-93, 386; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, p. 41.

The students were expected to study or to be instructed eight out of twenty-four hours of the day, sleep for eight hours, and drill, eat or relax the other eight hours. All of the activity was tightly regulated. Four hours each morning were devoted to study and recitation; two hours each forenoon; and two hours each evening to study only. This regime, plus enforced study hours each evening and for a part of Sunday afternoons, gave the students about forty-four hours of study and instruction each week, plus about eight hours of practical instruction or drill.[35]

Leahy's life at the Naval Academy followed the standard Annapolis pattern of an average, effective student. Since he entered the Academy in May rather than September he started his career, as all May entrants, living on the ancient floating hulk Santee, sleeping in a swinging hammock and struggling with an assortment of old lockers and accomodations. Then, there followed a summer cruise on board the U.S.S. Constellation to the Madeira Islands and to Fortress Monroe, Virginia. They returned to

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[35]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 376-81. The entrance procedures, instructional and disciplinary regime at the Military Academy were almost identical to that at the Naval Academy. At both schools, emphasis was on "things" rather than on "people," or on the historical or international context of events. Identical or similar textbooks were used at both Academies, including the racist and Anglo-centric Swinton's Outlines of the World's History, and P. V. N. Myers', General History for Colleges and High Schools (Boston, 1893). Hazing of blacks did not appear to be as vicious or brutal at West Point as it was at the Naval Academy. (See, Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," pp. 23, 28; Lieutenant Elmer W. Hubbard, "The Military Academy and the Education of Officers," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, XVI (January 1895), pp. 1-24, quoted in Sidney Formen, West Point; A History of the United States Military Academy (New York, 1950), pp. 141-42; Edward S. Farrow, West Point and the Military Academy (New York, 1895), pp. 18, 64; H. Irving Hancock, Life at West Point (New York, 1902), pp. 51-75; Myers, General History, pp. 2-3; Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, U.S.A., The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York, 1969), pp. 61, 104, 121, 165.

Annapolis in rough weather and were again put on board the Santee to await the arrival of the September plebes.[36]

In his diary, Leahy briefly recorded his summer cruise:

> June 3 to September 2, 1892...ship Constellation-Frigate built 1797....Naval cadets' cruise in the summer of 1893 started for Europe but because of storm damage received in mid ocean it was necessary to make port, at Fayal in the Azores Islands, and to accomplish repairs at anchor off Funchal, Madeira. My station at sea was on the Fore topgallant Yard....[37]

Thus Leahy served on the last cruise of the venerable Frigate Constellation. That old vessel had been authorized in 1794 during the presidency of George Washington, launched in 1797 and served actively in five wars.[38]

In the fall of 1893, the Naval Academy was still several years away from the commencement of the building of its modern twentieth century buildings and plant. The Cadets were housed in the dilapidated "New Quarters," with one-fourth in the even more dilapidated "Old Quarters,"

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[36]The Lucky Bag, p. 34; Annual Register, 1893-94; "Summary of the Cruise," p. 20; in Pratt, "Autobiography," p. 577; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 369; Wiley, An Admiral From Texas, pp. 9-14.

[37]Leahy Diary, June 3 to September 2, 1893.

[38]The Constitution was placed out of commission in September 1893, thereafter serving as receiving ship at Newport, Rhode Island. She was recommissioned in 1940 and served as the flagship of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and of Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic Fleet. She was finally made a naval shrine by the citizens of Baltimore in 1955. (Writers' Program of the WPA in the State of Maryland, A Guide to the United States Naval Academy (New York, 1941), pp. 100-01; United States, Department of the Navy, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. II (Washington, 1963), pp. 170-71, Frederick Stanhope Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships (New York, 1903), p. 198.

which dated back to 1845--the founding of the Naval Academy. The library, armory, and other buildings were old and mostly in need of replacement or repair.[39]

During the school year 1893-94 at the Naval Academy, Leahy's Fourth Classmates took mathematics, modern languages, and a composite called "English Studies, History and Law." The mathematics consisted of algebra and geometry, the French was introductory, and the "History and Law" section attempted to cover history from Greece to the colonization of America, using Swinton's Outlines of the World's History, and Samuel Eliot's History of the United States.[40]

By June 1894, Leahy's class had earned their relative "orders of merit" positions, based on an academy marking system which included academic and deportment marks, combined in a weighted aggregate score. Leahy stood 55th out of 77 classmates. In June of 1894, Leahy's third class, along with the first class, line division and fourth class, embarked on the practice ship Monongahela, for a cruise on the Chesapeake and visit to Fortress Monroe, Virginia. During 1894-95, their second or "third class" year, Leahy's group studied descriptive geometry and trigonometry, English and the United States Constitution, and modern languages--French,

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[39] Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King A Naval Record (New York, 1952), pp. 16-17; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 369-72.

[40] Annual Register, 1893-94, Appendix, pp. 7-9; Eliot, History of the United States; Swinton, Outlines of the World's History.

Spanish or German. In addition, they took physics, chemistry and analytic geometry.[41]

The Army-Navy football games, which had been a high point of each school year since 1890, were discontinued in 1894. The Secretaries of War and Navy had jointly agreed that the games had a deleterious effect on both the class standing of the players and of discipline at the Academies. The games were not reinstituted until 1899 and Leahy's class missed the games during the last two years at the Academy.[42]

In the summer of 1895, Leahy's classmates of the class of 1897 were old salts, chuckling at the plight of the new Plebes, whose life on the Santee was described as "one continual round of pleasure."[43] They themselves went on their second year or youngster cruise "having to pull on ropes--a disgusting occupation," and standing watches during a coastal cruise on board the Bancroft.[44] Following a month's leave and back at the Naval Academy, they considered themselves not only old salts, but "hardened sinners," several of whom managed to fly a pirate flag from the staff of their new quarters, and to carry out pranks such as startling the marine orderlies with clusters of buckets dropped down stairwells.[45]

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[41] Annual Register, 1894-95, pp. 73-75; Report of the Board of Visitors, 1896.

[42] Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 337.

[43] The Lucky Bag, 1895, p. 34.

[44] The Lucky Bag, 1895, p. 35; Annual Register, 1895, pp. 21-22.

[45] The Lucky Bag, 1895, p. 36.

They survived quite happily and comfortably despite the critical reports which condemned the entire dormitory and sanitation system of the Academy. No action was taken, however, until after Leahy's class had graduated.[46]

During 1895-96, their Second-Class Year, the emphasis was on scientific and professional subjects. Languages and MacClay's History of the Navy[47] were studied, along with physics, chemistry, mechanics and steam engineering. There was an additional emphasis of steam engineering and, during the second term, on celestial navigation.[48] In June 1896, William D. Leahy had risen to 35th in a surviving fifty-six man group.[49]

By the Spring of 1896, Leahy's classmates, now experienced Second Classmen, drilled the batallion in infantry and artillery exercises. By June they were "prayed over by the Chaplain and preached patriotism by a member of the Board of Visitors," and they watched the class ahead of them receive their diplomas, leaving Leahy's class as the new leaders of the batallion--the new First Class.[50] On the 15th of April, the new First Classmen were allowed to choose either line or the Engineer Corps.

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[46]Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 408-10; Report of the Board of Visitors, 1895, p. 5; United States, Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Navy Department for the Year 1897. Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, 1897), pp. 23, 147, 151-53.

[47]MacClay, History of the Navy.

[48]Annual Register, 1895-96, pp. 78-81; Report of the Board of Visitors, 1896, Appendix, pp. 7-9.

[49]Annual Register, 1896-97, pp. 66-67.

[50]The Lucky Bag, 1897, p. 29.

Leahy chose the Engineers.

That summer, the Line First Classmen made their cruise on board the Monogahela, while Leahy's group, the engineers sailed on board the old Bancroft. The Bancroft, like the old Constellation, and the other training ships of that time, the Monogahela and Chesapeake, were obsolete and ill-equipped for training cadets in the needs of the modern steel navy then building. Their emphasis was on sail and line handling, with little opportunity given to the cadets to learn first hand the characteristics of modern steel warships. Commodore S. B. Luce's Seamanship, the standard seamanship text at the Naval Academy until 1901 emphasized sails, rigging to the extent that it was virtually useless as a text. As late as 1909, the old Hartford, made the last sailing practice cruise with Academy classes.[51]

The line cadet group sailed to Funchal, Madeira Island, while Leahy's group, the engineers, sailed to Newport News, Virginia and then to Philadelphia, Elizabeth, New Jersey and the New York Navy Yard, where they examined ship building and other facilities. Leahy's group also managed to enjoy garden parties and dances in New London, Boston, Portsmouth, Newport, Rhode Island and Bath, Maine.[52]

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[51]Captain W. D. Puleston, Annapolis, Gangway to the Quarterdeck (New York, 1942), pp. 77-79, tells of the problems in utilizing the sailing ships for training midshipmen for a modern Navy; Robert Greenleaf Albion, Naval and Maritime History (Mystic, Conn., 1972), pp. 71-72, tells of the obsolescence of Commodore Luce's Text-book of Seamanship, the Equipping and Handling of Vessels under Sail or Steam for the Use of the United States Naval Academy (New York, 1895); United States, Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, The Battleship in the United States Navy (Washington, 1970), p. 12, illustrates an original plan for the battleship Maine rigged to carry a full set of sails.

[52]The Lucky Bag, 1897, pp. 31-35.

The Lucky Bag of 1896 described the activities of Leahy's fellow Second Classmen in a manner which implied that the class had not lost its spirit of individuality. It was obvious from The Lucky Bag boyish descriptions, that their previous year, in spite of their busy work and study schedule, had been also filled with dances, pranks and young romance.[53]

Leahy and the other fourteen of his class who had elected to be in the Engineer Division rather than the Line not only took their summer cruises on separate ships for Line and Engineer Divisions, but also took somewhat different course work. During their senior year, the Line Division Cadets took seamanship, naval orientation, naval tactics, ordinance, mechanics, physics and navigation, plus international law from Woolsey's International Law. Leahy's Engineer group took instead, naval construction, steam engineering mechanics and physics. Other instruction courses were the same as those of the Line Division Cadets. Following the passage of the Personnel Act of 1899, the Corps of Engineers was amalgamated with the Line and all course work at the Academy was standardized.[54]

Leahy was not a varsity athlete, and he did not attain a cadet rank in the brigade during his years at Annapolis. Nor was he a particularly

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[53] The Lucky Bag, 1896, pp. 48-51.

[54] Annual Register, 1896-97; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 391-97; The Lucky Bag, 1897, p. 21; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 355-61. The Navy Personnel Act of 1899 also eliminated some vestigial ranks remaining from the Civil War and to speed promotion established a board to periodically retire the least efficient officers of command grade. This act, plus the rapid growth of the Navy after the Spanish American War greatly enhanced and speeded junior officer promotions.

outstanding scholar. In June 1897, he graduated 35th in his graduating class of 47.[55] At the time of his graduation, rank and promotion supposedly depended strictly upon the final graduating position of each individual. Subsequent advancement, contingent upon successful passing of an examination was strictly on the basis of seniority, with only court martial or meritorious promotion capable of upsetting the order in either direction.[56]

Leahy had a solid and popular, if not brilliant record at the Naval Academy. His classmate and lifelong friend, Thomas C. Hart later spoke of Leahy's Academy career:[57]

> It would take a long time to describe Bill Leahy for he was a queer combination. As a student at the Academy he was not good, a little lazy. But when his classmates had a problem, a dispute about it, someone would say, "Let's go and ask Bill Leahy. He's got better sense than all the rest of us put together." That was always true for his common sense, his wisdom, was profound all through his life.

Leahy's four years at the Naval Academy instilled in him, as in all of the Academy graduates a standardized and uniform indoctrination in Naval subjects, with virtually no effective questioning of the "rightness" and worth of their uniformly identical backgrounds or assumptions. God, Duty and Destiny were so obviously on the side of Americans that

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[55] Register of Alumni, 1966; "Native Iowan Boss of U.S. Navy," The Sioux City Journal, June 5, 1938.

[56] Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 361-62, 382.

[57] Thomas C. Hart, The Reminiscences of Thomas C. Hart (Columbia University Oral History Project, New York, 1972), p. 44.

only an anarchist or a madman would have even thought to question them. Nor were the Naval Cadets apparently instructed on or bothered by the implications of the international events of their times. The emphasis was on conformity. Available sources and memoirs show little meaningful organized academic or private discussion of such problems as the Bering Sea seal hunting controversy, the growing internal troubles of Cuba, or the explosive Venezuela Boundary dispute between Venezuela, Britain and the United States in 1895. The Cadets at the Naval Academy, like most Americans of their time, grew up in an atmosphere of comfortable assurance and non-involvement.

Their education well prepared them for success in the American Navy at the turn of the century. They were well prepared for the type of mentality and the kinds of jobs which awaited them in the Fleet. The United States had no major enemies threatening her borders or her fleet. Thus, the still largely provincial, yet technically prepared men of these years were well prepared to man the ships and guns which spread American imperialism in the Far East and Latin America. The very limitations of the outlook of the young officers of the fleet made them effective agents of imperialism.

CHAPTER 3

BAPTISM OF FIRE

The Navy which Leahy entered upon graduation from the Naval Academy in 1897 still operated with many obsolescent ships and guns. America had relatively few modern steel battleships for a nation with growing pretensions for first-rate naval status. Nor was American steel production capacity, or naval shipyard or administrative organization sufficiently developed to support a major fleet organization.

In spite of the increasing impact of Mahan's "battle fleet" doctrines, naval theory in the United States was still too much tied to the outmoded theory of Guerre de Course or commerce raiding warfare. By this theory, local defense depended on harbor installations and vessels while swift commerce raiders would harass enemy merchant and naval shipping. Prior to the 1890's, this combination had been considered sufficient to hold off an opposing fleet of conventional ships-of-the-line.

The naval officer corps, especially the Academy graduates, were still a small, rank-heavy, group of competing comrades in 1897. The line officers, until the Naval Act of 1899 integrated them with the engineers, enjoyed an advantage in prestige over the engineer group in which Leahy started his career. Shipboard life had become comfortable by 1897, with opportunities for travel and adventure, and with shipboard enlisted helpers to make life safe and convenient.[1]

But great change was in the air in almost every aspect of the United States Navy. The modern armored vessels which had been built in the early 1890's at the insistence of men like Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy, Senator Matthew C. Butler of the House Naval Affairs Committee, and Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan were at last available. They were organized into a powerful North Atlantic Squadron consisting of four first-class battleships, two second-class battleships and two armored cruisers--the first Mahan-style modern American battle fleet. The three 17-knot, 10,000 ton displacement Indiana class battleships, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon, with 18-inch armor and 13-inch guns and the larger Iowa with her 13-inch guns, were complemented by the older battleships, Maine and Texas, and a growing host of smaller cruisers and smaller supporting vessels. In addition five more first-class battleships, 16 torpedo boats and one submarine were under construction.[2]

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[1]Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1952), pp. 415-16; Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946), Chapter 1, and pp. 192-96; Charles Oscar Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration in America, 1861-1911," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July-August 1914), pp. 1059-65; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), pp. 52-92, Karsten emphasizes some of the negative aspects of shipboard life, especially early in the nineteenth century and following the Civil War, including brutality to enlisted men, rank jealousy, conflict between engineers and line, and "boredom." However, by the end of the century, even Karsten observed that life for both officers and the increasingly native-American crews had become relatively pleasant. In addition, the Naval Act of 1899 integrated line and engineers and allowed for the elimination of deadwood in the higher ranks, greatly opening promotion possibilities.

[2]"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Miscellaneous Reports," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1897, p. 3; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), especially pp. 1-89, 506-42; Chester W. Nimitz and E. B. Potter (eds.), Sea Power A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960), pp. 344-45.

Perhaps the major factor in the accelerating growth of the Navy by 1897 was the belated impact of the ideas expressed and publicized by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Although Mahan's ideas were by no means novel, his lucid and readable exposition of the basic factors in strategic and naval power had immense impact on the growth of navalism after the publication of his The Influence of Sea Power upon History, in 1890. Mahan was the first major writer on naval affairs and strategy to marshall the full case for a main battle fleet of long-range battleships capable of destroying the main force of any enemy. This reversed American strategy dating back to the revolutionary war, which relied on a combination of coastal defense ships and fortifications plus swift commerce raiders to harass an enemy power.[3] Mahan's ideas took even tighter hold in the American Navy after 1897 with the appointment of his most influential disciple, Theodore Roosevelt, to the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy in April, 1897. In a June speech at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, Roosevelt used the War of 1812 to illustrate the horrors of American unpreparedness. Roosevelt touted naval growth in a variation of his later policy of "walk softly but carry a big stick." He emphasized to the naval audience that diplomacy was useless without force behind it. Roosevelt concluded therefore, "the diplomat is the servant and not the master of the soldier." His preparations for possible

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[3] Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898 (Ithica, N.Y., 1963), pp. 61-2, 85-95, 415-16; William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, 1947); William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, Vol. II (New York, 1935), pp. 429-31, describes Mahan's impact also on German naval strategy and growth.

war with Spain were of primary importance in the success of Dewey's success at Manila in 1898. In fact, it was Roosevelt who had the aggressive Admiral Dewey assigned to the critical position as the Commander of the American Asiatic fleet prior to the commencement of the war with Spain.[4]

In 1897, there were still only 1,508 naval officers on the active list. Line officers on the list included 6 Rear Admirals, 10 Commodores, 45 Captains, 85 Commanders, 74 Lieutenant-Commanders, 75 Junior Lieutenants, 179 Ensigns and 62 Naval Cadets. The Engineer Corps, which Leahy entered upon graduation included 70 Chief Engineers, 66 passed Assistant Engineers, and 22 passed Naval Cadets, including Leahy. Other officer ranks included a Surgeon Corps, a Pay Corps, Civil Engineers and Naval Constructors. There were, in addition, 11,000 petty officers and seamen, plus 1,200 apprentice boys in training. The Secretary requested an increase of 100 Lieutenants, 50 Lieutenants of the junior grade, and 15 Captains, and the additional authorization of a battleship and "a few"

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[4]Theodore Roosevelt, Address of Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Before the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June 2, 1897 (Washington, 1897), p. 20. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin, 1958), pp. 9-12; LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 62-101, describes the influence of the war-extolling cabal, including Brooks Adams, Roosevelt, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, which was strongly joined in 1897 by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan; J. A. S. Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (London, 1961), Fifth Series, Volume XI, pp. 1-21, tells how Lodge and his supporters first persuaded McKinley to appoint Roosevelt to his Navy post; J. A. S. Grenville, "American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896-1898," Journal of American Studies, 11 (1968), pp. 33-47, documents the early American plans for attacking the Philippines; Brayton Harris, The Age of the Battleship 1890-1922 (New York, 1965), pp. 53-54, tells how Roosevelt, in the fall of 1897, used his position and political influence to secure Dewey's assignment to the Far Eastern post, against Secretary Long's preferences.

torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. He reported the total cost of maintaining the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 29, 1897 as $17,514,213.13.[5]

Upon Leahy's graduation he received orders to report to the battleship, U.S.S. Oregon. He joined several other young Naval Cadets, including future Admiral Harry E. Yarnell on an exciting train trip via their Wisconsin and Iowa homes to join the Oregon, which was travelling along the northwestern coast of the United States. They finally caught up with the battleship in the British Naval Station of Esquimalt, on the west coast of Canada.

The Oregon was one of the handful of first-class armored vessels in the fleet in 1897. She and her sister ships, Indiana and Massachusetts, had initially been authorized by an act of Congress of June 30, 1890. The Oregon was launched in 1893 and commissioned in 1896. For her time the Oregon was a most formidable vessel. Her sides were armored with the best Harveyized steel, eighteen inches thick. The 3 million dollar vessel was 348 feet long, displaced over 10,000 tons and was manned by 32 officers and 441 men. She carried four thirteen-inch guns plus eight-inch and six-inch secondary batteries.[6] Leahy and a fellow naval cadet,

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[5]United States, Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Miscellaneous Reports," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1897 (Washington, 1897), pp. 3-9, 36-42; United States, Department of the Navy, List and Station of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy in the United States and of the Marine Corps on the Active List, July 1, 1897 (Washington, 1897), pp. 1-18.

[6]Frederick Stanhope Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships (New York, 1903), pp. 463-65; Leahy Diary, July 1897.

Henry M. Jensen from Iowa, felt "very fortunate" to share a stateroom which measured 6x7x8 feet, and which was located "directly over the boilers" of the Oregon. The room, in hot climates, often reached a temperature of 108° Farenheit.[7]

Nevertheless, Leahy's new life was an adventure as he visited the little Canadian city of Victoria, looked over the British cruiser Impereuse and the gunboats Peacock, Pheasant, and Wild Swan and attended a host of parties and receptions given in honor of Queen Victoria. Leahy and his fellow Naval Cadets were at first ecstatic to be "just out from four years of segregation within the walls of the Navy Academy." They were, nevertheless, somewhat chagrined to find that the British naval cadets, who were their "equal in such small rank as we had," were mere children of sixteen years of age and less--a sobering situation from the point of view of newly graduated American Naval Cadets. However, the round of port visits to activities like the Tacoma Rose Festival, with its pageants and lovely queen, to Seattle, then in the chaos and bustle of gold seekers on their way to the Klondike, and finally to cosmopolitan San Francisco, made their lives enjoyable.[8]

At Port Angeles the wardroom was excited by the rumor that there was trouble with Japan about the ownership of the Hawaiian Islands. Leahy noted that, "we expected at any time to be ordered to the Islands."

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[7] Leahy Diary, July 1897.

[8] Leahy Diary, July 1897.

Although there was no readiness to go to war with Spain at that time, the officers, like all informed Americans, had been exposed to anti-Japanese articles and rumors since the Japanese victory over China in 1895, and her "aggressive" attitude in Hawaii. American expansionists kept one worried eye on China, where a half-dozen small gunboats and cruisers tried to protect American lives and property interests. The other eye was kept on the increasing Japanese population in Hawaii (25,000, one-fourth of the population by 1897). But while the Japanese populated Hawaii and worked its fields, the American colony on that island gained control over the land, fields and political apparatus. The resulting tension saw American and Japanese cruisers nervuosly facing each other in Hawaiian waters, while men like Theodore Roosevelt and the American oligarchy on Hawaii advocated immediate annexation of the Islands.[9]

Fortunately for avoiding an outright conflict, Japan's primary amibtions in China led her to back down and avert a major crisis at Hawaii. Since there was no sequel to the Japanese war rumor, the Oregon finally entered San Francisco harbor on July 18, 1897 to spend several pleasant months in that city. In December, 1897, the ship moved to

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[9] Leahy Diary, July, 1897; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 11-29; Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," Journal of Modern History, 111 (1931), pp. 46-61; Outten Jones Clinard, Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), pp. 2-17, tells of the emergence of Japan as America's "most probable" enemy in the 1890's; Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, Japanese and American Expansion: 1897-1911 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), details the ever growing rivalry between Japan and the United States in the Far East and Hawaii and over later racist American immigration policies toward orientals; Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 53-131.

Bremerton, Washington Naval Shipyard to enter drydock for the installation of new bilge keels to improve her stability at sea. Again Leahy was occupied with both shipboard duties and with sightseeing, visiting and parties. In January, 1898, he again visited Seattle, still a "wide open" town in the grip of gold fever.

Finally, in February, 1898, rumors arose that the Oregon would be sent to the Atlantic coast due to the Maine disaster and that there was a possibility of war with Spain. At that time, Leahy reported that "None of us except the Chief Engineer, R. W. Milligan believed that there was any possibility of war and all of the junior officers anyway wanted to go to San Francisco and did not want to go to the Atlantic."[10]

On March 17, the ill Captain McCormick was relieved by Captain Charles Edgar Clark and on March 19, 1898, the Oregon set out on her historic race around South America to the Caribbean.[11] On the afternoon of March 30th, Leahy and all of those on board the Oregon not previously initiated, had the "honor" of undergoing the traditional Navy ceremonies reserved for those who first cross the equator. The hilarious ceremonies were complete with a "Sea King," his wildly garbed "Court," and even his "queen," Amphitrite. Although the enlisted members underwent the complete "treatment," including being lathered with a paste of molasses, dough and other sticky substances, dunked under water, etc., the officers were allowed to "buy immunity" by paying their "ransom" in beer, a deal

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[10] Leahy Diary, July, 1897 to February, 1898.

[11] Leahy Diary, February to March, 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, p. 466.

which added considerably to the fun of the occasion and, incidentally illustrated the privileges of rank.[12]

The Oregon, making good 10.7 knots, arrived at Callao, Peru, on April 4. She remained for eighty hours of frantic labor, loading on board the coal which the collier Marietta, which had preceded her into the port, had arranged. At Callao, Captain Clark received a message from Secretary of the Navy Long to be aware that the Spanish torpedo boat Temerario was in Montivideo, Uraguay.

Leahy, as one of the two junior officers in charge of the native coal handlers, arranged to work for twenty-four hours consecutively in order to then have the opportunity to visit the countryside. When his twenty-four hour stint was over, Leahy and his buddy, Harry Yarnell and Assistant Engineer Frank Lyon took the primitive train for Lima. The youths had time to see the main sights of the town, the cathedral, and to enjoy one good meal, somehow communicating in their limited French. Leahy also noticed that "The young women had a graceful carriage and have a disconcerting way of looking at strangers with their brilliant dark eyes."[13]

The Oregon sailed from Callao on April 6, 1898, with one boiler still under repair. Captain Clark telegraphed Secretary of the Navy Long

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[12] Leahy Diary, March 30, 1898; United States, Department of the Navy, "Addendum to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898), Vol. 1, pp. 46-56, "Voyage of the Oregon, Marietta and Nictheroy." The gunboat-collier Marietta preceeded the Oregon into each port during most of her voyage in order to prearrange the purchase of coal to be loaded on the Oregon upon her arrival.

[13] Leahy Diary, April 6, 1898.

that if the Marietta could pre-arrange coal for his arrival at Sandy Point (Puenta Arenas), Patagonia, he would be able to forego coaling stops at both Valparaiso and Motivideo. With permission granted, the Marietta proceeded ahead of the Oregon to Sandy Point to arrange for the coal and the Oregon raced forward in pleasant seas until April 15. Then freezing southerly winds hit the vessel and made the bow of the ship at times surge under the waves of the Straits of Magellan. The storm threatened the hugh ship and Leahy described the rocky apparitions which:

> On our port bow and perhaps a mile distant rose out of the heaving sea two ink black projections, upon the perpendicular sides of which the great waves broke into snaky spray that was thrown half way to the pinnacles of their pointed tops. The crashing of the seas and the boiling mass of spray, at first held all the observer's attention, but seen through the driving mist a mile or so beyond was a still more awesome picture made by a rocky black and threatening shore line upon which stretched as far as one could see a long line of curling white breakers....Our ship was driving head on into the sea at a speed of 13 knots, not riding up on a wave and then sliding down as do smaller vessels, but actually driving through the mass of water. At times I saw fully fifteen feet of blue water rush on the forecastle, break with a crash on the forward turret, and throw white spray nearly the entire length of the ship. Under the onslaught of these gigantic seas the ship dove, trembled, shook them off, and dove again, while her great engines with rhythmic beat drove ten thousand tons of steel forward at a uniform speed.
>
> We said she smelled the Spanish fleet. Just at dark we turned into the sheltered water of the Straits of Magellan and anchored for the night in a cove that was protected from the southerly gale.

On April 17, the Oregon anchored at Sandy Point (Puenta Arenas) and began loading coal, having made the run from Callao at the average speed of eleven and three quarter knots.[14]

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[14] Leahy Diary, April, 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 466-67.

The Oregon, having heard the rumor of a possible Spanish gunboat night attack at Puenta Arenas, arrived after dark with a dramatic show, described by Leahy as "searchlights playing on the shipping, and all gun crews at battle stations made a warlike picture." The Oregon sailed from Puenta Arenas on April 21, this time accompanying the Marietta, whose slow pace exasperated the young wardroom officers of the Oregon. During the transit, Captain Clark, still apprehensive as to the whereabouts of the rumored Spanish gunboat Temerario, kept his ship lights carefully screened and his batteries manned for instant action.[15] On April 30, Captain Clark released the hindering Marietta and the Oregon made the rest of the run to Rio at a forced draft speed of 16 knots. Once inside the harbor the Oregon crew strained to ask of passing ships "Is there peace or war in the United States?" The eager Americans received no response to their megaphone queries, however, until the harbor master arrived on board and informed them that "war has existed since the 21st of April." The Oregon officers and men were elated at the news of war, the band broke into the "Star Spangled Banner," and "everybody showed their joy in the noisiest way they could think of."[16]

At Rio de Janiero, Captain Clark was warned by a message from Secretary Long of "four Spanish cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boat destroyers," which had sailed in April from the Cape Verde Islands on a "destructive mission." After purchasing the Brazilian dynamite

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[15] Leahy Diary, April, 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 467-68.

[16] Leahy Diary, April 30, 1898.

cruiser, Nictheroy to add to his little force, Clark sailed out of the harbor on May 2. When the two smaller ships held his speed down to nine knots, however, he left them at Cape Frio with orders to beach themselves if necessary to avoid capture by the Spaniards. Clark then raced on and entered the harbor of Bahia, Brazil to get what news was available. At Bahia, once again his crew celebrated--this time because of the news of Dewey's one-sided victory at Manila Bay. Captain Clark mustered the crew of the Oregon aft and read them his orders from Secretary Long telling of "four cruisers, heavy and fast." This sequence of events was almost too much for the excited Oregon crew to bear. They cheered Captain Clark and they cheered the Oregon. Then almost unavoidably, someone invented a poorly rhymed ditty which Leahy recorded:

> For days thereafter about the decks the sailors were heard repeating "Four cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo boats, deep sea class, we could tow a couple of them home with us.[17]

On May 14, 1898, the Oregon, racing off the coast of Brazil met another famous American vessel and "crew" when she sighted and hailed the tiny sloop Spray, sailed by Joshua Slocum on the last leg of a one-man, round-the-world journey. The Oregon signaled to Slocum "Are there any men-of-war about?", designating the nation concerned with "...the yellowest Spanish flag I ever saw...larger than the Spray's mainsail." The astonished Slocum signaled back "No." Nevertheless, he had the

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[17] Long to Clark, May 1, Clark to Long, May 2, 1898, in "Addendum to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898), Volume 2, p. 50; Leahy Diary, May 4, 1898.

sense of human to signal to the Oregon, "Let us keep together for mutual protection." He received no agreement from the Oregon, which was soon over the horizon.[18]

The race around the Horn in search of the Spanish fleet and battle wrought a strange change among the crew of the Oregon. In February 1898, prior to the start of her trip to Cuba, Leahy noted that the crew of the Oregon was reluctant to go to the east coast on a war mission against Spain. Leahy noted that, while the Oregon was still at San Francisco, "of all the officers on board the Oregon" only the Chief Engineer, R. W. Milligan believed that there was any possibility of war with Spain and that the rest of the wardroom wanted to "stay in San Francisco and did not want to go to the Atlantic." Yet, after her race around South America, the members of the crew of the Oregon were literally raging to "get at" the Spaniards. When it is considered that the crew existed in a virtual news vacuum during much of their trip, it appears that the excitement of the chase and the possibility of impeding battle and war triggered an animal response in the minds of those initially reluctant warriors. By the time they reached Brazil, they were not only raring to go to war,

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[18] Joshua Slocum, Sailing Alone Around the World (New York, 1900), pp. 264-66. Slocum, who referred to himself as "the crew" of the tiny Spray, like the larger, naval crew of the Oregon, "did not think there would be a war." Although he had been warned by South Africans on his last leg of his journey that there might be a war between the United States and Spain, Slocum "had hardly given the matter a serious thought." He "pondered long that night over the probability of a war risk." Slocum finally concluded however against the probability of war or of danger to himself.

but their antipathy toward the Spanish had come from nowhere to urge them on.[19]

The metamorphosis of the crew of the Oregon, who as a group had been free of any apparent enmity towards Spain or desire to fight her, into a group of Spanish-hating killers, during their trip around South America is of special interest. Many writers have advanced theories as to possible causes of the aggressive expansionism which seemed to seize America after her sudden victories of the Spanish American War. Some writers have emphasized an historic American trend toward expansionism leading to the sudden burst of 1898 and after. Others have noted the rapid reversal of attitude among specific communities after the victories of 1898. The American business communities abruptly shifted from opposition to support of imperial expansion following the American victories.[20] Foreign observers also seemed to be struck by the sudden turn-about of general American attitudes toward the expansion:

> Between April 30 and May 1 the weather vane which shows the public breath swung clear around, "...The practical American read the news, asked himself, 'well, why not?' and hung another flag out his window."[21]

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[19] Leahy Diary, February, 1898.

[20] Julius W. Pratt,"American Business and the Spanish-American War," Hispanic American Historical Review, XIV (May 1934), pp. 162-201; Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936), Chapter VII. In both works, Pratt illustrates the rapid reversal of opinion, from opposition to war with Spain to strong support of the war, among significant proportion of the American business community following the dramatic American victories.

[21] London Chronicle, quoted in New York Sun, July 3, 1898, both quoted in Richard S. West, Jr., Admirals of American Empire, the Combined Story of George Dewey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winfield Scott Schley, and William Thomas Sampson (Indianapolis, 1948), p. 309.

One potential cause which has not yet been offered to explain the reversal is that which appears to have operated on the crew of the Oregon--irrational animal joy at an approaching conflict.

After stops at Bridgetown, Barbados, the Oregon arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on May 24th, 1898, receiving telegraphic congratulations from both Secretary Long and President McKinley.[22]

At Key West Leahy saw a beehive of military preparation and excitement. "Newspaper boats" flitted about the harbor seeking information from the Navy ships and a "World Herald" tugboat served to take Leahy ashore for a few hours of dining and mixing with the naval officers and news correspondents ashore. On May 28, Admiral Sampson arrived at Key West, having received orders from Secretary Long to hasten the departure of the Oregon, New York and Indiana for immediate action in Cuba. Sampson was incensed at a later telegram from Long telling him that Commodore Schley had left the blockade off Santiago with his ships for fear of running out of coal. He hastened his own departure and on May 30, left Key West with the New York, Oregon, and the little Mayflower and Porter, arriving off Santiago on June 1, 1898. Leahy recorded the drama as the Oregon arrived off Santiago:

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[22]Harris, Age of the Battleship, p. 22 tells that the Oregon's 68-day, 13,000 mile race from California to Florida broke the previous record set by the clippership Flying Cloud in 1857. Leahy Diary, May 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 468-72; Harris, Age of the Battleship, p. 11, lists the Nictheroy of Brazil as being, along with the ineffective American Vesuvius, the only so-called "Dynamite Cruisers" in the world's navies. These ships used compressed air to propel charges of several hundred pounds of TNT several miles toward the enemy; Sprouts, Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 233-34 describes how, in addition to adding her massive firepower to the U.S. fleet in the Caribbean, the Oregon's dramatic dash around Cape Horn emphasized the training value of such extended cruises and especially dramatized the need for an isthmian canal from the Caribbean to the Pacific.

> The Indiana's band played "there is a new bully that just came to town." The Captains sent complimentary messages to our Captain and we began to think that perhaps we had done something worthwhile.

The next day the Oregon was assigned her place for the blockading and naval bombardment of Santiago.[23]

During and following the month-long blockade duty of the Oregon, Leahy managed to get ashore during side trips which the Oregon made to refuel or to bombard the little town of Guantanamo with thirteen inch shells--an action which Leahy felt "unnecessary and cruel." At least during the duels with the batteries of Santiago, the American ships had themselves been subject to countering fire, with some close calls which Leahy felt[24]

> ...could have made a wooden indian dodge....While I was pointing the camera from our quarter deck at the Iowa, a shell making a more horrible shriek than usual fell into the water a few yards away and deluged the quarter deck with water. I was frightened as was everybody else in the vicinity, but I did press the button, and am curious as to what the picture will be when developed.

Finally, on the bright Sunday morning of July 3rd, Leahy and his shipmates were startled by the sound of General Quarters--the signal for battle stations. The Spanish Admiral Cervera, with the pride of Spain at stake, had been ordered to attempt to fight his way through the blockade of the powerful American battleships. Cervera raced his obsolete squadron out of the harbor and along the southern coast of Cuba. The over-taking

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[23] Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 468-72; Leahy Diary, June, 1898.

[24] Leahy Diary, June, 1898.

American battleships and supporting vessels successively pounded each of his warships into sinking hulks or drove them into the beach in flames. In his diary, Leahy recorded his first (and only) participation in a great sea battle.[25]

> On Sunday, July 3rd, 1898, after the first call to quarters for general muster had sounded and while we were in the junior officers' quarters getting our badly laundered white uniforms ready for inspection, the battle alarm gongs rang....Everybody was surprised and displeased at the idea of a battle station drill on Sunday....The enemy ships came out at high speed, opening fire as soon as their guns cleared the Morro, and by the time we were ready for action all of them had cleared the harbor entrance and were steaming or turning to the westward.... The first two ships to emerge met a concentrated fire from our entire fleet, and the first one, Reina Maria Theresa went ashore about five miles from the Morro, with her flag flying and flames bursting from every opening. About a mile further to the westward, the Almirante Oquando went ashore in the same condition....The Oregon's better preparation for speed permitted her to pass all other ships except the Brooklyn, which had about the same speed...within easy range of our big guns were four great cruisers making a run for their lives against terrible odds. Big red and yellow flags of Spain, floating straight out astern first caught the eye, and then came long lines of flashing fire jetting out from the broadside batteries at short intervals, and for a moment obscuring the flag with light brown smoke of their smokeless powder....Shortly after the chase began, I went below to look over my turret

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[25] Leahy Diary, July 34d, 1898, Richard Wainwright, Log of the U.S. Gunboat Gloucester (Annapolis: 1899), pp. 62-64; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 479-84, also contains descriptions of the chase and destruction of the Spanish Fleet; Robley D. Evans, A Sailor's Log, Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life (New York: 1901), pp. 436-37, 455-57, tells of the old-fashioned chivalry shown on both sides during the battle of Santiago. First, Admiral Cervera personally insured courteous treatment of captured American Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson who had been captured trying to block Santiago harbor with the old collier Merrimac. On their own side, the Americans treated Admiral Cervera with the highest of courtesy and honor when he came on board the Iowa after having to swim from his sunken flagship. The Americans cheered the old Spanish Admiral as he came on board the Iowa. Once their battle lust was satisfied the Americans treated the Spaniards as gentlemen.



Sunday July 3, 1898

Chart Drawn by William D Leahy

> machinery, and finding it all right, returned to the deck to watch the race (sic)....The Oregon and the Brooklyn led, apparently making the same speed, while the Iowa and Texas were dropping slowly to the rear and firing at long range....About an hour after passing the Oquendo ashore, the Vizcaya, upon which we were directing our fire, began to act as though she had lost her steering gear and was unmanageable. Some of us thought she was going to head out to us and close the range for a torpedo shot, but instead she hauled down her flag, and ran ashore, immediately thereafter bursting into flame....Everybody on deck cheered when the Vizcaya grounded and the Oregon continued at full speed after the Colon...our thirteen inch shells were striking dangerously near and throwing columns of water higher than the Colon's masts....When the enemy ship ran ashore and hauled down its flag our men cheered until their powder-coated throats refused to make any more noise. Then they got the band instruments and made a day hideous with noises, but everybody was too happy to care what they did.

Leahy was thankful that "My duty in charge of the operating mechanism of the forward thirteen-inch turret required very little personal attention and I took advantage of the opportunity to see much of the wonderful spectacle presented by a great naval battle.[26]

Leahy's excitement and joy at the one-sided contest with the Spanish fleet off Santiago reflected the attitude of many Americans at that time that war was a joyous adventure. To his credit, however, Leahy usually recognized the human tragedy and the viewpoint of those on the other side of the American guns and bayonets. In contrast to his attitude, the expansionist leaders of America at that time, like Mahan, and especially Theodore Roosevelt, were secure in their God-supported conviction of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and customs, and their concommitant conviction of the rightness of America's expansionist role. They were

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[26] Leahy Diary, July 3, 1898; Evans, Sailor's Log, pp. 436-37.

thus able to rationalize war and aggrandizement as an exercise beneficial for all concerned, and even as a form of game.[27]

By July, Leahy was so inured to the noise of battle that on 1 July, dog-tired after working all night repairing some machinery in the forward turret, he managed to sleep through a furious bombardment of the Spanish positions, with an 8-inch turret firing literally a few feet from his head.[28]

Leahy's capacity to feel and respect the personal feelings of the natives did not desert him in Cuba. On one occasion he met a Cuban officer..."a colonel, who commands the Cubans in this immediate vicinity. He spoke French at least as well as I do and we managed a conversation that was most interesting to me...he was a tall, handsome courteous soldier whose appearance would have been creditable in any army."[29] On July 6th, at Siboney, Leahy observed the pitiful Cuban refugees who:

> travelled in small squads, probably families, old men and women dressed in the most dilapidated clothing, children of all sizes with no clothing at all; and all of them looking hungry and fatigued after their long tramp in the burning sun.
> ...One scene that especially attracted my attention was that of a little barefoot lad, apparently about eight years of age, who trudged cheerfully along, with a smaller brother on his back.

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[27] John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (New York: 1954), p. 31; Julius W. Pratt, "The Ideology of American Expansion," in Avery O. Craven, ed., Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd (Chicago: 1935), pp. 335-53; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898 (New York: 1963), pp. 62-101.

[28] Leahy Diary, June, 1898 to July 2, 1898.

[29] Leahy Diary, June 26th, 1898.

> He had fallen behind the others of his party, but did not seem at all discouraged and smiled prettily when I said "good morning." The brave little fellow is too young to realize that when he returns to find his home in ashes and his father and brothers who may be fighting in Cuba, Libra or Spain, not there to welcome him.[30]

On July 12, 1898, the heavyweights Oregon and Massachusetts were moved into position off the Morro fortress in order to commence a final bombardment of the city. However, the Spaniards, demoralized by that time, proposed a truce, which became a complete surrender on July 17. The Spaniards had no alternative, for on July 7 Commodore John C. Watson had been put in command of a new so-called Eastern Squadron, formed for the ostensible purpose of being a counter-threat to the western coast of Spain in case a new Spanish fleet was sent from Spain to retake the Philippines. The mere rumor of this Eastern Squadron caused consternation in Spain, and the fleet of Admiral Camarra, which was actually en route to the Philippines via Suez, was recalled to Spain.[31]

On August 6th, the beloved Captain Clark, a burly, capable mariner, whose photos record a ready moustachioed smile, even in the thick of battle, was retired and rowed to the Vulcan by a picked crew of his junior officers. On August 20, 1898, the Oregon entered New York harbor with the victorious Atlantic Fleet. The city greeted them with hundreds of small craft surrounding the ships, whistling and tooting and with the Hudson River lined with cheering crowds of people. Soon, however, the Oregon was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard and Leahy was ordered to report to the battleship

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[30] Leahy Diary, July 6, 1898.

[31] Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, p. 486.

Texas for duty. After another round of triumphant fetes and parties given to the Texas by the Philadelphians, the Texas returned to New York, and sailed on December, 1898, for Havana. Leahy and his friend Cadet Morris H. Brown, however, had ideas of further battle action. Leahy wrote that:

> In December, 1898 the Texas sailed for Havana,... At this time stories of renewed warfare on the Philippines against insurgent natives appeared in the news items, and Cadet Morris H. Brown and I decided that we would like to adventure in the Far East. The gunboat Castine (about 1400 tons) was in Havana en route to Manila via the Mediterranean and upon our making application for assignemnt to the Castine...the Senior Officer present issued the necessary orders and we moved over to that ship.[32]

Leahy did not remain on board the Castine for long, however, for in order to return to the Naval Academy to take his promotion examinations, he soon began a bewildering series of transfers and travels. On leaving Havana the Castine transited the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and then the Suez Canal, but Leahy left the ship at Ceylon to return to Annapolis on board the U.S.S. Buffalo in order to take his examinations. He finally took and passed his tests at Annapolis in June, 1899, visited for several weeks with his parents in Madison, Wisconsin, and then spent several months on board the U.S.S. Philadelphia, at Mare Island, California. He then transferred on October 12, 1899 to the U.S.S. Newark, under Captain McCalla, later of Peking Expedition fame, but who in 1899 suffered the reputation of having an unhappy ship. On October 19, 1899 the Newark sailed from San Francisco for the Asiatic Station and undertook a rather leisurely pace for the Philippines. At Hawaii, Leahy passed several pleasant days visiting and sightseeing. On Guam, which the ship reached

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[32] Leahy Diary, July, 1898 to December, 1898.

on November 16, 1899, he found the natives to be clean, friendly, but lazy, and somewhat immoral by American standards. Leahy recorded one story, perhaps apocryphal, but which perhaps illustrated the actual situation:

> Morality as we know it is unknown to them, they consider falsehood entirely justified, marriage was entirely a matter of option before the arrival of the Americans. Our Governor proclaimed that men and women living together must be married, and the natives came in crowds to comply with the Governor's desires. One man came with his sister and when the magistrate demurred, said they had lived together for years and had several children.

Leahy also noted that natives were carefully trained by the Spanish to say a polite "Buenos noches, Senores," to all foreigners and he further noted that "American rule will probably substitute insolence." At any rate, life at Guam soon became sufficiently dull that Leahy wrote in his journal:

> November 18th, 1899...news that Tom Sharkey is now the champion prize fighter, having defeated Jeffries. I don't know why such junk is entered in this journal, probably because it is the only news; it certainly doesn't interest me in the least.

It was with some relief that Leahy sailed from Guam on November 20th and arrived at Manila on November 24th. On November 29th he transferred to the U.S.S. Oregon, where he rejoined his old shipmates and finally felt at home on the Philippine station.[33]

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[33] Leahy Diary, December, 1898 to November 29th, 1899.

CHAPTER 4

SHANGHAI AND AMOY

In 1900, Leahy had the opportunity to observe the workings of the primary rule of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan for the proper American diplomatic-military posture in the Far East--"cooperation."[1] This meant America's self-serving participation in the strictly limited joint military efforts which were at times conducted by the western nations and Japan in China. Their cooperation, as during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was only to the extent of jointly beating down the aspirations of the Chinese for true economic and political independence and to protect the lives and property interests of their respective nationals. In both Shanghai and Amoy, although at the periphery of the major excitement and danger of the Boxer Rebellion, Leahy saw both the positive and negative aspects of international cooperation against the Chinese threat.

The negative side consisted of continuing jockeying for advantageous political and economic position, even in the face of great mutual

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[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," in Atlantic Monthly, December, 1890, reprinted in William E. Livesey, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Norman, Oklahoma: 1947), p. 88, Livesey summarized Mahan's recommended worldwide strategic-diplomatic posture for the United States as "...dominance in the Caribbean, equality and cooperation in the Pacific, and interested abstention from the strictly continental rivalries of the European powers."


Mukden
Kalgan
PEKING
K'alp'ing
Antung
Luanchow
Tientsin
Taku
Paoting
Hsiaochow
Dairen
Port Arthur
Pyongyang
Hochien
Taiyuan
Shihchia-
chuang
Lung
Kou
Chefoo
Tungchow
Weihaiwei
Seoul
Changteh
Chinan
Tsingtao
Kiaochow Bay
Ichow
Yellow R.
Kaifeng
Hsüchow
Chencnow
Hamilton
Hsiangch'eng
Huai River
JAPAN
Yangtze
Nanking
Chiangyin
Hankow
Shanghai
Hanyang
Wuch'ang
Huk'ou
Nanch'ang
Mayang
Ch'angsha
P'inghsiang
0 100 200 300
MILES
Kweilin
Amoy
Canton
Huichow
TAIWAN
P'enghu
Islands
Hong Kong
Kwangchow
Bay
HAINAN

Map of China

danger. At Shanghai Leahy observed first-hand the almost comical efforts of the foreign powers to gain economic and military advantage over each other in order to ensure their own future prestige and power. Similarly, at Amoy, his ship took part in the rapid marshalling of western naval forces which successfully prevented a Japanese takeover of the island and port of Amoy on the pretext of an insult to Japanese national honor.[2]

The delicate balance between American "cooperation" in the Far East and her attempts to gain some economic advantage for her own nationals was made more complex by the diplomatic maneuvers of Secretary of State John Hay. To insure that America, with no established zone of interest in China and with no large fleet or forces could enjoy the benefits of trade and commerce in China, Hay issued his first open door note in September, 1899 calling for equality of commercial opportunity for all western nations within the several spheres of interest in China. Although he claimed that the responses to his notes had been affirmative, actually Hay received only equivocal replies for the nations circularized, when in June, 1900 the patriotic Chinese "Society of Boxers" arose against the abuses of western missionaries and businessmen, the China policy of the United States was a shambles. The lack of European commitment, the principle of the "open door," the lack of formidable American naval and military strength, and Hay's determination not to form any alliances, put the United States in a position of attempting to defend nebulous interests with insufficient ships and forces. Thus when Hay sent out his

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[2]Reverend Philip Wilson Pitcher, In and About Amoy (Shanghai: 1909), pp. 251-63.

circular to the other powers in July 1900 declaring the American policy of "preserving Chinese territorial and administrative entity," only Britain responded and in a half-hearted manner.[3]

Leahy's ship, the Castine arrived at Shanghai prior to the beginning of the Boxer Rebellion. On December 17, 1899, the Castine had been ordered to sail for Nagasaki via Hong Kong for repairs. Enroute however, on February 12, 1900, the ship developed engine trouble and a shortage of fuel and anchored at Shanghai for repairs instead of continuing on to Nagasaki. This, fortunately, put her in Shanghai as the only American Naval vessel on that station during much of the Boxer Rebellion. In July and August, she was still in Shanghai, completing repairs and "guarding American interests" in the entire Shanghai and Yangtze River area.[4]

Leahy's description of life in Shanghai contained in and between its lines comments which may help to explain why the Chinese masses had come to hate foreigners, especially the missionaries, and to fight for their expulsion:

> Shanghai from our anchorage off the "Bund" looks like a European city. The busy commercial part of the foreign city seems to consist of three streets parallel to the waterfront and two or three streets at right angles. Most

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[3] A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, 1930), pp. 62-80, 494-502.

[4] Leahy Diary, December 16, 1899; December 17, 1899 and February 14, 1900; U.S. Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1901, Part 1 (Washington, 1901), p. 537, lists the Castine as arriving at Shanghai on February 12, 1900 and sailing for Amoy on August 29, 1900; John Leyland, ed., Brassey's The Naval Annual, 1900 (Portsmouth, 1900), p. 289, lists the Castine, built in 1892, as having a length of 204 feet, a displacement of 1,177 tons and carrying eight 4-inch quick-firing guns, four 6-pounders and two 1-pounders.

of the big business houses and the Shanghai Club face the waterfront on a wide, well-paved street called the "Bund."

I am told that government of the British and American concessions has been consolidated. The two consuls general are the supreme authority. They permit the paying residents to elect a municipal council which is in the nature of an advisory body, but which is charged with the disbursement of municipal funds.

Thousands of natives live in the foreign concessions, coolies to unload the ships, rickshaw men to take the place of our street cars, servants for the foreigners and the prosperous Chinese, and merchants getting the advantage of a stable modern government.

A consul general is the sole arbitor of differences arising between citizens of his country.

Questions between a native and a foreigner are adjudicated in a mixed court consisting of the Consul General and a Chinese official.

In crimes committed by Chinese within the foreign concessions, and of so serious a nature that the consul cannot assign an adequate punishment, the accused is brought before the governor of the Chinese city.

During our visit one such c iminal was executed... by a method which the Europeans call slow strangulation that is supposed to last for four days.

This one died the second day and is said to have been poisoned by his wife.[5]

The events and reports of the Boxer Rebellion and the seige of Shanghai sustained a continual atmosphere of excitement and danger during the time that Castine was in Shanghai. The social life of the British colony offered excitement of other kinds. Leahy and his shipmates enjoyed the heady pleasures of being apparently accepted into the inner circle of Shanghai's social life. He enjoyed the whirl of teas, dances,

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[5]Leahy Diary, February 20, 1900.

and social gatherings at the Country Club. Even for a provincial young officer from the midwest, the satisfaction that he had been accepted was by no means lessened by the fact that many of the people whom he met had not been accepted by Shanghai society. The grim American missionaries, especially, had failed to win acceptance by the other members of the Shanghai foreign community and Leahy noted that most of the missionaries with whom he had come into contact "are not very attractive."

He was impressed by the fact that "everybody" seemed to drink whiskey and soda and smoke cigarettes and, except for the missionaries, seemed to enjoy occasions like the spring race meetings. At these gatherings, gentlemen riders rode little Chinese ponies, cheered by the crowd and by "ladies in their new spring gowns," who cheered the riders rather than the horses and who were the real center of attraction.[6]

In spite of the threat of small pox, the social whirl continued to be busy and pleasant. Leahy concluded, "I think it safe to say that all the officers like Shanghai and hope for a long stay before starting back to the Philippines." The pleasure of their stay was increased even more when the unpopular Commander Very left the ship in June and was relieved by Commander C. G. Bowman.[7]

At the beginning of June, 1900, however, rumors began to be received by the Americans to the north in Peking that a native organization called "Boxers" had risen against the foreigners and murdered several

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[6] Leahy Diary, March, 1900.

[7] Leahy Diary, February to March, 1900, June 1900.

missionaries.[8] By June 16, they received word that Peking was being besieged by the Boxers and that the Seymour relief column with the American Navy Captain McCalla, second in command, was on its way to relieve the European inhabitants in Peking. The Taku forts, near Peking, had been bombarded and captured by the allied European and Japanese forces.[9] From this point on, with the American and European ships at Shanghai on the alert for any possible trouble, reports of the Peking uprising were received second hand by the vessels at Shanghai, with false reports as numerous as those which later proved to be valid.[10]

With the troubles in the north increasing, Consul-General Goodnow, at Shanghai urgently wired the Department of State in June, 1900 to

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[8] Leahy Diary, February to June, 1900.

[9] Leahy Diary, June 16, 1900.

[10] Leahy Diary, June-August, 1900; for events and significance of the Boxer Rebellion, see Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising A Background Study (Cambridge, Eng., 1963), pp. 194-271; Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York, 1955), G. Nye Steiger, China and the Occident; The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement (New Haven, 1927); Peter Fleming, The Siege at Peking (New York, 1959); W. A. P. Martin, The Siege in Peking (New York, 1900), pp. 31-40; Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), pp. 90-128; Lieut. C. C. Dix, The World's Navies in the Boxer Rebellion (London, 1905); J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager, Being the History of the Life and Times of Tz'u Hsi (Peking, 1939), pp. 246-342. Many eyewitness accounts of the Boxer Rebellion were written by the Western participants. Rev. Chase A. Beals, China and the Boxers, A Short History on the Boxer Outbreak, with Two Chapters on the Sufferings of Missionaries and a Closing One on the Outlook (New York, 1901), typifies the attitude of many missionaries relative to China amounting to almost hatred. Beals (p. 9), a veteran of nine years in China gave thanks that "At last China, conservative, excluded, selfish, heathen China--has overstepped herself, and forced upon herself either permanent dictation of the more civilized nations or dismemberment."

protest Admiral Kempff's plan to move the old gunboat Monocacy to Taku.[11] He complained that only the tiny British gunboat Esk operated between Shanghai and Ichang, that there was one small Japanese gunboat in the port. Goodnow asked Captain Bowman of the U.S.S. Castine, still under repairs and to anchor in the harbor in order to afford better protection with her guns. At that time, the 60 men which the Castine could have landed were the only available American military men in the area. The troops of the friendly Chinese Viceroy were of no use. Consul Goodnow had observed the Chinese regular troops at "drill," carrying spears and a few rusty rifles, and in a ludicrous state of training and discipline.[12] Goodnow again repeated his request for permanent American gunboats, one at Naking to operate between Naking and Hankow, and one at Shanghai, operating as far as Chinkiang when necessary.[13]

Goodnow was not alone in his apprehension at the lack of significant naval power on the Yangtze. In a letter to the editor of the British newspaper, The North China Herald of June 13, 1900, an irate writer complained that "the utterly unprotected state of the enormous British

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[11] Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 4, 1900, June 8, 1900; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 (Washington, 1900), pp. 497, 1194-50, lists the Monocacy as being in Shanghai, China from November 11, 1899 to June 11, 1900, when she sailed for Tangku, arriving under command of Commander F. M. Wise. She is listed as then not only capturing several steam launches and tugs, but also as "operating railroad toward Tientsin."

[12] Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 14, 1900.

[13] Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 14, 1900.

interests, both at Shanghai and the Yangtze River, is a grave national scandal....There ought to be at all times of the year at least one cruiser of the Bonaventure class cruising between Changliang and Hankow." The writer complained that the four tiny British gunboats, Woodcock, Woodlark, Snipe and Esk, capable of only slow speeds, were "in charge" of the entire Yangtze for the British. Since the cruiser Hermione was scheduled to leave the following week for Wei-Hai-Wei, the writer complained that there would be no British ships at Shanghai, except for, possibly, the Esk.[14] In another article, "The Scandal in the Far East," the British writer complained that with 200,000 men fighting in South Africa against the Boers, the British government expected four "toy" gunboats, with about eighteen men each, to "protect" 4,000 miles of Yangtze River with their nine-knot speeds and "six-pounder pop-guns.[15]

Slowly, however, more foreign warships and troops arrived at Shanghai. On June 17, 1900, the Russian gunboat Otvajny anchored off the Shanghai Bund and disembarked 55 sailors, who, with Cossacks already at the Shanghai fort, patrolled the city, day and night.[16]

On June 18, Consul Goodnow wired Secretary of State Hay that "a Japanese destroyer arrived Chefoo today." On the 22nd he telegraphed Hay that "three Chinese Armstrong cruisers arrived here today." Goodnow

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[14] The North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette, A Complete Record of Political and General News..., Shanghai, June 13, 1900.

[15] North-China Herald...General News..., June 13, 1900.

[16] North-China Herald...General News..., June 27, 1900.

took the safety measure of successfully requesting the Chinese cruisers to proceed upstream, beyond Woosung, where they would be of no immediate threat.[17]

On July 3, 1900, the Consular Body at Shanghai published a "proclamation...to all Viceroys and authorities" from the "Admiral and Senior Officers in China" proclaiming that the Western nations in China only intended to use force against the Boxers and against those who were besieging Peking. The joint statement had previously been issued on June 22, by the senior naval officers off Taku, the port city for Peking for the purpose of calming fears and insuring the cooperation of the Chinese authorities. The local Viceroys and lesser authorities did attempt to protect foreigners. The Viceroy of Nanking went as far as to send a letter to Goodnow praising the Americans for withholding their naval fire during the allied bombardment of the forts at Taku and expressing gratitude that some American forces were at Shanghai.[18]

While the Europeans cooperated to the north in Tientsin and outside of Peking for the purpose of mutual defense against the Boxers, their cooperation in less threatened ports like Shanghai was flavored by their

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[17]Goodnow to Hay, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 22 and June 23, 1900; William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin, Texas, 1958), pp. 96-97, describes the determination of the European naval officers at Shanghai to prevent the 11 Chinese cruisers and assorted gunboats and torpedo craft which were located up the Yangtze from either menacing the foreign naval and transport ships at Shanghai, or from escaping into the open sea.

[18]Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, July 3, 1900, July 21, 1900; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 93-94.

traditional contest for local power and spheres of influence. In July Consul-General Goodnow informed the State Department that the local German newspaper Der Ostasiatische Lloyd had reported a promise by the Kaiser that nine cruisers were being sent to Shanghai. Goodnow again complained that the few little English gunboats on the river were not enough to protect American interests and that an American cruiser and gunboat should be sent. However, he reported that he and Captain Bowman of the U.S.S. Castine, the only American ship present at that time, had remonstrated against telegraphic orders from Admiral Kempff at Taku to evacuate all non-combatants from Shanghai. Bowman insisted that such action was as yet unnecessary, and would probably cause a panic. Admiral Kempff then gave Commander Bowman discretionary authority to delay evacuation.[19]

In early August, the pace of foreign competition at Shanghai increased when the British Admiral Seymour asked his government for 3,000 troops. His act triggered a series of countering moves by the French, Germans and Austrians, all of whom started procedures for getting more of their troops to Shanghai in order to protect their own interests. Consul-General Goodnow telegraphed the Department of State and mentioned the 1,200 Americans then in Shanghai and their "large interests" there. He reminded the Department that the little gunboat Castine plus the Princeton, which had arrived on August 2nd, could together land only

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[19] Goodnow to Hay, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 12, 1900; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in Annual Report of the Navy Department for the Year 1901, Part 1 (Washington, 1901), p. 537.

about 120 men and requested more American military support at Shanghai.[20]

The powers at Shanghai, in spite of their shared danger from the Chinese rebels, and their mutual military cooperation against the Chinese at Peking and elsewhere, continued their political power struggles in the Shanghai area. The British plan to land thousands of troops was at first opposed by the other powers, who feared British long-range intentions in the area. The British, on their side, indignantly denied that the importation of their troops implied any intention of seeking an increased sphere of influence.[21] On August 15, the British in turn were agitated when the French newspaper Echo de Chine reported that the Consul General of French Indo-China had decided to send to Shanghai a battalion of French infantry and a battalion of Annamite Trailleurs, plus a battery of artillery.[22]

In August, the British community in Shanghai was further dejected by the imminent departure of the transports with Indian troops which had been originally scheduled for Shanghai, but which were then to be sent

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[20]Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 58, August 6, 1900; "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in Annual Reports, 1901, pp. 571-72, notes that the Princeton sailed from Amoy on July 31, 1900, arrived at Shanghai on August 2, and remained until November 29, 1900, when she sailed to Cavite, in the Philippine Islands; William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, Vol. II (New York, 1935), p. 694, describes the continued mutual distrust among the powers despite their cooperation at Peking.

[21]"The Defense of Shanghai," in The North-China Herald...and General News, August 10, 1900.

[22]Echo de Chine, quoted in The North-China Herald...and General News, August 15, 1900.

north to Wei-Hai-Wei. To the great joy of the English, however, the transports were recalled to Shanghai and on August 22, 1900, the 30th Bombay Infantry disembarked in Shanghai. They proudly struck up "The Campbell's are Coming" with an authentic lilt which made it hard for the delighted Englishmen to believe that "the pipers were sons of India." They were followed in a few days by the arrival of the tough little fighters, the world-famous Gurkhas, to the great pride and relief of the British community in Shanghai.[23]

At Shanghai the Castine and Bowman thus found themselves in the center of an international power struggle in which the German forces insisted that the British did not have hegemony over Shanghai and the Yangtze region. The powers had cooperated, however, against the common danger of a possible Boxer uprising in Shanghai or of warlike actions on the part of the numerous Chinese naval vessels. The allied Admirals agreed to leave the Chinese ships alone as long as they did not attempt to leave the river.[24] On board the Castine Leahy noted that:

> Five Chinese warships are in the river three miles below us. They will probably remain there because the "undaunted" guards the river mouth and if they come this way we will be assisted by the two little British gunboats in giving them a suitable reception.[25]

He continued:

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[23]The North-China Herald...and General News, August 22, 1900; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 94-99.

[24]Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 96-97; Leahy Diary, June 22, 1900.

[25]Leahy Diary, June 22, 1900.

> It looks a little as though there may be trouble here in Shanghai later. We have in the river now one Dutch cruiser, the "Holland," one German cruiser, "Giflon," two Japanese gunboats, three British gunboats and one British destroyer, "Hart," and the Castine.
>
> The British cruisers, "Bonaventure" and "Undaunted" are at Woosong, where there is a Chinese fort and some soldiers.
>
> ...Additional Ships have arrived. One Dutch cruiser, a French cruiser and a French gungoat have come in and the U.S.S. Princeton is at Woosong. We expect the latter to relieve us after which it is said that we may go up the Yangtze River.[26]

Leahy described the plan of local Shanghai defense which the powers had agreed upon:

> Japanese sailors would protect the Pootung section; British sailors Foochow Creek and Hongkew, Civilian volunteers would defend the British and French concessions, and the Americans were to protect some missionaries located outside of the native city.

However, Leahy realistically considered, with three thousand Chinese troops in the city and fifteen hundred more in an arsenal near to the American defensive area; that:

> If a real uprising occurs and the soldiers join as they did at Tientsin we will not last very long. We are counting on a probability that any uprising will be in the nature of a mob, which we should be able to handle with our machine guns. The dangerous and not unlikely possibility is organized opposition by Chinese troops.[27]

Leahy noted the charade carried out by western nations at Shanghai in the face of what seemed imminent danger from the local Boxers or the Chinese Government naval and military forces. With their eyes on long-

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[26] Leahy Diary, July 21, 1900.

[27] Leahy Diary, June 29, 1900.

range political advantage, the "Allies" maneuvered to delay the arrival of each other's troops in Shanghai before the arrival of their own. From the deck of the Castine the entire affair seemed farcical:

> Many people think that the trouble will center here after Peking is taken. No reason for this opinion is apparent, but the large naval force assembling here is an indication that European powers, especially Great Britain, do not intend to take any changes of being unprepared.
>
> It has been said that two regiments of British Indian troops will be landed here to defend the city and that no other nation will land troops.
>
> The French Consul-General requested his government to send a force and the British local officials protested, for what reason or on what grounds I do not know. British residents were pleased with the idea that their soldiers would arrive first anyway and have the possession which is nine points of the law, until they woke up one morning to find that the French concession patrolled by a detachment of Anamite Trailleurs from Southern Asia, which the French Consul General must have had concealed up his sleeve.[28]
>
> August 14th. A shipload of Indian British troops arrived today and according to press reports they are not to be landed because of protests made by the French and American Consulates.
>
> The political situation is quite beyond my understanding but this tuning up of the powers is likely to end in a noisy concert before China settles down to business again.
>
> The newspapers are attacking everybody who might be responsible for the failure of British troops to land, and the French and American Consuls General are getting most of the hammering. I do not see any reason for us to get mixed up in the row.
>
> August 20th. British troops which came into port and went out again have returned and are now

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[28] Leahy Diary, August 9, 1900; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 97-98.

> landing and going into camp in Hongkew the American concession. It is said that the French are going to land more soldiers and that our Consulate had asked for some. It is difficult to imagine what they will use them for unless it is to fight each other.
>
> ...I visited the British camp site finding two regiments, Gurkhas, and Bombay infantry. The famous Gurkha of Kipling is a little man who does not look formidable and who certainly does look dirty....The Bombay Infantry soldiers are quartered very much the same as are the Gurkhas. They are large, better looking men, if their fighting record is not nearly as good as that of their smaller countrymen.[29]

While Leahy's little Castine was enmeshed in the international intrigues and pleasures of Shanghai, to the north in and around Peking, major American Naval and Marine and Army forces were being drawn deeper into the Boxer catastrophe. On August 4, 1900, a combined force of 18,000, including 2,500 American troops started to fight its way to Peking. On August 14, the city fell before the combined British, American and Japanese assaults.[30]

Following the fall of Peking and the collapse of the Boxer Rebellion, international rivalry for spheres of influence continued unabated. The Japanese, seeing the successful British landing at Shanghai and continued Russian encroachment into Manchuria, apparently decided to seize Amoy. In the scramble by western powers and Japan for concessions in China, Japan had obtained China's commitment that Fukien province,

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[29] Leahy Diary, August 20, 1900.

[30] United States War Department, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1900 (Washington, 1900), Vol. 1, pp. 7-9, 33; W. H. Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee (Chicago, 1958), pp. 175-202; Robert Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis, 1962), pp. 137-45; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. II, Chapter XXI.

opposite Japan's new holding of Formosa, would not be ceded to a third power, a concession which Japan treated as a de facto recognition by China of Japan's paramount interest in that province. Amoy, located just off the coast of Fukien province boasted a port which was of great commercial and trading value to Japan. In addition, Amoy offered an invaluable naval and military operational and supply base just off the coast of China and backed by the Japanese-held island of Formosa.[31]

In August 1900, the Japanese, under pretext that a Japanese temple had been burned by a local mob, landed troops at Amoy to "prevent mob violence." This move was vigorously protested by the English and German consuls. The American Consul, Anson Burlingame Johnson, was understandably almost hysterically indignant, since he, as a member of the local foreign volunteer defense corps, was concerned with opposing both violence and unwarranted invasion.[32]

At Amoy, Consul Johnson had led a harried existence from the day he took over the duties of American consul in June, 1897. As soon as he inspected his new post, the efficient Johnson reported that

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[31] Fleming, Siege in Peking, p. 30; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 100; Powell, Rise of Chinese...Power, pp. 90-91; Martin, Siege in Peking, pp. 150, 153-54, tells how Japan came to consider Fukien province as her particular sphere of influence, especially after Russia, Germany and France had forced her to give up the Liaotung peninsula, which she had won in the Sino-Japanese War.

[32] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, January 12, 1899, August 24, 1900, telegram, August 26, 1900, August 29, 1906, August 30, 1900; Johnson to Green, Record Group 59, Area 10 File, October 2, 1900, all quoted in Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 101; "Amoy," North-China Herald...and General News, August 29, 1900, tells that the Chinese rioters were not Boxers, but members of local anti-Christian secret societies in sympathy with the rebellion.

the affairs of the office of the Consul were in unsatisfactory condition and forced his predecessor, D. E. Kemfer, to remain to get affairs in order before his departure.[33] In addition to his constant attempts to make his office more efficient and to secure supplies and some local Chinese clerical help, Johnson soon found that his greatest concern was to counter the constant attempts of the Japanese to increase their influence over Amoy. He reported that Japanese mineral surveying expeditions were on the island and that the Japanese were aggressively attempting to gain control of a disproportionate amount of key waterfront property in Amoy harbor. Johnson emphasized that if the U.S. government "contemplates taking charge of the Philippines either temporarily or permanently" ...that Amoy would be a key port of entry and trade for the Philippines.[34]

In March 1899, Johnson was able, with the help of the Chinese Taotai (local representative of the Chinese government) to delay Japanese takeover of the harbor lands. He reported that his unusual influence with the local Chinese officials was due mainly to his having established an Anglo-Chinese college, the Tungwen Institute, on the island with funds which he had raised from wealthy Chinese donors. Only this special influence prevailed to encourage the Taotai to resist the Japanese demands,

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[33] Kemfer to Rockhill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, June 21, 1897; Johnson to Rockhill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, June 1897.

[34] Johnson to J. B. Moon, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 8, 1898; Johnson to David J. Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, January 12, 1899.

which were put forth with the moral help of a Japanese warship which had "happened" to enter the harbor of Amoy.[35]

Johnson emphasized to the Chinese and their Viceroy that America did not desire any "special discrimination" in her favor, but that she did not desire the alienation of any large portion of the land of the port by the Japanese or other nations. He did take advantage of the discussions to obtain several leases along the waterfront from New York tea firms and for the American Consulate. Although the Japanese ultimately managed to obtain one piece of waterfront property, Johnson reported that it was limited in area and far from desirable.[36]

The Japanese, jealous of Johnson's influence with the Chinese officials, finally established their own Chinese college. Their efforts included impressive opening ceremonies and the gathering of several men-of-war in the harbor of Amoy. Nevertheless, the Japanese could not get the cooperation of Johnson's local Chinese friends for either moral or financial support.[37]

In July, 1900 upon the start of the Boxer troubles, the Consular Body at Amoy met to form a plan of local defense for the little foreign

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[35]Johnson to Hill, March 14 Record Group 59, Despatches from Amoy, 1899; March 5, 1900.

[36]Johnson to Hill, March 14, 1899, Record Group 59, Despatches from Amoy; Johnson to Hill, May 24, 1899, Record Group 59, Despatches from Amoy; Johnson to Hill, November 21, 1899, Record Group 59, Despatches from Amoy; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, p. 153, also contains a copy of Johnson's similar despatch to Minister Conger of November 21, 1899.

[37]Johnson to Hill, Record Group 59, Despatches from Amoy, March 5, 1900.

colony on the harbor island of Kulangsu. Johnson was chosen as the Chairman of the "Committee of Three on Defense" and set about obtaining defensive arms for the strongly built American and Japanese embassies. He soon established a "rifle club" and practice sessions. The local Taotai also cooperated by providing troops to help defend and to maintain order in the city of Amoy.[38]

Consul Johnson was relieved to see the U.S.S. Princeton arrive and anchor off the United States Consulate in July 1900. In August, however, Johnson reluctantly gave Captain Knox permission to take the Princeton to aid in calming even more troubled Shanghai.[39]

Trouble in Amoy increased during the month of August with over twenty chapels and churches being burned in as many days by Chinese rebels. The new troubles were capped when a temple which had been rented by the Japanese for their use was burned and they took the incident as a pretext for landing marines. In spite of the fact that the other foreign Consuls, the foreign community and the Taotai and other Chinese officials complained that the fire was very probably a Japanese-rigged incident, the Japanese

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[38] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 16, 1900; Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 25, 1900.

[39] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 25 and August 1, 1900; "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Annual Reports, 1901, Part I, pp. 571-72, lists the busy Princeton as being successively in Canton, Hongkong, and Swatow, China in July, 1900, arriving at Amoy on July 21, 1900. She then sailed from Amoy on July 31, 1900, arriving at Shanghai on August 2 and remaining until November 29, 1900, when she sailed for Cavite, Philippine Islands; John Leyland, ed., Brassey's Naval Annual, lists the U.S. Princeton built in 1897, as being 168 feet in length, of 1,000 tons displacement, and carrying six 4-inch quick-firing guns, four 6-pounders and two 1-pounders.

Consul authorized the landing of even more troops and guns. This created the danger of either a total Japanese coup or an international clash with possibilities of war.[40]

After consultation with President McKinley, acting Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee decided to send a ship to corroborate Consul Johnson's reports and to represent American interests at Amoy. Thus, on August 28, 1900, Commander Bowman and the Castine received orders to hasten to Amoy and report on the situation. The Navy Department reminded Bowman that the United States reserved the right to land troops to protect her citizens in case of local failure to do so.[41]

When the Castine arrived at Amoy on August 31, Leahy wrote in his diary:

> There are two British and four Japanese Naval vessels in port. The situation here is as follows: Japanese ships landed a large force with artillery and it was assumed that they intended to hold the place permanently as Japan has since the China-Japan war advanced a claim to ownership of this province. When British ships arrived and landed, a great part of the Japanese returned to their ships. Nobody seems to know what is likely to happen next.[42]

In early September Johnson reported that the "most earnest" efforts

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[40]Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 8, 1900; Johnson to Hay, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 24, 1900; Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 26, 1900; U.S. Department of State Telegram ceceived August 30, 1900, Johnson told that the British landed marines and that the Japanese conduct was "unjustifiable"; "The Trouble at Amoy," North-China Herald...and General News, September 5, 1900.

[41]Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 101-02.

[42]Leahy Diary, September 1, 1900.

of himself, the British Consul, and Captain Bowman of the U.S.S. Castine, which was by then supporting Johnson at Amoy, had failed to remove the Japanese. Johnson was convinced that only the presence of the British and American ships and the cooperation of the Chinese had prevented an open clash with the Japanese.[43]

Consul Johnson cleverly used the presence of the Castine and the threat landing its small landing party as an implied threat against the Japanese. By prearrangement with the Chinese Taotai, the British Consul and the Captain of the British ship, fifty British marines were landed. This put American Consul Johnson into the much more tenable position of being able to "demand" the simultaneous withdrawal of both Japanese and British marines on the threat of American landings.[44]

Finally the Japanese backed down and, with the British, withdrew their Marine forces from the shores of Amoy. By that time nine warships confronted each other in the small harbor with their guns and embarked troops: The Japanese Idzima, Takachio Takao; the British Isis, the U.S.S. Castine; the Russian Rurik; the German Tiger, and Schroeder. Another British ship had left on the day that withdrawal had been agreed upon, and a French cruiser was still on the way.[45]

At Shanghai and again at Amoy, Leahy had seen first hand how

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[43] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 5, 1900.

[44] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 5, 1900; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 102; "The Japanese Troops at Amoy," North-China Herald...and General News, September 5, 1900, tells of the panic in Amoy and the landing of British troops.

[45] Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 6, 1900; "Japanese to Evacuate Amoy," New York Times, August 31, 1900, tells of the British ship Isis landing marines and of the Japanese withdrawal.

relatively junior ship captains like Commander Bowman of the Castine often found themselves making decisions of long range diplomatic as well as immediate military importance. Often the little guns and the few dozen sailors and marines on board an old gunboat would be the sole protection for the lives and property of thousands of Americans and perhaps Europeans and the sole guardian of the future strategic and economic interests of the United States.[46] Just as Admiral Louis Kempff at Taku held massive interests of the United States in his hands at every decision, so too Captain Bowman, of the Castine, both at Shanghai and then at Amoy, found himself almost single-handedly managing incidents which could have meant peace or war for the United States.[47]

Even American gunboats carried Junior Marine Officers plus a few enlisted men. The forces which carried the rifles and bayonets of American power were usually composed of both Marine and naval personnel.

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[46]While the right of Europeans and Americans to be in the colonized foreign nations or to carry out their business, military or religious schemes is open to question, there is little doubt as to the efficiency of the little gunboats and the Navy and Marine team to support them in times of trouble.

[47]Milton Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 1-16; Frederick Waite, "Some Elements of International Military Cooperation in the Suppression of the 1900 Anti-foreign Rising in China with Special Reference to the Forces of the United States," University of Southern California School of Research Studies, number twelve (Los Angeles, 1935), p. 3; Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Police (New York, 1962), pp. 186-88, 264, 317-18; U.S., Department of the Navy, Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1896 (Washington, 1896), pp. 64-65; U.S., Department of the Navy, Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States, 1900 (Washington, 1900), p. 76, authorizes the "Commander in Chief" (Senior Naval Officer Present) with virtual carte blanche to protect the "life and property" of American citizens or of American "interests" personal or corporate.

During the Spanish American War, 67 vessels carried Marine guards of from 6 to 80 men, for a total of only 2,000 Marines on vessels at sea. The sailors, therefore, were counted on to provide the loyal and trained hands who often made up the majority of the riflemen in American landing parties.[48]

In the American armed forces operating in China, especially during the period of the Boxer Rebellion, the naval landing forces owed as much to the firepower and spirit of the sailors as they did to the few indispensable Marines. The American warships and these men were the instruments of American power on-the-scene. In addition, due to the problems of distance and communication, they were as often the de facto instigators of American naval and national policy as they were its tools.[49]

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[48] W. H. Russell, "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1879-1899," Marine Corps Gazette (April-July, 1951), pp. 629-30; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Commandant of United States Marine Corps, 1900," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 (Washington, 1900), pp. 1098-1115; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, September 24, 1898," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898), p. 827.

[49] Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York, 1934), p. 316, notes that, unlike the Army, the Navy "had the world for its range," and that naval officers were often involved in the formulation of naval policy. Beard went so far as to feel that naval officers had been "mainly responsible" for determining national policy in the Pacific; Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 3, vii-viii, felt that diplomatic historians too often have ignored the role of the Navy in the formulation of foreign policy. Braisted feels that, while Naval men did not actually dictate American foreign policy, naval matters were often the determining factors in the formulation of American foreign policy in the Pacific during the years of 1897-1909. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 15-16, tells that, in the late 19th century cruisers and gunboats of the small American navy were almost totally concerned with protecting the lives and property of American missionaries and merchants, especially in China and Korea. The American naval officers were often the best and most available on-station reporters for the State Department. In addition, although they were seldom briefed, and were only faintly aware of the massive changes in the international political situation brought about

Leahy's commanding officer, Commander Bowman, and his little gunboat Castine, within the space of several months, almost single-handedly represented the United States and the vital interests, lives and property of all Americans in both the Shanghai area and during the short-lived but critical Amoy crisis of 1900. When the Castine finally left Amoy on September 10, 1900, to take part in suppressing the Filipinos under Aguinaldo, Commander Bowman was convinced that the Japanese, in the absence of tangible American and British power represented by the naval ships and marines, would move into Amoy if given the smallest pretext.[50]

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by Japan's defeat of China in 1895, they were often the effective on-scene diplomats, usually ready to defend "American," "Foreign," or "Western" interests as a whole against any native threat or resistance. Anthony Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat (London, 1967), p. 3, define "gunboat diplomacy" as "the use of warships in peacetime to further a nation's diplomatic and political aims." The authors chronicle the British utilization of "gunboat diplomacy," especially during the nineteenth century, and against weak, non-white nations.

[50]Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 95, 103.

CHAPTER 5

THE PHILIPPINES AND AFTER--YEARS OF GROWTH

By the beginning of the year 1899, the United States, newly confident of her strength after her decisive defeat of Spain, set about to carry out another of Admiral Mahan's precepts. This policy--reserved for those areas where there was no big-nation opposition to American power--was one of complete American dominance.

In January, 1899, the members of McKinley's Paris Peace Commission, on McKinley's instructions, procured a peace treaty which meant the virtual subjugation of the Philippines by the United States.[1] This made two things inevitable: that the United States would do all in its power to re-subjugate the Philippines, under the screen of words like "Duty and Destiny", and that the Filipinos would have to fight the Americans if they were to have any hope of establishing an independent government. On February 4, 1899, just one day before a scheduled Senate vote on the Paris Treaty, soldiers of the 1st Nebraska Volunteers shot and killed two Filipino soldiers, triggering a general conflict. The news of this outbreak was

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[1] Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn (Garden City, N.Y., 1961); pp. 152-73; William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia (New York, 1970), pp. 49-60.



Map of the Philippines

all that was needed to gain Senate approval of the treaty by one vote.[2]

To the surprise of the American would-be conquerors, Aguinaldo's poorly equiped and untrained forces proved to be tough, highly effective fighters.[3] In the face of the furious Filipino resistance to American conquest, the American Navy, in addition to the Army, was forced to augment its forces. The Navy's functions included transporting and supplying the ever-increasing outposts throughout the island, and lending gunfire support for landing operations and such operations as the taking of Manila. The Navy's busiest task, however, was the interruption of the communications, and the supply of arms and supplies to the insurrectionists on the various islands.

Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty transferred fifteen small gunboats to the United States. They were taken over by the Navy and used under their original Spanish names. These and other American gunboats of shallow draft and of several hundred tons displacement were kept busy between the hundreds of islands of the Philippine

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[2]Paulo E. Coletta, "Bryan, McKinley and the Treaty of Paris," Pacific Historical Review, No. 27 (May 1937), p. 139; Paulo E. Coletta, "McKinley the Peace Negotiations and the Acquisition of the Philippines," Pacific Historical Review, XXX (1961), pp. 341-50; Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism, pp. 53-60; Wolff, Little Brown Brother, pp. 176, 197, 213-30; U.S. Senate Document No. 331, part 1, 57 Congress 1st Session, "Affairs in the Philippine Islands," Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate (Washington, 1902), p. 505, General Robert Hughes, former Provost-Marshall of Manila told of the American escalation as soon as any firing was reported.

[3]U.S. Congress, A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, Senate Document No. 62, 55th Congress 3rd Session (Washington, 1899), p. 429--"Brief notes by Senor Agoncillo," tell how Aguinaldo's forces captured 1,500 Spanish troops and took control of the province of Cavite and most of Luzon prior to the arrival of any American troops.

Archipelago.[4] This required so many additional officers and crewmen that in the Spring of 1900, with no major naval power threatening the area, the Navy deactivated all large vessels in the Philippines, including the Oregon, which were not serving as flagships and used the released officers and crews to man the gunboat fleet.[5]

Leahy, who had transferred from the Newark to the Oregon on November 29, 1899, was subsequently transferred to the gunboat Castine in December, 1899.[6] The Castine spent the period from February 1900 to August 28, 1900 in Shanghai, China, during the period of the Boxer Rebellion protecting American interests.[7] When the ship arrived back at Manila on September 16, 1900, Leahy found that

> the war is still on....The insurgents are making just as much of a fight...as they ever did, except in the vicinity of our large cities, where our soldiers are too numerous ....The insurgents are adopting civilized methods of warfare, such as humane treatment of prisoners and release on parole, which indicates that their organization is getting better instead of worse as is usually the case in an unsuccessful war.[8]

In the Philippines, as was to be the case in every intervention

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[4]Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 316.

[5]Allen to Remey, April 12, 1900, Record Group 45,00 File, in William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin, 1958), pp. 71-72.

[6]Leahy Diary, December 16, 1899.

[7]Leahy Diary, February 12, 1900 to August 28, 1900. Also see Chapter 4, "Shanghai and Amoy."

[8]Leahy Diary, September 16, 1900.

in which he took part, in Asia and Latin America, Leahy found himself serving in forces opposing popular native independence movements which were defended by brave, although poorly armed native forces.

While Leahy and his former Navy shipmates were busy manning the gunboat flotilla, other naval officers--the American Marines--saw little action during the first part of the American suppression of Aguinaldo's army. The main body of Marines smarted in inactivity at Cavite. Lieutenant Smedley D. Butler, who had brought a battalion of 300 marines to the Philippines by a journey which started on the American East coast on April 13, 1899, was eager for action. Butler, a first Lieutenant of Company A, under Lieutenant H. C. (later Brigadier General) Haines, spent his time cheering the sporadic broadside volleys of the old monitor Monterey, which lay off Cavite, and griping that the 10th Pennsylvania volunteers "hogged the show," while the Marines stayed in the navy yard.[9]

Butler's Marines had one hilarious "non-action" when they were towed by a ludicrous "gunboat" which had been rigged out of a barge to take the town of Orani on the northern shore of Manila Bay. After a comedy of errors on their trip across the bay during which their forward 3-inch gun fell overboard, Butler's men found an empty town and a full rum shop which made the day worthwhile.[10]

Finally, to the relief of tigers like Butler, the 10th Army

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[9] Smedley D. Butler, Old Gimlet Eye; The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler as Told to Lowell Thomas (New York, 1933), pp. 29-31.

[10] Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 31-33.

volunteers left the area to the Marines. Butler's first major battle was to help take the heavily defended town of Novaleta, the principal approach of which was up a narrow causeway under the sights of the enemy's guns. Novaleta had already cost the Spanish many troops, once a whole regiment, in an unsuccessful attempt to wrest it from the Filipino defenders. In October, 1899, Lieutenant Colonel G. F. Elliott led his 6 companies of 376 Marines in two columns, supported by the six-inch guns of the gunboat Petrel. The eighteen year old Lieutenant Butler, commanding a company in action for the first time, was "quivering with excitement." Butler's company, in the lead, was soon pinned down by intense fire, which crippled his first sergeant. In one of the heroic actions which were to become his trademark, Butler led a wild attack which ended with the fall of Novaleta to the Marine and Army columns.[11]

In December, 1899, Butler first encountered Marine Major Littleton Tazewell Waller, a man who later served with him in interventions "in every corner of the world" until their last campaign in Haiti in 1917. Butler, after his first look at the fiery, red-moustachioed Waller, received a briefing from the older officers on Waller's outstanding record. Waller had been in charge of a landing party of American Marines at Alexandria in 1882, under British Admiral Sir Charles Beresford against the Egyptians of Arabi Pasha. He had also gained attention for his outstanding performance in charge of a 5-inch battery of the battleship

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[11] Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 33-35; Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis, 1962), pp. 121-22.

Indiana against the Spanish fleet off Santiago, Cuba in 1898.[12] Butler soon concluded that Waller was "the greatest soldier I have ever known."[13]

The fighting in the Philippines proved to be dirtier, in several senses of the word, for the Marines then for the Navy. The main Marine operation fell into two phases, first, fighting on Luzon in 1899. Two years later, the Marines conducted operations with the Army under General Jacob M. ("Hell Roaring Jake") Smith whose scorched earth policies subjugated the island of Samar.

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[12]Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York, 1939), pp. 224-45, a detachment of seventy-three Marines, under Captain H. C. Cochrane and Lieutenant L. W. T. Waller landed at Alexandria to help keep order and protect the U.S. consulate after the British fleet had bombarded Alexandria; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 36-37; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 118, tells of Waller's outstanding performance off Santiago in 1898, where his Marine gun crew fired 500 rounds of 6-pounder shells into the fleeing Spanish ships of Admiral Cervera.

[13]Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 36-37. Butler later complained that Waller had not been chosen Commandant of the Marine Corps because "he had not gone to Annapolis." Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 165, saw political influence of Pennsylvania's Senator Penrose favoring the politically well-connected Colonel W. P. Biddle over Waller. Heinl also noted that Waller never overcame the stigma which he was to carry from his brutal actions in suppressing the Filipinos on the island of Samar, an action which took place after Butler had left the area for the United States and Caribbean duty; Joseph L. Schott, The Ordeal of Samar (New York, 1964), p. 283, tells how some newspapers continued to attack him as "the butcher of Samar" for twenty years following his court martial for committing atrocities on Samar--a situation which did not enhance his chances of becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1910, when Waller was a strong contender for the Commandant's job, President Taft, remembering Waller's record in Samar, among other things, chose Colonel William Biddle. When Biddle himself retired in 1914, Waller was again passed over. He finally retired in 1920 at the rank of Major General, but never became Commandant.

By the fall of 1901, it was apparent that the 9th and 17th U.S. Infantry combined could not overcome the fierce resistance of the Samar Moro troops. On September 28, 1901, Company C, 9th Infantry had been wiped out except for 26 survivors.[14] In response to the Army's need, Waller's 315 man battalion was sent to Samar. After sailing separately to Samar with Rear Admiral Frederick Rogers in a converted yacht, Waller was joined off Samar by General Smith, who told him of his scorched earth policies. Smith told Waller, "I want no prisoners. I wish you to burn and kill; the more you burn and kill, the better it will please me."[15] Good to his orders, Waller had, by November 10, burned 255 houses, killed 39 Filipinos and captured 18 more.[16]

In November, 1901, Waller's battalion penetrated the wilderness

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[14]Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 121-23; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 10-55.

[15]W. T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg, 1939), p. 273; Proceedings of General Court-Martial, Case of W. T. Waller, Manila, March 5, 1902, and testimony summarized in the dispatch of the Adjutant-General to Maj. Gen. Chaffee in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the Same, Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Counselors in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 (Washington, 1902), pp. 1327-28, quoted in Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 123; Manila Times, April 9, 9902, tells of Smith's order; Reuben Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism, The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946 (Columbia, S.C., 1972), pp. 89-136, enumerated in detail examples of the virulent "anti-nigger" racism which the white American soldiers brought with them to the Philippines. Regrettably for the Filipinos, as non-whites they were given the dehumanizing identity of "niggers." Smith's genocidal order could never have been given,, carried out, or politically tolerated without the racism inherent in American attitudes at all levels; "Niggers and Dagos," Manila Times, November 17, 1899, recommended that two words be eliminated from the vocabulary of American soldiers, "nigger" and "dago."

[16]Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 124.

of Samar in search of the guerrilla leader, Vicente Lukban. After the most severe hardships and a fierce battle, Waller's battalion, in three columns led by Waller and Captain David D. Porter and Hiram Bearss stormed the Filipino positions. Bearss and Porter later received the Congressional Medal of Honor for their part in the action.[17]

By 1901, American military actions and policies in Samar had degenerated, under the supervision of General Smith, into a virtual extirpation policy against the Filipinos. General Smith, who had risen through the ranks during the Civil War had later learned to deal with "savages" by methods of extermination against Apaches during the Indian wars. On December 24, 1901, Smith issued his Circular Number Six, which blamed the resistance of Samar on the upper-class Filipinos and gave virtually carte-blanche to his lesser officers and troops to brutalize the Filipino populace to whatever extent necessary to force them out of the war.[18] The official record is filled with the stories of burnings, torture and rapine conducted by the American Army and Marine forces in the continuing struggle to subjugate the Filipinos.[19]

To complete the picture of the oppression, on December 13, 1901, a policy of retaliatory murder of hostages was instituted by General J. Franklin Bell during the Batangas Campaign:

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[17]Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 124; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 86-96.

[18]Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 70, 126-27.

[19]U. S. Senate, Document No. 331, Part II, 57th Congress, 1st Session, "Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate" (Washington: 1902), pp. 901-1623.

Batangas, P. I. December 13, 1901

> The Brigade Commander...announces for the information of all concerned that whenever prisoners or unarmed or defenseless Americans or natives friendly to the United States Government are murdered or assassinated for political reasons, and this fact can be established, it is his purpose to execute a prisoner of war under the authority contained in Sections 59 and 148 (of Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field). The prisoners of war will be selected by lot from...officers or prominent citizens.[20]

Waller overstepped himself when, on January 20, 1902, he conducted a "hanging court" of his own on a party of Filipino bearers and guides who had been accused of plotting against a party of his Marines.[21] Regretably for Waller and his accomplice in these murders, Lieutenant J. A. Day, General Adna Chaffee heard of the murders, as did Secretary of War Elihu Root, who was busily trying to defend the reputation of the Army against a storm of stories of American atrocities in the Philippines. After conducting his own investigation of the already recorded and tried Philippine atrocities, and the new Waller affair, the angry Root sent Senator Lodge in February 17, 1902, a list which showed that 44 atrocities had been tried. Of these, even guilty pleas had resulted in little more than reprimands. The one officer who had been given five years for wanton man-slaughter of a war prisoner had his sentence commuted and received a light fine and loss of 35 places in the seniority list. Root ordered General Chaffee to court martial Waller and any other perpetrators of

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[20] U. S. Senate, Document No. 33, part 11, 57th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1548, 1613-1619.

[21] Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 125; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 135-45.

atrocities against the Filipinos.[22]

In the event, both Waller and Day were acquitted. Their senior, General Smith was court martialed for the atrocities which he had fostered. He was "admonished," and ordered to be retired from the service by President Roosevelt. Major Glenn, "expert in the water cure" was court martialed and "admonished," which did not prevent him from later rising to Brigadier General.[23]

As indicated on her itinerary, Leahy's ship the Castine left Cebu to sail for Santa Cruz, on the island of Marenduque to aid in the search for a missing party of American soldiers. When the Castine arrived in port on 19 October, 1900, the U.S.S. Bennington and U.S.S. Villalobos were already there, along with 1,300 American troops who had been landed to search for the 52 missing men. Although the insurgents released the Americans, one of whom had been killed in battle and several wounded, they did not obey an American ultimatum to give over all of their arms. Leahy then joined with the three vessels and 1,300 troops in a hunt for the insurgents. On one dark night he took several boats ashore loaded with a half company of men. Leahy did not enjoy the trip in night "as dark as the inside of a hat," and "filled with odors of the tropical jungle," but all returned safely.[24] The arms were not recovered but

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[22] U. S. Senate, Document No. 331, Part 11, 57th Congress, 1st Session, "Affairs on the Philippine Islands. Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate" (Washington, 1902), pp. 949-51; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 162-67.

[23] Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 168-280.

[24] Leahy Diary, October 22nd and October 25th, 1900.

Leahy noted that "the trail of burned houses left by our soldiers will probably discourage future activity by the natives of this little island."[25] The conditions on the island were not comfortable, and Leahy and the other shipmates longed for "a place where ice and fresh food can be obtained." He was grateful, however, to have "duty where there is some active service even if in the Navy it is limited to acting as an occasional transport for soldiers."

At Iloilo, the Castine was assigned the duty of surveying the area for a possible navy yard site and Leahy soon found himself setting up markers and levels from morning to dark along the shores and jungles of Iloilo. He gained an acquaintance for sorts with bands of chattering monkeys, lizards "four or five feet long," and ants so fierce that on one occasion they left his hands and face covered with blood after his hasty retreat.[26]

On January 1, 1901, Leahy recorded that he feared capture because he had heard that the Padre of Molo, who had been taken prisoner, had been tortured to death by the Americans in search of information. Saddened, he mused

> Such things make one doubt that this is the beginning of the twentieth century. What has become of the knights of our childhood stories, who delighted in battling with foemen worthy of their steel, who treated vanquished enemies as honored guests and who away from battle were gentle souls.

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[25] Leahy Diary, October 28, 1900.

[26] Leahy Diary, January 1, 1901.

> One used to wonder why all the fuss about Chevalier Bayard, "sans peur et sans reproach," who when dying gave half his cup of water to a wounded soldier.
>
> I have been taught from childhood that it is the duty of every soldier to forget his own troubles in those of his comrades, to fight with courage while the fight is on, and when it is finished, to make less bitter the defeat of the vanquished.
>
> My father was that kind of soldier, but in this war there are few sans peur et sans reproach.
>
> The old priest of Molo died under torture because he knew the whereabouts of some insurgent money. Men are shot because they may once have been armed or may have been going to be armed.
>
> I have heard officers and gentlemen tell of how they had prisoners shot because they knew them to be bad characters and knew that a military court would not convict them. [Italics supplied.]
>
> I have heard them tell stories intended to be humorous of the actions of prisoners while undergoing torture by the "water cure."
>
> ...they are successful soldiers, but they are not good knights. One doubts if there ever were more than a few good ones outside the story books.[27]

The capture of the guerilla leader, Emilio Aguinaldo by Brigadier General Frederick Funston, aided by the gunboat Vicksburg in March, 1901 began the slow demise of the guerilla movement, although both fighting and American atrocities continued. Leahy's revulsion at American atrocities stands in stark contrast to the attitude of many of his mates in the Philippines. Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) Yates Stirling, in command of a small gunboat at the time was more typical of

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[27] Leahy Diary, January 1, 1901. The brutal attitude of many Americans toward the Filipinos contrasts with the gallant treatment of captured Spaniards both in Cuba and the Philippines. See Admiral Thomas C. Hart, The Reminiscenses of Thomas Hart (New York, Columbia University Oral History Project, 1972), p. 10, and Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, The Reminiscenses of Admiral Alfred W. Johnson (New York, Columbia University Oral History Project, 1972). Both Admirals Hart and Johnson noted in eyewitness accounts the chivalry and gallantry on both sides during the battle of Santiago.

the American attitude towards the Filipinos. Sterling proudly recorded that, as a young officer in command of the gunboat Paragua, he had helped to round up Filipinos for the notorious Major E. F. Glenn, who then administered the "water cure" torture to obtain information from the captives. Stirling rationalized the torture of Filipinos with the unproveable claim that "the Major discovered and prevented the planned massacres of many of our soldiers. Of course, the method used was uncivilized and cruel, but war is both of these."[28]

Stirling also told of assisting Brigadier General Robert Hughes in the "pacification" of Samar. Because of the notoriety of the "water cure" treatment, General Hughes decreed that "There would be no written instructions of any kind....No high-ranking officer dared to fly in the face of Providence." Stirling and the crew of the Paragua seemed to enjoy their work of destruction. He spoke in almost glowing terms of one foray on the Gumbara River in which "We certainly did a good job on the river. After we finished up, there was very little left to speak of. We burned the villages; in fact every house for two miles from either bank was destroyed by us. We killed their livestock: cattle, pigs, chickens, and the valuable work animals, the carabaos."

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[28] Yates Stirling, Sea Duty, The Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral (New York, 1939), pp. 61-67; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 28-29, 80, tells how Major Edwin F. Glenn, Judge Advocate of the Department of the Visayas, was a "leading exponent" of the so-called "water cure"--a torture would consisted of filling a victim's insides with water from a hose and then punching his stomach and supposedly forcing him to divulge information in his agony. Although Glenn was court martialed for such activities, his career did not suffer and he ultimately retired from the Army as a Brigadier General.

Although the cocky Stirling was impressed with Leahy's adventure of being attacked while erecting a signal on shore, he did not like Leahy's Commanding Officer, Commander C. G. Bowman. Bowman, as Senior Naval officer in the area, had criticized Stirling's eagerness to join the Army forces in destructive raids on Filipino villages. For this, Stirling, who was something less than loyal to his Navy superiors, never forgave Bowman.

Stirling's calloused and racist attitudes toward "natives," like Leahy's much more sensitive feelings, remained with him throughout his career. As Commandant of all naval forces at Hawaii from 1930 to 1933, he devoted much of his time and energy combating the local "Japanese menace" and worrying about the dangers of "racial mixing" in Hawaii. Like most racists a confirmed paternalist, he could never believe that the Filipinos desired independence from the Americans. Stirling, as late as 1939, felt that "under American leadership they have prospered, and as a people the Filipinos are happier and more contented than they have ever been in their history....I do not believe the intelligent people of the Philippines want independence...."[29]

The shooting incident which had impressed Stirling had occurred on January 20, 1901, while Leahy was temporarily assigned to the gunboat Castine on a shore signal building trip around the island of Iloilo. During that mission Leahy and his party came under fire from a group of Filipinos at a distance of 200 yards. Leahy later noted that only the poor marksmanship of the enemy saved his party. After

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[29] Stirling, Sea Duty, pp. 67-68, 74-79; Leahy Diary, November 21, 1901.

a quick withdrawal, he returned ashore the next day with a Colt automatic weapon and 12 men, but only found the remains of the Filipino ambushcade and their small hut. Leahy's party then started a cat-and-mouse game as the native troops systematically destroyed the Americans' signal markers as soon as they were built. The Filipinos left behind notes in Spanish which were pathetic only because the Americans would not heed them. The notes generally said that:

> You have proclaimed our liberty to the nations of the world. Then let us have it and peace will be with us.
>
> More humanity and less oppression is the cry coming from the mouths of the ten million inhabitants of these islands.[30]

On February 3rd, the Castine and the Leyte, after bombarding the shore, landed two boatloads of sailors and Marines, one boat under the command of Leahy and the other under the command of a surgeon, Dr. Curl. After rescueing Dr. Curl and a four-man scouting party from another Filipino ambush, Leahy noted, somewhat with awe, that the brave Dr. Curl:

> ...told me that when walking through an open space ahead of his men he felt some dirt strike his face, heard the report of a gun, and slid for cover behind a tree, all at practically the same time.
>
> He saw and fired at with his pistol one man at a distance of 150 yards just as the natives opened fire from a line about a hundred yards long, extending across in front of him.
>
> His little party...waiting for an attack when we arrived.
>
> Dr. Curl is a good surgeon and an excellent surveying officer, but he says there are innumerable places where one may get shot without being seriously damaged, and is very careless about his own safety.

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[30] Leahy Diary, February 1st, 1901.

The captain of the Castine, was not agreeable to Leahy's own brave offer to take a party of sailors and Marines to "clean up the shore line in this vicinity."[31]

During the first week in February, 1901, Leahy got a chance to observe an example of the American extermination policy. General Smith had decreed that on the Island of Samar, "the enemy" would include all males over 10 years of age.[32] Leahy wrote:

> ...the 39th Infantry...had been two days in the swamp and had seen only three natives whom they had taken prisoner.
>
> ...the one prisoner that I saw was a very much frightened child about fifteen years old. While I was there the Colonel, I think his name was Allen, told the boy that he was a brigand and that he would be shot tomorrow.
>
> The prisoner wept, protested that he was not a brigand, was so visibly terrified, and was altogether such a pitiful sight that I took my leave and returned to the Leyte.
>
> During that day we followed the path of our soldiers, by smoke from burning houses, and the next morning at daylight we heard heavy intermittent rifle fire and returned to the Leyte....[33]

Leahy also saw the surrender of the rebel General Delgado in a scene which shows that apparently only hopeless odds against the well-armed and ruthless American forces, rather than poor moral forced the Filipino surrender:

> Before our departure I was fortunate enough to see the surrender of the insurgent General Delgado, at Jaro, a small town two miles from Iloilo, the general's home and the place from which his personal guard was recruited.

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[31] Leahy Diary, February 3, 1901.

[32] Manila Times, April 9, 1902.

[33] Leahy Diary, February 1, 1901.

> It was an interesting spectacle.
>
> Leading the column was a small party of our scouts in blue and Khaki mounted on small native horses and looking like the tireless workers that they were. Then came Delgado and his staff, followed by the little native army of about two hundred rifles, marching in good order, going through the manual of arms in a way that showed the effect of drill, and on the whole looking like a very serviceable body of native troops.
>
> They did not look starved or worn out as one might expect, but seemed in every way well-equipped for active service where a native can live on the natural products of the tropical shore at all seasons of the year.
>
> Army canteens and Army rifles were proudly carried by a number of the insurgents, trophies of surprise attacks and the driving in of our pickets.
>
> The returning natives were received by their townspeople with enthusiasm and they seemed happy to get home in spite of the fact that they represented a failure, and that two years ago they started out to obtain their "sacred liberty" or die in the attempt.[34]

On 12 March, 1901, the Castine turned over the duty to the U.S.S. Albany, and proceeded to Cavite convoying the Leyte, which had lost her rudder during landing operations on the island. On March 28, 1901, while the Castine was also undergoing repairs, news arrived of the capture of Aguinaldo by General Funston. Leahy wrote:

> March 28th, 1901, the U.S.S. Vicksburg came into port, carrying Aguinaldo, President of the insurgent government, who had been captured by Brigadier General Funston, U.S. Volunteers. The capture is said to have been effected by a most ingenious and daring ruse which was planned and executed by General Funston, who has accomplished what was the dream of every ambitious subaltern in the islands.
>
> It is supposed that he will be rewarded with a commission in the regular army.[35]

For a short while, Leahy enjoyed command of the tiny, captured Spanish gunboat Miravales, which was armed with two 3-pounder guns and

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[34] Leahy Diary, March 12, 1901.

[35] Leahy Diary, March 17, 18, and 28, 1901.

2-one-pounders plus two machine guns and a complement of 23 men.[36] The short experience was not pleasant for Leahy aside from the thrill of having his own command. He had trouble in getting supplies for his small command and in handling the motley crew, which was the dregs collected from larger ships. After one altercation between the Chinese cook and a "bad man of the crew," the Chinese cook was badly beaten and Leahy put the renegade sailor on five days bread and water. Leahy laconically recorded that "the Chinaman disappeared and after some delay another one was sent to us."[37]

Leahy's command experience was cut short through no fault of his own when he grounded his ship while entering the poorly charted harbor of Cebu. The U.S.S. Pampana helped to float the vessel free at high tide, and Leahy proceeded to Iloilo. At Iloilo he was excited to learn from the senior officer, Captain Craig, that his ship was scheduled to be sent to Samar where its assistance was needed. Prior to being assigned to Samar, however, Leahy's ship lost her port propellor while on the way to salvage the grounded gunboat Mondoro, and ended up being towed to Cavite by the Austria for repairs.[38] Rather than wait for the extended repairs, Leahy transferred to the U.S.S. Glacier, serving as Chief Engineer of a decrepit engineering plant, and by the middle of August was on his

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[36] Leahy Diary, April 28, May 1, 1901.

[37] Leahy Diary, June 2, 1901.

[38] Leahy Diary, June 5, 1901.

way to Australia on board the Glacier via the colorful island of Zamboanga.[39]

On board the Glacier, Leahy had the opportunity to visit many ports of Australia and the Philippines, travelling through the countryside whenever time allowed. In December, 1902, Leahy, who had been promoted to Junior Lieutenant on July 1, 1902 was stationed on the U.S.S. Pensacola at Yerba Buena Island at San Francisco. With no war threatening the United States, he settled into the pleasant and busy peace-time rotation between sea and shore duty.[40] He passed his examination for full Lieutenant in January, 1904 and married Louise Tennant Harrington in February. After his honeymoon Leahy returned to the new cruiser Tacoma, on board which he sailed to ports on the American West Coast and Hawaii. When the Tacoma sailed for the East Coast on July 2, 1904, he transferred to the U.S.S. Boston and thus managed to stay in San Francisco near his new bride.[41]

From October, 1904 until February, 1905, the Boston spent a hot and boring period at Panama where there had been rumor of impending trouble. While there, Leahy came down with a severe case of yellow fever during an epidemic which killed several of his shipmates. He and several other convalescents were finally shipped back to America in March, 1905, one month after the Boston had returned to San Francisco.[42]

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[39] Leahy Diary, July 15, September 1, August 12, 1901.

[40] Leahy Diary, August, 1901 to December, 1902.

[41] Leahy Diary, December, 1902 to September, 1904.

[42] Leahy Diary, September, 1904 to March, 1905.

Once again Leahy underwent the peacetime schedule of training and visits to the ports of Hawaii and the West Coast. In October, 1905, the Boston again visited Panama, where Leahy visited with the famous doctor William Crawford Gorgas, who had helped to save his life when he suffered from yellow fever. The Boston returned to San Francisco in January, 1905, in time for her crew to take part in the firefighting and rescue work during the San Francisco fire and earthquake. In addition to his official duties during the crisis, Leahy helped save the house and belongings of his in-laws from the raging fire. In September, 1906, Leahy was still on board the Boston when she was grounded on Pea Pod Rock in the Straits of Rosario. Unlike the grounding experiences by Leahy and many of his contemporaries in the little gunboat flotilla in the Philippines in 1900, this grounding was both avoidable and expensive. Although Captain V. L. Coffman of the Boston was found "not to blame" by an investigating board conducted under the forgiving rules of those times, the grounding offered Leahy an object lesson in the need for care in navigation and piloting.[43]

The Boston completed repairs at Bremerton Washington and again commenced her schedule of training and post visits. In February, 1907, Leahy and the rest of the wardroom officers of the Boston were relieved to hear that a projected tour of duty to check possible unrest in San Salvador would be taken by the Chicago instead of the Boston. Leahy noted that, "If a revolution does happen in San Salvador the Chicago will do nothing but lie off an open coast and try to intimidate the belligerents into letting alone American citizens and their property."[44]

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[43] Leahy Diary, March, 1905 to October, 1906.

[44] Leahy Diary, October, 1906 to February, 1907.

On February 22, 1907, Leahy was detached from duty on board the Boston and ordered to instructor duty at the United States Naval Academy. During a quiet two years at the Academy, he sharpened his own knowledge while profiting from the fact that, as an Academy Instructor, he was automatically marked as one of the inner elite of naval officers. On 14 August, 1909, he received orders to report to the U.S.S. California, at San Francisco for duty as navigating officer under Captain (later Admiral) H. T. Mayo, who had relieved Captain Coffman in August.[45] In September, the California as part of the 8-ship American armored cruised squadron, sailed for Japan via Hawaii and Manila. The high point of Leahy's visit to Japan was seeing Admiral Togo at a large reception, "a very ordinary looking Jap with all his gold lace and decoration."[46]

In February, 1910, the California returned to San Francisco and recommenced her training target practice and visit schedule on the American coast. During 1910, the California sailed between Chile, Hawaii, San Diego and San Francisco on a round of training cruises. In January, 1911, Rear Admiral Chauncy Thomas, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet chose Leahy to be on his staff as fleet ordnance officer. In March of that year the Pacific Fleet was mobilized in the possibility that it would be used to intervene in the Mexican Revolutionary troubles. An Army detachment of 1,800 men under Brigadier General Tasker Bliss was encamped at San Diego, 500 Marines were brought into the area, and the fleet formed a naval brigade of 1,300 men. However, the successes of Francisco Madero

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[45] Leahy Diary, February, 1907 to August, 1909.

[46] Leahy Diary, August to December, 1909.

and the abdication of President Diaz removed the necessity for a U.S. Force on the border. Leahy noted that, "for us this Mexican War was ended."[47]

After several months of cruises on the West Coast, on October, 1911, the California and other fleet units sailed to San Francisco, to take part in a fleet review in honor of President William Howard Taft. Leahy was detailed as temporary aide to Taft, an assignment which did not particularly please him. The man who was later to be the first Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and Personal Representative of both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman observed of his four days of aide duty for Taft that, "While it was interesting and instructive to be attached to the President's personal staff I do not think a permanent assignment to such duty could be either agreeable or valuable."[48]

On 21 April, at Hawaii Rear Admiral W. E. H. Southerland relieved Admiral Thomas as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, bringing with him a staff of officers who would take part with Leahy in the American occupation of Nicaragua.[49] Once again the California sailed for Manila and the Far East. After three months in the heat of Manila, the California, in company with the South Dakota returned to California via Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Yokahama, Japan, arriving at San Francisco on August 15, 1912. Several weeks after their return, a message arrived on board the

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[47] Leahy Diary, February and March, 1911.

[48] Leahy Diary, October 10, 1911.

[49] Leahy Diary, April 21, 1912.

California ordering Admiral Southerland and the California to proceed to Nicaragua and to be prepared to send a landing force ashore upon arrival.[50]

[50] Leahy Diary, August, 1912.

CHAPTER 6

NICARAGUA, HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO

William D. Leahy's early career led him repeatedly to the Caribbean and Central American region. He first went to Cuba in 1898 during the Spanish American War, then to Panama in 1904-05, and Nicaragua in 1912. He later participated in the occupation of Haiti in 1915, and of the Dominican Republic in the following year. During his first contacts with Spanish-speaking "natives," in Cuba in 1898, the Philippines in 1899-1901, and in Panama, Leahy developed ambivalent attitudes toward those people and to what he considered to be the proper relationship of Americans to them. On the one hand he was always the calmly efficient naval officer, able and willing to carry out all orders of his superiors; on the other, he was throughout his career often haunted by doubts as to the motives or justification for America's actions toward those small nations. He never shared the ingrained racism which stilled the consciences of many Americans of his time. His early ambivalent attitudes remained with him later, when he took part in the Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo interventions.

The freedom of Americans to dominate the nations of Central America and the Caribbean was notably different from the situation which Leahy had observed in the Far East. In China, the relatively weak United States had operated behind her demand for an "open door" under which all western

nations would share in the spoils of China trade and exploitation.[1] Leahy had seen during the Boxer Rebellion and Amoy crisis in China that every move made by one of the competing western nations or by Japan was countered by a variety of counter moves. These ranged from the movement of one small gunboat, like the Castine, or of a few available troops, to the more extensive economic and political agreements and treaties which tied China in an intricate web of competing interests. This was not the situation in Central America and the Caribbean. By the first decade of the twentieth century the Monroe Doctrine and its "Roosevelt Corollary," combined with British support to make the Caribbean virtually an American lake. In those unhindered conditions, as in the Philippines, America's "real" personality could emerge. This personality proved to be not the cooperative open door guardian of the Far East, but rather the blustering bully boy of the Caribbean. When a Caribbean nation did not "behave," be it for Presidents Roosevelt, Taft or Wilson, American ships and Marines would descend from their Panama base and impose by force the system or ruler desired by American "interests" on the unfortunate nation. Leahy observed this process successively in Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo.

In 1909, the Nicaraguan strongman, Jose Santos Zelaya, under whose regime Nicaraguans had enjoyed almost two decades of general prosperity, angered powerful American interests by refusing to allow the Americans to gain control over Nicaraguan banking, mining, and railroad interests. Zelaya's independence irritated American Secretary of State Philander

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[1] A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, 1930), pp. 6-7.

Knox, whose policies consistently furthered the interests of a few large American economic combines in Nicaragua. By October 1909, an American fostered and financed revolution against Zelaya broke out on Nicaragua's east coast.[2]

After American naval ships and Marines, requested by the American Consul at Bluefields, Thomas Moffat, aided the "rebel" forces to overcome Zelaya's government troops, Zelaya fled from Nicaragua, depositing his power with the Nicaraguan Assembly. That group elected Dr. Jose Madriz, a renowned jurist, as Zelaya's legal successor. Knox, with his man Diaz still a "rebel", refused to recognize Madriz. Once again American ships interferred with the operation of Nicaraguan government ships against the Diaz rebels, while American Marines under Major Smedley Butler forbade the government troops from even firing at the rebel forces in Bluefields, under the pretext of protecting "American lives and property."

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[2]U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-ninth Congress, 2nd Sess. Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 15, Relative to Engaging the Responsibility of the Government in Financial Arrangements Between Its Citizens and Sovereign Foreign Governments (Washington, 1927), pp. 1-2, 42 [hereafter cited as "Hearings, 1927"];"Hearings, 1927," pp. 1-62; Burton K. Wheeler, "Why Are We in Nicaragua?", originally published in Volume 11, Number 5 of the May 1928 issue of Plain Talk, and reprinted in Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 521-22, April 16, 1928; General Raphael de Nogales, The Looting of Nicaragua (New York, 1966), p. 8; Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States 1910-20 (Baltimore, 1942), pp. 384-90, 395, 462; Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1934), pp. 170-73; U.S. Department of State, The United States and Nicaragua, A Survey of the Relations from 1909 to 1932 (Washington, 1932), pp. 6-7; Wheeler, "Why Are We in Nicaragua?", pp. 521-22; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), pp. 171-78.

Madriz, helpless against the American forces, soon was "defeated" by the Diaz forces, who entered the capital, Managua, on August 28, 1910.[3]

Yet popular opposition to the American imposed regime of "President" Estrada and "Vice President" Diaz continued. With Knox's approval, the American minister to Nicaragua, Elliott Northcott, demanded that Estrada resign and turn over the presidency to Adolfo Diaz. The frightened Estrada fled Nicaragua in May 1911, and at last Diaz, who had evidently been Knox's chosen puppet from the beginning of hostilities in 1909 was installed in the presidency.[4]

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[3]U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909 (Washington, 1909), pp. 452, 455-56; Hearings, 1927, pp. 2, 33, 34-36; The United States and Nicaragua, 1909 to 1932, pp. 6-7, 9; Beard, Idea of National Interest, pp. 177, 371-73, discusses the almost mystical use of the term "American lives and property" as a shibboleth to justify interventions during America's imperial years; U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910 (Washington, 1910), pp. 746-47, 753, 729; Harold Norman Denny, Dollars for Bullets, The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York, 1929), pp. 115-20, tells of the use by Taft and Knox of the term "Zelayism" to refer to any popular, liberal forces who opposed Knox's puppet Diaz; see also, "Nicaragua Policy is Growth of Years," New York Times, July 22, 1928; Smedley D. Butler, Old Gimlet Eye; The Advantures of Smedley D. Butler as Told to Lowell Thomas (New York, 1933), pp. 127-28; Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 183-86, tells how the American gunboat Paducah prevented the effective operation of the Nicaraguan government gunboats against the Diaz-Estrada forces. The Americans refused to allow the legal government forces to collect customs even after they had captured their own customs houses.

[4]U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington, 1911), p. 655; Hearings, 1927, p. 38; A. A. Vandegrift, Once a Marine; The Memoirs of General A. A. Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps, as Told to Robert B. Asprey (New York, 1964), p. 38; Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 190-211.

With Diaz openly in power in Nicaragua, the American State Department had little further difficulty in negotiating a treaty to establish an American customs collectorship similar to that in the Dominican Republic, and identical to one which had been signed with Honduras five months before. The treaties were so obviously unfair that Congress did not even call up the Honduran treaty for action due to Democratic opposition, and in spite of Taft's strong support. Nor did Congress consider the Nicaraguan treaty before its adjournment. In May 1912, tie votes in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked the end of any chance that Knox's efforts to promote the two treaties would be successful.[5]

Major Smedley Butler had doubts as to the honesty or justice of Knox's actions. Butler wrote:

> Adolfo Diaz was running the revolution. He was secretary and treasurer of La Luz Mining Company in which Philander C. Knox, then our Secretary of State was reported to own stock. Juan J. Estrada, a carpenter who had become governor of the province in which Bluefields was located, was selected to be provincial president of the new government if the revolution was successful.[6]

Nicaraguan politics in 1911 then became a struggle, with the forces of Knox and the American business interests, who backed Diaz and his

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[5] Munroe, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 192-93, 203; Hearings, 1927, p. 2, also quoted in Beard, Idea of National Interest, p. 175; Foreign Relations, 1909, pp. 452ff., quoted by Beard tells of executing two American "dynamiters"; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 79 quotes Estrada in an interview in New York that "American commercial interests" gave $1,000,000 to the Estrada-Diaz revolution against Zelaya and Madriz.

[6] Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 227; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), p. 162, 413 n. 47, grants that they had the right to try the Americans by military tribunal; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 655-60.

conservative regime in power, versus the efforts of the popular Liberal party to regain control.

The Nicaraguan Constituent Assembly in a last-ditch effort to escape from the Knox-Diaz interests, elected General Luis Mena as President for a constitutional term to begin January 1, 1913, and extending to January 31, 1916. General Mena, well aware of Knox's determination to keep Diaz in power, first tried to occupy Managua, the capital, but was foiled by the troops of Diaz's General Chamorro. Mena then withdrew from the city to Masaya, where he was joined by his son, commander of an army barracks at Granada and by most of the army and many sympathetic Liberals.[7]

For the third time the combination of American financial and diplomatic power plus naval and marine support was used to save the fortunes of the puppet, Adolfo Diaz. By this time Diaz was the "legitimate" president of Nicaragua, rather than a clerk-revolutionary as in 1909. Knox had replaced Minister Northcott and his successor, Chargé Gunther, with George T. Weitzel, former assistant head of the U.S. State Department's Latin American Division. Weitzel was thus in a position to intimately know and carry out Knox's wishes in Nicaragua.[8]

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[7] Foreign Relations, 1911 (October 6), p. 668, Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 204-05; Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 38.

[8] U.S., Department of State, Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912, p. 594; Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 190-211, describes Minister Weitzel's murderous hatred of the Liberals in Nicaragua, the leaders of whom he wanted to hang. Weitzel's influence and the presence of the American armed forces insured an "election in 1911, which was so slanted toward Diaz that the Liberals refused to participate."

The die was cast for William D. Leahy's participation in the 1912 American intervention when the new Minister Weitzel relayed a complaint to Knox from the "American corporation owning the railway which runs from Corinto to Granada and certain steamships on the island waters of Nicaragua," that Mena's followers had commandeered several of the company's vessels to bombard the "unfortified" town of San Jorge. The government of Nicaragua (Diaz) had, not surprisingly, informed Weitzel that it could not protect "American lives and property." Knox suggested that Taft authorize the sending of three hundred and fifty marines from Panama. Taft granted the request.[9]

In August, 1912, a cipher telegram arrived from Washington ordering Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, on board Leahy's ship the California to proceed as soon as possible to Corinto, Nicaragua and to be prepared to send a landing force ashore upon arrival.[10] This marked the beginning of William D. Leahy's participation in the 1912 American intervention in Nicaragua. During the intervention Leahy was repeatedly struck with the unpopularity and the rapicity of the Conservative Diaz regime and by the obvious fact that it had been set up only by the aid of indispensable American political and military support.[11]

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[9] Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 993-1022, 1027-33, describes the direct interference of Knox and his on-the-scene agents at Managua, in demanding the retention of Diaz in accordance with the "Dawson Agreements" of 1910, in which U.S. Plenipotentiary Thomas C. Dawson had insured the "election" of Estrada and Diaz as President and Vice-President of Nicaragua.

[10] Leahy Diary, August, 1912.

[11] Leahy Diary, August to October, 1912; Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (Hamden, Conn., 1964), pp. 250-53. Former Secretary of State Elihu Root

As the U.S.S. California, other naval vessels and marine units converged on the Port of Corinto, the American Consul at Cornito James Weldon Johnson, found himself heavily dependent on a small American ship, the U.S.S. Annapolis, and her few sailors and guns. On July 31, 1912, as soon as she received the report of General Mena's revolt against American-backed President Diaz, the U.S.S. Annopolis, on routine patrol duty on the west coast of Central America proceeded to Corinto. On August 1, on the recommendation of President Diaz, and American Minister Weitzel at Managua, Commander W. J. Terhune, Commanding Officer of the Annapolis, disembarked ninety seamen and five officers. These men left for Managua by railroad and reached Managua on August 4. Captain Terhune left Lieutenant Junior Grade J. W. Lewis in acting command of the Annapolis and also in charge of the few sailors left at Corinto. On August 6, Terhune reported from Managua, that his force was "comfortably situated" in the American Legation, but the rebel force numbered 2,000 versus 950 loyal government troops at Managua.[12] Also, on the urgent recommendation

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by 1913 had developed strong reservations that the United States was unduly restricting the independence and freedom of action (i.e., the sovereignty) of the Latin American nations. On January 7th, 1915, Root wrote that he questioned whether the Nicaraguan government was representative of the Nicaraguan people and that it was apparently "maintained in office by the presence of United States Marines in Managua"; "What Are We Doing in Nicaragua?", The World, September 2, 1912, criticizes both the motive and right of Taft and Knox to invade Nicaragua in support of private American commercial interests.

[12]U.S.S. Annapolis, Ship's Log, July 6, 1912, July 31, 1912, August 1, 1912; Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1036; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1912 (Washington, 1913), p. 12; Terhune to Navy Department, August 6, 7, 1912.

of Mr. Weitzel, 338 Marines and 10 Marine officers under Major Smedley Butler were dispatched from Panama on the collier U.S.S. Justin. They arrived at Managua on August 15 to reinforce the legation guard previously sent by the Annapolis.[13]

On August 3, Consul Johnson cooperated in the landing from the Annapolis of Commander Terhune's initial small legation guard. On the fourteenth of August he was relieved to see the Justin arrive with Major Smedley Butler and three hundred and forty-six more marines from Panama.[14]

After Butler moved inland, Johnson with the help of young Lieutenant Lewis of the Annapolis, and the little force of sailors, tried to maintain control and order at Corinto. Starting on August 16, 1912, he was plagued by the presence of Dr. Toribo Tijerino, Diaz's personal representative in Corinto and the surrounding area. Tijerino had left his force of 300 troops at Paso Caballos, but reported insurgent victories at Leon, and supposed atrocities committed by the insurgents during the fighting.[15]

Tijerino's reports created wild excitement at Corinto. Consul Johnson and Lieutenant Lewis took a six-pounder gun from the Annapolis and mounted it on a railroad flatcar with a small crew of sailors. The

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[13] Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1032-33. U.S., Marine Corps, "Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1912 (Washington, 1913), p. 582.

[14] James Weldon Johnson, Along This Way, The Autobiography of James Weldon Johnson (New York, 1933), pp. 276-77.

[15] Johnson, Along This Way, pp. 277-78.

flatcar was placed at the junction of the railroad and the main street of Corinto, and a machine gun was manned at a commanding corner of the custom house.[16] The lonely Johnson, backed by Lieutenant Lewis' 20 sailors stood up to the bullying of Tijerino, who attempted to take over control of Corinto in Diaz's name. After several stormy sessions, Consul Johnson and Lieutenant Lewis, who at one point "arrested" Tijerino, finally gained his grudging cooperation.[17] On the afternoon of August 12, Johnson was relieved to see the U.S.S. Denver arrive at Corinto. On the next day, William D. Leahy's ship, the U.S.S. California arrived, with Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on board.[18]

Now the ships of the U.S. Navy began to converge on Nicaragua. The U.S.S. Tacoma landed fifty men at Bluefields on the east coast of Nicaragua and herself remained off Bluefields from August 6, until October 19, 1912.[19] Also in view of the increasing possibility of victory of the Liberal forces of General Mena, an additional regiment of marines, consisting of 29 officers and 750 men sailed from Philadelphia on board the U.S.S. Prairie.[20] Soon the supply vessel Glacier and the colliers

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[16] James Weldon Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book, Corinto, Nicaragua, from July 29th to November 14, 1912," in James Weldon Johnson's Collection, Bieneke Library, Yale University, August 18, 1912 entry; Johnson, Along This Way, p. 278.

[17] Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book," August 18, 20, 1912; Johnson, Along This Way, pp. 280-81.

[18] Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book," August 27, 28, 1912; Johnson, Along This Way, p. 286.

[19] "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912," p. 12.

[20] "Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps," 1912, p. 582.

Prometheus and Saturn arrived at Corinto. The final arrivals were the Colorado and Cleveland, bringing an overwhelming naval force to Nicaragua. The virtual army of sailors and marines ashore came to a total of 2,350.[21]

On the afternoon of August 28, Admiral Southerland transferred to the Annapolis, which had tied up alongside the pier at Corinto. Late on the evening of the 28th, the landing force and a one-pounder gun was transferred from the California to the U.S.S. Annapolis.[22] A battalion of five companies of sailors and marines were also landed. This force, together with men from the Annapolis, was to take and hold the railroad line between Corinto and Leon. Commander W. J. Terhune was given overall command of the expeditionary force consisting of the California contingent of 300 men, a company from Annapolis of 70 men, a 60-man company from the Denver and 350 marines whom Smedley Butler had left at Leon to safeguard his communications and the railway routes.[23]

On August 29, the same day that Admiral Southerland officially shifted his staff to the U.S.S. Annapolis, the Admiral sent the California to Panama to pick up the marine expeditionary force under Colonel Joseph

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[21]"Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912," p. 13; Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1051-52; Ship's Log, U.S.S. California, August 28, 1912; Taft to State Department/War Department, August 27, 28, 30, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs in Nicaragua, 1910-1929 shows an exchange of notes between Taft and the Secretaries of War and State in which Taft, who first considered sending the 10th U.S. Infantry Regiment to Nicaragua, was advised by the Secretary of War, that Marines should be sent since the sending of Regular Army troops would result in international complications.

[22]Ship's Log, U.S.S. California, August 28, 1912; Ship's Log, U.S.S. Annapolis, August 28, 1912.

[23]Leahy Diary, August 28, 1912.

Map of Nicaragua

Pendleton. He sent the Denver south to San Juan del Sur to protect the cable station there and to relay wireless messages. Admiral Southerland appointed Lieutenant Commander Major of his staff to be in charge of the railroad and appointed Leahy to be in command of Corinto and its defenses. With the California and Denver gone, Leahy and Consul Johnson faced a rumored attack with a total local defense force of twenty sailors, a steam launch, and a boat gun. Luckily, the rebel attack never materialized.

Admiral Southerland had planned to merely seize and hold control of the railroad, which in itself would have crippled the revolution. However, after receiving orders from Washington to take a definite stand to support the Diaz regime, he took a more aggressive attitude.[24] Leahy noted:

> ...later orders from Washington directed us to take a definite stand on the side of the existing government which has resulted in disarming the rebels and supporting a weak unpopular tyrannical government, against which the people will in self defense take up arms again as soon as we leave the country.[25]

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[24]Wilson to Taft, August 30, 1912 and September 23, 1912, National Archives, State Department Files, both quoted in Richard Turk, "United States Naval Policy in the Caribbean, 1865-1913" (unpublished dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 1968), pp. 175-77, 205, tells of the anger of Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, an ardent Diaz booster, at the intention of Admiral Southerland to stay strictly neutral. Southerland was thus ordered by Secretary of the Navy Meyer to "keep the railroad open without interruption" for the government forces, which meant that Southerland was forced to oppose the Liberal revolutionists who controlled major cities on the railroad.

[25]Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 208-09, tells of Weitzel's murderous hatred of the rebels and of Diaz's and Weitzel's influence on Washington's aggressive anti-Liberal policy in Nicaragua; Leahy Diary, September 1912.

When the American expeditionary force reached Leon, the ever-cautious Terhune, hearing of the presence of a large body of rebel troops, camped his force at a bridge nearby. When Colonel Pendleton's 750 marines arrived at Corinto, however, they were sent through Leon and into temporary camp beyond the city. Admiral Caperton's forces were then divided into districts throughout Nicaragua: Corinto to Paso Caballos under the command of Lieutenant Commander William D. Leahy; Paso Caballos to Leon under Commander Terhune, and all beyond Leon under the command of Colonel Pendleton. Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Long, with a company of marines was camped near Leon. Leahy's first trip on the rickety railroad was a fourteen mile haul to Leon to deliver the command assignments. His train "stalled on grades, pulled draw bars, broke through culverts, and ran off the rails." Leahy also noted that

> During the first four days work of the expeditionary force in getting trains through to Leon, the officers and men were continuously employed day and night on outpost duty and railroad repair work. Few of them had their shoes off for four days. Major Hill, Aide to Terhune, broke down from heat exhaustion and was brought back to the "Glacier" where he attempted to commit suicide. He has since recovered and is back on duty in Leon.[26]

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[26] Leahy Diary, September 1912; A. A. Vandegrift, Once A Marine; The Memoirs of General A. A. Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps, as Told to Robert B. Asprey (New York, 1964), pp. 36-41. Vandegrift related how, in view of the all-important military value of railroads, especially in the rugged and poorly developed Latin American nations, Major Smedley Butler spent much imagination and effort in training his Panama-based battalion in every phase of railroading, from engineering to track laying. The constant training paid off when Butler's battalion and other marine and naval forces were forced to not only capture, but repair and operate the Nicaraguan west coastal railway, the main supply and military artery of that nation; U.S., Department of State, The United States and Nicaragua, 1909 to 1932, p. 1 noted that about seven-eighths of the population of Nicaragua and about the same proportion of the national wealth were on the western side of of Nicaragua. All of the major cities of the country, Corinto, Granada, Leon, and Managua, were also located on the key western railway.

With the railroad in operation between Corinto and Leon, Admiral Southerland expanded his operation by sending Major Butler with his Marines and a group of Annapolis sailors to take the city of Granada, at the southern-most end of the railroad and on the shores of Lake Nicaragua. Once again, Butler, although barely able to stand with a malarial fever of 104, faced the rebels under General Zeledon, who controlled the key town of Masaya, between Managua and Granada. Zeledon's forces did what they could to stall the advance of Butler's train, including putting milkweed on the tracks to make them too slippery for the train to climb the slopes leading through Masaya. Zeledon's forces controlled the tracks through Masaya from trenches on the slopes of two opposing hills "Coyotepi," and "Barranca." They engaged in a sharp fire-fight with Butler's force, wounding five of Butler's men and capturing three.

Butler, who loved the excitement of battle described the scene when his train worked its way through the center of Masaya:

> I yelled to our men to shoot. Sixteen machine guns were mounted on the roofs of the cars. The Marines blazed away...the native engineer frightened to death had crawled under the seat....I climbed into the fireman's seat and leaned out of the cab window. It was a gorgeous spectacle. A sheet of fire was spitting into the darkness on both sides of the road. Four hundred Marine rifles were popping with tongues of flame, the sixteen machine guns were rapping out a stacatto beat, the engines were screaming and puffing all in one narrow little street while the natives shot back at us from both sides of the road. The whole performance lasted only about twenty minutes.[27]

Butler, who found that he had three men missing after the battle,

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[27] Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Vandegrift, Once A Marine, p. 41; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 151-56.

angrily demanded the immediate release of his men on the threat of taking the town. His demand was granted and the three men were released by the rebels. Finally free to get at General Mena, who was at Granada, Butler continued his train trip to Granada, taking over five more days to reach the city.[28]

Once Butler had safely passed Masaya, Admiral Southerland decided that he could direct operations best from Managua. He left Leahy to handle all staff work and local defenses at Corinto and took the rest of the staff to Managua. Since Southerland took along Lieutenant Commander Major, the harassed Leahy found that he had also inherited Major's responsibility for the Corinto end of the railroad, a duty which proved to be the "most trying and least satisfactory part of my work."[29] He had reason to be sure of Admiral Southerland's satisfaction with his performance at Corinto when on September 20th, Southerland wrote an official letter to Captain W. A. Gill, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Colorado and Senior Officer present at Corinto:

> My Dear Captain Gill:
>
> Please send the following to the Department. 'Sec. Nav. Washington'
> Lieutenant Commander Leahy is in command of Corinto and the defenses thereof and at his own request will not be detached until the present situation has cleared. He is a valuable officer and I need his services. Southerland, please show this to Leahy before you send it, and direct Commander Washington to put it in code.[30]

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[28] Leahy Diary, August, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 157.

[29] Leahy Diary, August, 1912.

[30] Leahy Diary, September, 1912; William D. Leahy, "Officer Fitness Reports,

While in charge of naval forces at Corinto, Leahy, like Lieutenant Lewis before him, worked in close conjunction with the black American Consul at Corinto, James Weldon Johnson. Johnson, intelligent and capable, greatly impressed Leahy, who noted that, "The United States Consul at Corinto, Mr. Johnson, an American negro was of daily assistance to me in my command of the town and in the staff work. One is accustomed to expect little of United States Consuls and almost as little of Negroes, but this one is a man of excellent judgement, and well fitted for his post made difficult by our occupation of the country."[31] Regrettably for Johnson, the racism and Democratic party spoilsmanship of the Wilson-Bryan regime cost him his appointment to the State Department. Under Bryan, the Department refused to confirm President Taft's previous re-appointment of Johnson to a post in the Azores. The State Department's loss was America's gain in other ways as Johnson went on to a varied and highly productive career as a writer, poet, Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, fighter for black rights, and Professor in Creative Literature at Fisk University.[32]

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for the periods April 12th to September 30th, and from September 30th to October 18, 1912," signed by Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Commanding U.S. Pacific Fleet, describe Leahy's duties as being "Military Governor of Corinto, Nicaragua...assisted in the management of the railroad from Corinto to Granada. These duties were performed in the most thorough and satisfactory manner possible...an exceptionally able man...a man of marked ability."

[31] Leahy Diary, September, 1912, October 18, 1912.

[32] "Johnson Resigns From the Service," in The New York Age, September 25, 1913; John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, A History of Negro Americans (New York, 1967), pp. 486, 501-03, 510, 513; Johnson, Along This Way.

While Leahy and Johnson were busy at Corinto, Butler finally reached Granada. He decided, showman as always, to impress General Mena with the vast horde of Marines in his small force. Camping at a small railroad station just outside Granada, Butler rigged his two guns under canvas to make them appear to be heavy artillery, and arranged his 400 men around himself in such a manner as to appear to be an overwhelming force to Mena's emissaries. He even had himself mounted on a raised platform like an oriental potentate to appear more foreboding. Apparently impressed, on September 22, 1912, Mena signed his "X" to a paper sent him by Butler, in which Mena agreed to turn over all of the captured railroad property, including the commandeered lake vessel Victoria.

Although Butler had the situation well in hand, Colonel Pendleton arrived with a large force several days later on the rumor that Butler's forces were being besieged and fighting for their lives in the streets. Pendleton and his two battle-ready battalions from Managua found Butler's force "engaged" only in washing their grimy uniforms.[33]

Pendleton was closely followed by Admiral Southerland, whom Butler had requested to come to Granada for a conference. On Butler's recommendation Admiral Southerland agreed to grant Mena amnesty if he would surrender himself to be sent to Panama on an American ship. Gaining the agreement of Admiral Southerland, Butler went to confront the Old Tiger, Mena, but found instead a desperately sick old man. Mena was guarded in the fortress-like San Francisco Cathedral by a garrison of seven hundred

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[33] Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 157.

men, but was crippled and moaning on his back in continual pain. Butler learned that Mena had been crippled almost from the beginning of the revolt, and had tried to conduct all operations through his son, Daniel and the loyal General Zeledon. Mena, with no alternative, accepted the offer of Butler and Admiral Southerland and his soldiers surrendered control of the city and of the remaining two lake steamers which the rebels had used to serve as gunboats. In addition Butler captured 10,000 rifles, many of them modern Remingtons, several machine guns and field pieces, and a million and a half rounds of rifle ammunition. Mena, his son and a servant were shipped to Corinto on their way to Panama and exile. Leahy's mixed emotions toward the Liberal General Mena were evident as he commented on Mena's arrival at Corinto:

> Mena is an old savage who has been the cause of much suffering in his unhappy country, who is probably not much better or worse than other leaders on both sides in this war, and who probably richly deserved a worse fate than he met; but his arrival at Corinto in a steaming closed box car at midnight was a pitiful sight. In the dim light of a railroad lantern held over him by one of our guards I could see that his face was drawn with pain of the long journey which must have been enough to try the stoicism of an Indian....It was a sad picture of the mighty fallen. A leader of his people and an absolute autocrat, escaping under our protection to save from destruction the wreck of a body that was left to him.[34]

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[34]Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 159-64; Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Southerland to Navy Department, Record Group 59, September 20, 21, 1912, tell of Butler's safe arrival at Granada and of his freeing the three captives from General Zeledon at Masaya. Southerland reported "all quiet," and that he had accepted control of all of the property of the American controlled railroad, including two lake steamers. He also reported that he had agreed to accept the surrender of General Mena; Panama to State Department, Record Group 59, October 2, 1912, reported that the severely crippled General Mena was checked into Ancon Hospital in the Canal Zone, entirely crippled from what was diagnosed as "siphilitic rheumatism."

As late as the time of General Mena's surrender Admiral Southerland's attitude had remained that of a neutral desiring only to protect the lives and property of foreigners...but on the day of Mena's surrender Southerland received further orders from the Secretary of the Navy to take definite action on the side of the Conservative government of Diaz and to turn over all prisoners to Diaz's troops. Admiral Southerland, who had already agreed with Smedley Butler and Mena to allow Mena's removal to Panama, wired Washington that the message had been received too late to fully carry out the instructions, since he had already given Butler orders.[35]

With the surrender of Mena, the hopes of the Liberals rested solely on General Zeledon, who unfortunately now faced the determination of American Secretary of State Knox to keep Diaz and the Conservative interests in power. This meant that Zeledon's forces faced not only thousands of American sailors and marines already at Nicaragua, plus powerful warships but also the threat of as many more as would be required to silence Liberal opposition to Diaz. After the direct order from the Secretary of the Navy to win the Conservative's fight, Southerland's whole force turned its attention to Zeledon's stronghold at Masaya. Diaz's Conservative troops, after receiving all of the arms and ammunition captured by Butler in Granada, boasted that they would overcome Zeledon's forces with 2,500 government troops. Diaz's forces actually did little more than slowly shell Zeledon's position. It was by then obvious that Admiral

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[35] Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 163.

Southerland's sailors and marines would win their war anyway.

Within a few days, after General Zeledon had refused Southerland's offer of safe passage out of the country if he surrendered, the Americans attacked Zeledon's positions.[36] At dawn of October 3, the American forces attacked Zeledon's hill positions, killing 27 of Zeledon's force, capturing nine, and routing the rest. General Zeledon was hunted down by Diaz's cavalry and killed.[37] After Zeledon's defeat, Diaz's four thousand government soldiers, who had been unwilling to fight Zeledon's forces, now stormed into the demoralized town, routing and killing the last of the Liberal defenders. Butler described the scene, a repeat of the Conservative's takeover of Leon and a preview of what was in store for the Liberals of Nicaragua:

> I took my battalion down the hill. As I passed through Masaya to load the guns on our train and steam away, the four thousand government soldiers, half naked, were parading in high silk hats, and women's underclothes. Everybody was reeling in circles, drunk and hilarious. A few were playfully shooting their own comrades. Otherwise there was no violence.[38]

Leahy also noted that the drunken, looting Federals had at times

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[36] Leahy Diary, October, 1912.

[37] Leahy Diary, October 8, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 165-67; and Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 42.

[38] Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 167. Butler, pp. 140-48, also noted the rapine inflicted on the captured Liberal stronghold of Leon by a seven-hundred man mercenary force under one of Diaz's generals named Duron. The people of that ravished city finally rose en masse against Duron's force and wiped out all Duron's entire force, including two American mercenaries--West Point dropouts--who had shared in Duron's battles and rapine.

shot each other during their orgy in Masaya. The day after the looting of Masaya, the Colorado's battalion and two companies of Marines under Major Hill occupied Leon. Commander Terhune was placed in charge of all towns between Corinto and Leon. Colonel Pendleton occupied Leon itself, and Major Butler's forces controlled Granada.[39]

Under the umbrella of absolute protection of the American armed forces, Diaz's troops repeated the rape of towns throughout Nicaragua. Leahy noted:

> All other cities were being held by Federals who busied themselves getting even with inhabitants who had sided with the defeated rebels. The only hope for any person out of favor with the Federal regime was to reach one of the cities occupied by our forces where they were given protection from their countrymen. The party that had come into power through our efforts seemed unable to understand why we would not permit them to rob and execute their late antagonists.[40]

On October 12, 1912, with the Liberal threat destroyed and with Mena at Panama and Zeledon killed, Admiral Southerland sent Leahy, Captain Gill of the Colorado and Lieutenant Commander Washington, on an extended "inspection trip" from Corinto to the end of the railroad at Granada. Once again, the trains suffered their usual series of derailments, difficulties in climbing the steep grades, and breaking of draw bars. In addition, they were periodically startled by sudden volleys of wild rifle firing by still-celebrating Federal troops, firing into the air in a combined celebration and threat. While conditions were difficult enough

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[39] Leahy Diary, October, 1912.

[40] Leahy Diary, October 12, 1912.

in their private war, they were even wilder in the native passenger cars, where there were "natives closer than I have ever seen people packed into a broadway surface car in a rush hour. Even the outside platforms were crowded, some people even sitting (sic) on the lower steps with their feet dangling."[41]

At Managua, Leahy skeptically listened to a Mr. O'Connel, manager of the American owned railroad, who insisted that he had been prepared to operate the railroad at any time since the beginning of the occupation. Leahy, no fool, concluded that O'Connel was merely preparing his company's claims for damages against the very American government forces which had saved the railroad for its owners. He was similarly disillusioned and unimpressed by American Minister Weitzel. Leahy noted:

> We called at the legation on Mr. Weitzel, the Minister from the United States. Some persons have said that he is responsible for the revolution. But I have no knowledge of his part in the beginning of the trouble. He is now very much in favor of the excuse for a government that now holds office through our defeat of the Liberals.[42]

Weitzel further shocked Leahy, but unconsciously gave a perfect example of the modus operandi of Taft-Knox regime in Central America when he:

> Made a statement that seems remarkable to a sailor, as follows: Instructions issued by the State Department to an officer in the field must always purposely be vague and capable of different interpretations in order that the Department may always in case of necessity unload responsibility for its mistakes upon some subordinate.

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[41] Leahy Diary, October 12, 1912.

[42] Leahy Diary, October 12, 1912.

Leahy noted that "we are all familiar with the practice of our State Department but I have never before heard a diplomatist enunciate that doctrine."[43]

Their trip onward to Granada was accomplished in a "very special train consisting of one glass enclosed hand car and a toy engine the "Nindire" which had much difficulty with our dimunitive car on the steep slopes." The train stopped at Masaya for three hours where Leahy studied the recent battle. He noted that:

> Even without opposition climbing the steep hill under a burning sun was a task and it was apparent at once that a well intrenched body of men should have held the place indefinitely. A trench on the summit had been used to bury natives who were killed, the bodies being in many cases only partly covered with earth.
>
> In Masaya there was evidence everywhere of the thorough looting that the town suffered at the hands of the victorious Federals after we took the commanding hills.

At Granada, the party inspected the massive Church of San Francisco which had "for years been used as a fortress and arsenal by one or the other side in succeeding revolutions." Leahy correctly predicted that the 10,000 rifles which the Americans had seized in the church-fortress and turned over to the Federal General Chamorro would make him "the balance of power in the state." The party then retraced their trip, this time stopping at Leon, where Colonel Long and his men and the sailors from the Colorado were still in occupation. The sailors were located in a church at the city's edge:

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[43] Leahy Diary, October 12, 1912.

> It had been barracaded (sic) and provided for defense by natives but abandoned by them when our sailors appeared. It was strange to see our sailors housed in a church amid the gaudy Latin American paintings and decorations, but the roof did not leak and the sailors seemed quite as well satisfied as they could have been in any other structure.

As his final diary comment on Nicaraguan politics, Leahy predicted:

> General Chimorra (sic), said by his enemies to be an illegitimate son of the house of that name, a strong character, and an experienced revolutionist now holds all the power in Nicaragua. The President Diaz is probably, according to our standards, the best man in the government but he is generally considered to be not strong enough to hold his office without assistance from us. Mr. Weitzel says that General Chimorra (Chamorro) does not aspire to the presidency but natives of both political parties consider him a probable source of danger to peace.[44]

Within a few weeks Leahy sailed for Panama on board the Colorado, crossing the Isthmus by train and then sailing from Colon on October 22 on board the S.S. Cristobal. By December he was in Washington where he chose his new duties as Assistant Director of Target Practice and Engineering Competitions in the Division of Operations, in charge of the Engineering Branch, since it offered better opportunities for professional experience than the job of instructor at the Naval Academy which was also offered to him.[45]

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[44] Leahy Diary, October 12, 1912; Nogales, The Looting of Nicaragua, pp. 19-20. Emiliano Chamorro easily won the "election" of 1916 in Nicaragua. His nephew, Diego was "elected" President in 1920. On p. 20, Nogales lists 13 members of the immediate Chamorro family occupying most of the major political police and military posts of Nicaragua in 1920 (list provided by the Pan American Federation of Labor).

[45] Leahy Diary, December, 1912.

In his famous 1912 speech to Congress, President William Howard Taft justified the successful intervention of American Naval and Marine forces in behalf of the Diaz government and supporting American interests. In his speech Taft boasted of "substituting dollars for bullets." He boasted of the "idealism" which such a policy entailed, in addition to strictly commercial American interests. In another part of his annual message, Taft, not surprisingly, attributed the Nicaragua troubles and atrocities to the Liberal forces or "malcontents." He implied that the entire Nicaraguan situation could have been averted if only the U.S. State Department had encouraged a policy of loans to the Central American states. Taft praised the actions of the Navy and Marine forces, lamented the deaths of seven Americans in the Nicaraguan campaign but boasted that subsequently, elections had been held in Nicaragua in "conditions of peace and tranquility." Never forgetting the aims of his Secretary of State, Knox, Taft said that, "The only apparent danger now threatening Nicaragua arises from the shortage of funds." He then duly chided Congress for still not having approved the notoriously one-sided Knox-Castrillo convention of 1911, which would have given American bankers unprecedented entry into the complete financial control of Nicaragua.[46]

The eyewitness accounts of the situation in Nicaragua in 1912, as observed and commented on by Leahy and other participants, rebutted the rhetoric of Taft and Knox. The Central American policy can scarcely be termed one of "substituting dollars for bullets." It would be more

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[46] Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. x-xiii, xxiv-xxvi.

accurately termed one of "introducing American (investment) dollars with bullets."

Once back in Washington, Leahy thrived on his duties as Assistant Director of Target Practice and Engineering Competitions in the Division of Operations. With little clerical assistance he tabulated reports on the gunnery and engineering performances of all of the combat vessels of the fleet. In August, 1913, Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Aide for Personnel to the new Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, asked Leahy to serve in his office as assistant. Leahy reported to Admiral Mayo in August and soon saw Mayo relieved by Admiral William F. Fullam. Fullam in turn went to the Naval Academy as superintendent, leaving Leahy, still a Lieutenant Commander, in charge of the Personnel Division. Leahy worked often and well with Secretary Daniels, although Leahy suspected that Daniels disliked naval officers as a group.

In 1914, Leahy was assigned as detail officer and handled with no assistance the assignment of all officers in both line and staff and all disciplinary court-martials of officers. In 1915, he was designated to command the newly constructed destroyer tender Melville, but instead, Secretary Daniels assigned Leahy to command his personal dispatch vessel, the U.S.S. Dolphin. Leahy relieved Commander G. S. Lincoln of command of the Dolphin on September 18, 1915. Within a few months Leahy was ordered to take the Dolphin to the Caribbean.

On February 25, 1916, Rear Admiral Caperton and his staff boarded Leahy's ship, the Dolphin at Port-au-Prince and Leahy took over the duties previously filled by Captain Edward L. Beach and his ship, the Memphis.

Caperton appointed Leahy to succeed Beach as his Chief of Staff. This assignment kept Leahy in contact with the local political situation. Since Caperton knew no French, Leahy found himself serving in the added capacity of interpreter for Caperton.

Leahy praised the work of the Marine force in Haiti commanded by Colonel L. W. T. Waller and of Major Smedley Butler who was busy setting up the Haitian constabulary. Like Butler, and indeed like most Americans in America's new dependencies, Leahy boasted of the great "Miracles in improving the condition of the poor inhabitants who were poverty and disease stricken beyond words, but it was bad fortune for the ruling class most of whom were taken off the payrolls and none of whom could under their social system accept any employment that did not carry with it official rank."[47]

In his dual role commanding the Dolphin, and serving as Rear Admiral William B. Caperton's Chief of Staff, Leahy repeated many of the experiences of his predecessor, Captain Edward L. Beach, commanding officer of the U.S.S. Memphis, in dealing with the Haitians. As Admiral Caperton's successive Chiefs of Staff, both Beach and Leahy saw the brutal side of American military and political domination of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.[48] Prior to the American invasion of 1915, although

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[47] Leahy Diary, September 18, 1915, February, 1916; Officers Fitness Report of William D. Leahy; U.S.S. Dolphin, September 18, 1915; Haiti and Nicaragua were the only "colonial" areas in which Leahy operated in which he did not seem to see the human side of the natives' problems and in which he uncritically accepted the stereotyped self-justifying boast of establishing law and order, roads and improving living conditions.

it was by no means a legitimate excuse for United States intervention, the Haitian political situation was admittedly chaotic, even by the standards of that country. Between the years 1912 and 1915, Haiti experienced a succession of seven Presidents, the last being Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.[49]

On July 27, 1915, General Oscar Etienne, military Governor of Port-au-Prince under the bloodthirsty Guillaume Sam, ordered the murder of 167 political hostages, including former President Oreste Zamor. At this act, Port-au-Prince arose in fury. First Etienne was hauled from the Legation of Santo Domingo, killed, and mutilated. The terror-stricken Sam, hiding in the French Legation, was soon discovered by the mob, killed and literally torn to pieces and paraded, in pieces, through the streets of Port-au-Prince.[50]

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[48] Leahy Diary, September 18, 1915; U.S.S. Dolphin, Ship's Log, September 18, 1915. Leahy relieved Commander G. S. Lincoln; Leahy Diary, January, 1916. The Dolphin was ordered to the Caribbean to relieve the U.S.S. Memphis, under the command of Captain E. L. Beach; U.S.S. Dolphin, Ship's Log, February 26, 1916, "Rear Admiral Caperton, USN, Commander in Chief, Cruiser Squadron, came on board with members of his personal staff: Lieut. R. B. Coffey, USN and Lieut. J. W. Ferguson, USN and hoists his flag on this vessel...The Commanding Officer called officially on the United States Minister of Haiti."

[49] U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington, 1916), pp. 311ff., 326, Davis to Lansing. Secretary of Legation Davis summarizes the succession of Haitian presidents from 1870 to 1916.

[50] Captain Edward Beach, U.S. Navy, "Admiral Caperton in Haiti," unpublished manuscript (1920), National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Record Group 45, Box 850 ZWA 7, pp. 20-21; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 181. Both Captain Beach and Smedley Butler described the customary Haitian revolutionary cycle, usually bloodless, in which revolutionary leaders would collect troops on the poverty-stricken north of Haiti, and march south.


ATLANTIC OCEAN
Port De Paix
Cap-Haitien
Fort Liberte
Ouanaminthe
Le Trou
Bichon
GOLFE
DES GONAIVES
Gonaives
Ennery
St Michel
de L'Attalaye
Lamel
Hinche
Cerca-la Source
St Marc
Thomonde
Mirebalais
Lascahobas
CANAL DE ST. MARC
CANAL du SUD ou de LA GONAVE
Jeremie
Miragoane
Gde Goave
PORT
AU-PRINCE
Leogane
Jacmel
Aquin
Cayes
CARIBBEAN SEA
REPUBLIQUE
D'HAITI

Map of Haiti

Admiral Caperton, leaving the Eagle at Cape Haitien, sailed for Port-au-Prince, arriving on board U.S.S. Washington on July 28th. On that same day, at the request of the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, he was ordered to land Marines. The next day, Caperton ordered the Haitian "Committee of Safety" to ensure that all Haitians in the city were disarmed. On August 4, the battleship Connecticut arrived carrying a badly needed regimental headquarters, and five companies of the 2nd Marine Regiment. Also, at Caperton's request for more marines, a Brigade was organized under command of Colonel L. W. T. Waller.[51]

Caperton ordered an 11 o'clock curfew on Port-au-Prince. He then ordered his Chief of Staff, Leahy's predecessor, Captain Edward L. Beach to intimidate Doctor Bobo into resigning his claims to the presidency. Beach invited Bobo and his chief ministers on board the flagship Memphis and then proceeded to bully the suddenly frightened Bobo into resignation

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At the surrender of St. Marie, 50 miles from Port-au-Prince, the incumbent President automatically stepped down to be pensioned off and the new President continued his march, entered Port-au-Prince, and was duly inaugurated; U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington, 1915), Davis to Lansing, July 28, 1915, describes the events surrounding the riot and murders. Foreign Relations, 1915, July 28, 1915, Lansing to Daniels.

[51]Robert Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis, 1962), p. 171; James McCrocklin, Garde D'Haiti, 1915-1934; Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps (Annapolis, 1956), pp. 12-14, 21-24; Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York, 1939), pp. 375-76.

at the point of Caperton's naval guns.[52]

On August 15, Colonel L. W. T. Waller arrived on board the armored cruiser Tennessee with his new 1st Marine Brigade Headquarters and eight companies of Marines, reinforced by a field artillery battalion. On September 3, Caperton proclaimed martial law at Port-au-Prince. Within a month, Waller had accomplished his dual mission of generally quieting the major cities and towns and especially of taking over the key customs houses. His Marines soon were in control of ten cities.[53]

After former President Legitime, and other Haitian notables refused to run for President, Caperton chose the pliable southern Haitian mulatto Sudre Philippe Dartiguenave. Dartiguenave "won" the election with 94 out of 116 votes from an Assembly ringed by American Marines

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[52]Beach, "Admiral Caperton in Haiti," pp. 140-44; William B. Caperton, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, "History of the Career of Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Commencing January 5, 1915," unpublished manuscript, National Archives, Record Group 45, Box 802, pp. 63-65; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Sixty-Seventh Congress, Volume 1 (Washington, 1922), pp. 313-17; McCrocklin, Garde D'Haiti, pp. 26-28; Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 24-25, 378.

[53]Foreign Relations, 1915, September 2, 1915, Caperton to Daniels; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 171; McCrocklin, Garde D'Haiti, pp. 12-14, 21-22; Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 375-76. In one of the best examples of de facto American foreign policy being made by an aggressive senior naval officer on the colonial frontier, Admiral Caperton continually overstepped the bounds of his orders, but saw his actions later approved. After taking the customs-houses, contrary to the initial wishes of Secretary Daniels, Caperton sent his marines into Haiti's interior against the Cacos. On his own authority, he then imposed martial law. (Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938 (Durham, N.C., 1940), pp. 217-20.)

with ready weapons and in which Admiral Caperton's Chief of Staff, Captain Beach circulated "in a friendly manner" on the floor of the Assembly.[54]

Under these conditions it was not surprising that as Smedley Butler laconically recorded it:

> Senator Philippe Dartiguenave, had our backings. When the National Assembly met, the Marines stood in the aisles with their bayonnets until the man selected by the American minister was made president. His excellency, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave was put in office in September. I won't say we put him in. The State Department might object. Anyway, he was put in.

Chargé Davis reported to Secretary Lansing on August 12, that "Today at about midday Sudre Dartiguenave elected President, receiving 94 out of 116 votes. Election held under protection of marines."[55]

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[54] Montague, Haiti and the United States, pp. 213-16.

[55] Foreign Relations, 1915, Davis to Lansing, August 12, 1915; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 182-83. Butler's Marines and his willingness and flair in terrorizing the natives was of continual value to the American puppet Dartiguenave. In 1917, after the plucky Haitian Congress had twice refused to allow Dartiguenave to write a new constitution allowing foreign (American) land ownership, Butler and his Marine-officered "native constabulary" dissolved the Congress at rifle point. (Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 212-17) Foreign Policy Association, "The Seizure of Haiti by the United States," A Report on the Military Occupation of the Republic of Haiti and the History of the Treaty forced upon Her (New York, 1922). In this report, a group of 24 distinguished Americans, including Zachariah Chafee, Jr., and Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School accused the United States of invading a "recognized sovereign nation...a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1907." Their report accurately emphasized "that no American citizen has been injured in person or property by the people of Haiti; nor have any other foreigners been molested....Foreign investments had at all times been respected, the interest on Haitian foreign debt has been scrupulously paid...." The report pointed out that the American puppet Sudre Dartiguenave "proclaimed himself a candidate for election to the Presidency of the Republic and offered if President to acede to any (sic) terms which the United States might name." The report was entirely derived from the 1922 investigation of the Haitian situation, "Official Report of the Hearings before a Select Committee of the United

Following the resignation of Haitian foreign secretary Sannon, Dartiguenave and the Haitian Senate continued to delay the approval of the tough American treaty, while Dartiguenave and the new foreign secretary, Borno, unsuccessfully sought changes in that treaty.[56]

The treaty was finally "approved" in February 1916 by the Haitian senate only after the United States' refusal to loan the government $100,000 for salaries and expenses.[57]

On July, 1915, the American Chargé D'Affaires at Santo Domingo, instructed by Robert Lansing the American Secretary of State, had taken the unprecedented step of warning Arias and his dissatisfied faction that the United States would back President Jimenez no matter what forces were gathered against him. This American interference was immediately answered in an open message of General Horatio Vasques contesting the right of the United States to interfere in Dominican internal affairs.[58] By the summer of 1915, Jimenez suffered a severe mental and physical breakdown. Nevertheless, on September 17, 1915, the new American Minister William

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States Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, authorizing an inquiry into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic."

[56] Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 442-45.

[57] Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 322-27, 458; Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 447f., quoted in Montague, Haiti and the United States, pp. 221-23.

[58] Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 339-42; Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (New York, 1928), pp. 611-34, 675-81, 690-99, 705-08, 718-48, tell of the determination of U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and, later, of Woodrow Wilson, to vest the "ultimate decision regarding the domestic policies of the Dominican Government in the hands of representatives of the United States" (quote, p. 748).

H. Russell was instructed to make a mandatory demand on the Dominicans to institute an American customs and financial control of the country, and de facto American political control by the establishment of an America-officered Dominican constabulary. Dominican public opinion was immediately aroused both against the demands and against the pliable Jimenez. This marked the start of a series of frantic American moves to prevent the impeachment of Jimenez by the angry Dominican Congress, or the military takeover by the forces of the popular (with the Dominicans) General Arias.[59] On January, 1916, Secretary of State Lansing notified the wavering President Jimenez through Minister William H. Russell that Jimenez had the full support of the American government. On January 15, President Wilson himself sent Jimenez reassurances of his support. In March, 1916, Russell reported to Lansing that Arias' forces had taken over the fortress which dominated Santo Domingo city following an attempt by Jimenez to arrest General Cesario Jimenez, the Commander of the Fortress and General Cesario Jimenez, the Chief of the National Guard. The frightened President Jimenez was prevented from resigning only by the pleadings and demands of American Minister Russell.[60]

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[59] Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 755-63.

[60] Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 220, January 24, 1916, Lansing to Russell; March 14, 1916, Russell to Lansing; April 15, 1916, Russell to Lansing; April 27, 1916, Russell to Lansing; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 755-58, 767, describes Russell, who replaced the inefficient and allegedly corrupt American Minister James Mark Sullivan in 1915. Regrettably for the popular political forces in Dominican Republic, Russell was a returnee from a previous tour as Minister during the dollar diplomacy days of Taft and Knox. Russell looked on the patriot leader Arias and all like him, as enemies if they were not completely amenable to American control.

Jimenez's pliability and half-collapsed emotional state made him extremely valuable for the carrying out of the proposed American policy, which was to effectively bring Dominican Republic under American political, military and financial control through imposition of the demands of September, 1915. Minister Russell therefore, intensified his efforts to keep the increasingly reluctant Jimenez in power and to keep Arias out of the Presidency, by force if necessary. Both houses of the Dominican Congress voted to impeach Jimenez. The President, however, with Russell's support and probable instigation, refused to allow his own impeachment and retired to the outskirts of Santo Domingo City with a weak force, to await the military aid promised by Russell. Russell had been requesting troops and ships for several months, and had already caused several hundred sailors and marines to be landed while larger forces were on the way. Jimenez nevertheless found the strength to refuse Russell's demand that Jimenez go on record as requesting American armed support in Santo Domingo City. At the insistence of his family, Jimenez finally resigned on May 7, leaving Russell with no other puppet in sight and leaving the presidential chair declared officially vacant by the Dominican Congress.[61]

On April 16, 1916, Admiral Caperton received an urgent message

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[61] Foreign Relations, 1916, May 1, May 2, 1916, Russell to Lansing; May 2, Lansing to Russell, reiterates the American intention to fully support President Jimenez regardless of circumstances or the wishes of the Dominican people or their Congress; Foreign Relations, 1916, May 3, May 7, 1916; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 766-70; Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing tells of the attempts of the Dominican House and Senate, opposed in every way by Russell, to impeach President Jimenez for his apparent readiness to capitulate to the unpopular American demands for control of the country.

Map of the Dominican Republic

from the Prairie, located at Santo Domingo requesting support against the rebel forces of former Dominican Minister of War, Desiderio Arias. Caperton, his work on subjugating Haiti well in hand, decided to shift his flagship Dolphin in Santo Domingo City.[62]

By the time Admiral Caperton arrived at Santo Domingo City on board the Dolphin, the Prairie and Castine had already landed several hundred sailors and marines outside the city at Russell's request. This was despite the fact that even President Jimenez had finally resigned rather than authorize such an obvious infringement on Dominican sovereignty by the United States forces. Caperton ordered the Culgoa to bring several more companies of marines from Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien to Santo Domingo City. The Hector brought 150 more marines from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

On the afternoon of May 12, Caperton, accompanied by Commander Leahy as his Chief of Staff, attended a meeting which included Desiderio Arias, American Minister Russell and Cesario Jimenez, the Commandt of the Fortress. Russell and Caperton, determined to destroy Arias as an independent political and military force, demanded that he disarm and surrender his forces by May 15. At Arias' refusal, Caperton returned to the Dolphin and ordered that landings be made. On May 12, and 13, seven companies of marines were landed from the Colgoa, while ships companies of sailors were landed from the Memphis, Prairi, Dolphin, and Castine. Leahy watched the landings with fascination from the deck of the Dolphin:

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[62] Caperton, "History of the Career of...Caperton," p. 233.

> ...over three hundred men with equipment and field guns in the glare of searchlights from the ships were landed over the surf with no casualties other than a few smashed boats. When the mixed force of Marines and sailors assaulted and scaled the walls of the city, Arias had fled and there was no battle.[63]

In spite of his precipitous flight from the American forces, Arias' supporters were determined to elect him president. However, on May 15, Russell reported to Lansing that it was "impossible for any good to come by the election of a new President since it was probable that Arias or his candidate would be elected." Arias still held back his forces, "trusting to the Dominican constitution." He was convinced that the Dominican Congress would elect him as legally acknowledged president. Unfortunately, for Arias, at that same time Minister Russell repeatedly advised Lansing against allowing Arias or any of his supporters to be elected to the Presidency. Russell recommended that Arias be "finally eliminated" as a political and military factor in Dominican affairs. Russell reminded Lansing that, in view of his repeated accusations against Arias "during the last few years," Arias was unacceptable (to the Americans) as a President. Ironically, considering the intentions and political and military actions of Russell and Caperton, but consistent with the pattern of American actions versus offical statements in the Caribbean

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[63] Leahy Diary, May 1916; Caperton, "History of the Career of...Caperton," pp. 254-55; Foreign Relations, 1916, May 2, 1916, Russell to Lansing, describes Jimenez's flight from the city of Santo Domingo, Jimenez withdrew and after a comic opera "advance" on the city, waited for the Americans to fight for his power. The naive Arias, trusting apparently to American good faith or respect for Dominican sovereignty, also waited outside the city with his strong forces and, aware of his own popularity "relied on the provisions of the constitution"; Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 343-44; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 180-82.

area, on May 14 Caperton and Russell issued circulars in the city of Santo Domingo boasting that Caperton's forces had only arrived to "guarantee the free election of the next President of the Republic by the Chambers."[64]

Commander Leahy took note of the effects of American intervention on the government and people of the Dominican Republic:

> No responsible government existed at this time and the inhabitants refused to elect a government during my stay. The Dominicans definitely did not like us, differing from the Haitians in that some of the latter were in favor of our efforts to stabilize their government and their finances....The natives who speak Spanish are all said to have some African ancestry. In most of them this is not apparent. They are proud, intelligent, inefficient, and unfriendly toward Americans.[65]

Once again, as in Nicaragua and Haiti, the American Minister and Senior Naval officer found themselves exerting every effort, including military force, to support or install a non-popular puppet, while at the same time fighting off the efforts of popular forces to take charge of their own government and country. To their credit, the Dominicans, unlike the Nicaraguans or Haitians, refused as a group to bow to American demands. Nor did any individual offer himself in the subtle manner of Diaz, in Nicaragua, or Dartiguenave in Haiti to be the American's puppet for a price. On May 23, Minister Russell was further infuriated when the Haitian Congress ignored his "request" to delay final election of the new president. The Dominican House elected Dr. Francisco Henriquez y

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[64] Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing; May 17, 1916, Vice Consul von Zielinski to Lansing; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, p. 773.

[65] Leahy Diary, May, 1916.

Carvajal, however, since he did not agree to bow to the American demands. The U.S. State Department informed Russell that neither Carvajal nor Arias were "acceptable" as candidates for the Dominican presidency.[66]

This intensified the long struggle between Russell and popular Dominican forces led by Arias. Russell and Caperton with the direction of the American State Department, were determined to impose an "acceptable" (i.e. complete pliable) man in the office of President. Russell was convinced that if the Dominican Congress were "allowed" to elect a President, he would "undoubtedly" be the highly popular but undesirable (for purposes of American control) Arias. Russell and Caperton therefore made every effort to delay the election of a Dominican president until a means was found to insure that he would be controllable.[67]

On June 4, in view of the insistence of the Dominican Senate to proceed with the election, the American-influenced Council of Ministers, with the support and probable instigation of Russell, arrested four Senators who were strong supporters of Arias. The popular uproar which followed the arrests forced Russell to "advise" release of the Senators. Meanwhile, Arias and his forces, refusing to capitulate to Caperton and Russell, withdrew to the north to Arias' political base and military stronghold, Santiago. On June 18, the 4th Marine Regiment, under command of Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, arrived at Santo Domingo City and on the next day was shipped north to capture Arias' stronghold of Santiago.[68]

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[66] Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing, May 18, 1916.

[67] Foreign Relations, 1916, May 15, 1916, Russell to Lansing; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 775-77.

[68] Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing, May 18, 1916, June 4, 1916, June 6, 1916, June 26, 1916; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 775-77.

Pendleton's northern Marine force landed in two contingents, one fighting southward from the port of Monte Cristi, and the other from the port and railroad terminal of Puerto Plata. The two columns joined at the railroad junction of Navarette, and continued their fighting advance into the City of Santiago. Although two Marines, a private and a captain were killed during the advance, the city of Santiago fell without a final struggle on July 7 and Arias surrendered to the provincial Governor.[69]

During this period, on June 16, William D. Leahy's tour in Santo Domingo ended when the Dolphin was ordered to be detached from Admiral Caperton's command and sailed, first to Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico. In Mexico Leahy found the local populace to be bitterly resentful as the result of Wilson's interventions. The Dolphin then sailed to Norfolk, Virginia on July, 1916 for repairs.[70] Leahy and the Dolphin narrowly missed tragedy at Santo Domingo. On August, 1916, the Memphis which once again was serving as Admiral Caperton's flagship, anchored off the City of Santo Domingo, was driven ashore by a storm and wrecked with the loss of 40 lives from boat drownings and engine room explosions.[71]

The Dominican situation was finally resolved by the Americans in

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[69]U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1916 (Washington, 1917), pp. 73-74; Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing, July 7, 1916; Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 345-46.

[70]Leahy Diary, May, 1916.

[71]U.S. Navy, "Statement of the Chief of Naval Operations," October 12, 1916, in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1916 (Washington, 1917), p. 92.

a typically imperalistic manner. The Secretary of State wrote the President on November, 1916, that Stabler, Chief of the State Department's Latin American Division, had recommended that in view of the fact that the popular Arias could never be defeated in a fair political contest, Captain Knapp, who had just taken over the Caribbean squadron, should also take over the governing of the Dominican Republic.[72]

On November 29, military government was proclaimed by Captain Knapp. His proclamation had been drawn up in the State Department and approved by President Wilson . The Americans initially hoped that Dominican officials would cooperate in running a puppet regime, but when no Dominicans came forward to act as puppets for their American conquerors, Knapp filled all vital positions with American naval officers.

Then began a series of bloody operations by the American Marines against Dominican forces, who were called "Political bandits," the appellation of "bandit" making it much easier to justify their annihilation by Marine forces. By 1920 most of the bandit groups had been killed or captured and the Dominican Republic settled under American martial law rule.[73]

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[72] Foreign Relations, 1916, November 22, 1916, Russell to Lansing, Lansing to Wilson.

[73] Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 332-55; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 791-93.

CHAPTER 7

THE FORCE OF SHARED ASSUMPTIONS

William D. Leahy and his fellow officers served in the vanguard of American expansion during the late 1890's and the first two decades of the twentieth century. They and their ships and guns were the agents for destroying the power of Spain over her former colonies. They then were the means by which America moved into Spain's former empire and imposed American rule over certain small nations.

Their field of action involved not only military but also political problems of vital significance in America's foreign relations. Like their English cousins and mentors, America's imperialists shared many assumptions concerning the proper interrelationship of God, Anglo-Saxons, white Americans, and other peoples of the world. These assumptions may be termed limiting assumptions in that they were so deeply held that options to them were usually unrecognized or discredited by those who held them. Thus, they partially blinded their adherents and limited the operation of either conscience or justice when Americans dealt with "lesser" peoples. Nor were the workings of these one-sided assumptions noted by American historians, most of whom have shared the same assumptions as articles of unquestioned faith. The most powerful of these often invisible limiting assumptions were:

1. The Calvinistic belief dating back to Puritan times, that the inborn virtue of white Americans had gained for them the advocacy of the all-powerful Christian God in their dealings with other people.
2. The racist belief, reinforced by the scientific jargon of Social Darwinism, of the innate racial superiority of whites, and especially of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic branches of the white race.
3. A Chauvinistic conviction of the superiority of the American economic, political and cultural systems.
4. A consequent conviction of the "Duty and Destiny" of Americans to impose their control and ideology on other peoples.

These four basic assumptions stood Americans in good stead, guarding their consciences during the extirpation of the Indians of America, the enslavement, and post-Civil War re-enslavement of America's blacks and the continual erosion of the rights and exclusion of America's orientals. By the end of the nineteenth century the lure of overseas economic and strategic advantage, made possible by the use of the growing new American fleet and the fall of Spanish power soon brought new batches of non-whites --this time overseas--for the Americans to dominate.

The four basic assumptions were ideally suited to enable Americans to rationalize their new imperialistic course. The limiting assumptions made it certain that "American lives and property" would be protected overseas at all costs, even when the private American "interests" involved by no means represented the American "national interest." The assumptions

made it possible for Americans including Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and William D. Leahy and his comrades, to feel genuine fury when "natives" had the affrontery to oppose American control or the installation of American-backed puppet governments. Similarly the assumptions of the innate rightness of the Americans' position and future, made it "obvious" that only "bandits" or "malcontents" would oppose the desires of American political or economic opportunists, while natives who cooperated were by definition, "good."

The limiting assumptions, made it certain that when the Americans found themselves with the fallen apple of the Spanish empire almost in their hands and realized that their shiny new fleet could fight, no problems of conscience or justice toward their victims would arise to upset their calculations. Even the vast majority of those who opposed America's imperialistic course usually did so on the grounds of racist, self-serving arguments. The problems of both method and conscience for dealing with new batches of non-white subjects overseas had been long since resolved by white Americans in dehumanizing and subjugating the Indians, blacks and orientals within America's borders.[1]

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[1]Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in America in Crisis; Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History, edited by Daniel Aaron (New York, 1952), pp. 173-200, described the conscience deadening effect of the Manifest Destiny concept; Richard F. Trask, Victory Without Peace, American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1968), pp. 20-22. Trask concluded that moral, racist, and social Darwinist rationalizations were developed to justify the basic economic, strategic and power drive of the United States; Gunnar Myrdal, "An American Dilemma," Vol. 1, The Negro in a White Nation (New York, 1962), Introduction, pp. lxx-lxxv. Both Trask and Myrdal emphasized the historic dichotomy between the statements and self-imagery of Americans and their actual actions towards non-whites; Reuben Francis Weston, Racism in U.S.

The Calvinistic certainty of God's grace operated more than any other factor to still the historical consciences of American conquerors of weaker peoples. Under the Calvinist scheme success in any endeavor was an outward sign of God's probable grace. Thus, Dewey, after his overwhelming victory at Manila Bay in May 1898 could conclude that, "the hand of God was in it." It was a short step from such "reasoning" to conclude that a God-ordained Manifest Destiny justified American imperialism.

Leaving aside all immediate American strategic or economic interests or plans, these limiting assumptions were in themselves the constant yet invisible underlying motivating force for America's accelerated imperialist expansion, especially after the 1898 Spanish War victories had shown the ease of imperial conquests. They enabled America's expansionist leaders to operate in certainty of the proper interrelationship of God, America and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the proper position of the world's "lesser" peoples, both within and outside of the borders of the United States. These assumptions were shared to a large extent by those on the frontiers who were to carry out the policies of America's leaders. Largely products of the same class and background and ideology,most of the junior military and naval officers and functionaries felt few qualms about carrying out

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Imperialism; The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946 (Columbia, S.C., 1972), documents the constant, underlying American conviction of racial superiority and of the inferiority of non-white peoples. This attitude, often operating "invisibly" helped both to instigate and to rationalize America's subjugation of the small nations in which Leahy served; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, The Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," Journal of Southern History, XXIV (1958), pp. 319-31, details the racism of anti-imperialists and southerners who opposed the absorption of "inferior" races.

the dictates from Washington. Their shared assumptions made it almost certain that, regardless of their surface motives or declarations, whenever confrontations arose between American interests, national or private, and the sovereignty or rights of the people of small, non-white nations, automatic, often unplanned bullying or intervention by American political or military power would be the result.

William D. Leahy shared to a considerable degree the standard assumption of his times on the superiority of western ways, and of the American economic and political system. During his early days he had no doubts as to the primacy of American interests over all others. He was, like most of his shipmates, a quietly religious Protestant with a strong, idealistic determination to defend "my country, right or wrong."

In Guam, the Philippines and the countries of Central America, he found the "natives" to be immoral, lazy, and backward. Like many of his shipmates, Leahy was somewhat ill at ease in interracial social gatherings which he attended in the Philippines, Japan and the Latin American republics. However, unlike most American men of his own or other eras, his sense of "differentness" apparently made non-white women generally unattractive to him. He was singularly unattracted by "native" women, whenever he encountered them and not even the "strange manipulations" of Hawaiian hula dancers attracted him.[2]

Leahy judged the relationships of his country and himself with the

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[2] Leahy Diary, October 30, 1900, September 12 and September 8, 1902, January 19, 1909, December, 1904 to March 1, 1904, September 16 and September 29, 1902, December 5, 1911.

small nations always from the viewpoint of American interests above all others. In 1906, he noted Japan's anger at American racist policies which had segregated oriental children in San Francisco schools, deprived Japanese citizens of their rights and lands in California and some other western states, and placed restrictions on Japanese immigration. Although he was an admirer of Japanese patriotism and intelligence, he feared the Japanese aim of forcing the white nations out of Asia and of creating an "Asia for the Asiatics." He went so far as to regret that the United States had not supported Russia, a white, Christian nation against Japan, "a nation of ambitious pagans who have nothing in common with our culture and whose record in Korea would have shamed Nero." In a burst of patriotism he concluded that "I am for the United States exclusively and always, regardless of the ambitious desires or even the rights of other nations, and for that reason think it was a mistake to assist Japan."[3]

Like most of his contemporaries, Leahy was a firm believer in the work ethic--American style, and was an opponent of such threats to the status quo as militant unionism. He was certain that cities often bred "degenerates." Like his civilian and military superiors and contemporaries, he considered the Caribbean nations to be troublesome wards whose "stubborness and recalcitrance was not to be tolerated."[4] When in 1906 trouble arose in Cuba, he felt that it was "time to take over

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[3] Leahy Diary, September 23, 1906.

[4] Leahy Diary, August 27, 1902, September 16, 1902.

permanent possession of the island, using experience gained in the Philippines."[5] He felt the same exasperated superiority toward the people of recently-subjugated Panama, who "although dirty and getting rich...do not want the canal completed because their opportunities then to get money from us will be less frequent...they hate and despise us....Everybody...seems to agree that it was time long ago to stop temporizing with the natives, who if (sic) the country is to be left in their possession, ought to be assisting instead of retarding work." He had no patience with the local political schemes and maneuverings of the leaders of the "ridiculous little Republic."[6]

On the positive side of his attitude toward the peoples of America's new imperial empire, Leahy was infinitely more ready to recognize their problems and viewpoint than most Americans of his time. He did not share the strong social Darwinist racism or disregard for the rights and lives of non-white, non-Americans that infected many of his contemporaries. He was capable of admiring and fearing the intellectual, organizational and physical prowess of the Japanese even while he feared their takeover of the Orient.[7] He sympathized with the position of the Philippine insurgents who had fought against the American forces in 1899-1901. He recognized the organization of the Filipino rebels and their humane treatment of prisoners and civilians. Although a participant in "search and

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[5] Leahy Diary, August 27, 1902, April to June, 1906.

[6] Leahy Diary, November 2, 1905, September 3, 1906, December 11, 1904.

[7] Leahy Diary, September 23, 1906.

destroy" missions against the Filipinos, Leahy had no stomach for American-inflicted atrocities against the natives. He was certain that his father, an officer in the Union Army during the American Civil War, had been a chivalrous soldier and would have been compassionate toward any defeated enemy. The sight of a fifteen-year old Filipino "suspect," weeping and hysterically protesting his scheduled execution saddened Leahy, not enough to openly protest, but enough to prompt him to sadly return to his ship, the Leyte, and leave the executions to the soldiers of the 38th American Infantry Regiment.[8] Similarly, he had sympathized with the plight of the Cuban refugees, especially the children during and after the Spanish-American War.[9]

Throughout his life Leahy could recognize and admire a capable individual or a fellow fighting man, of any nation or color. In 1898, at the beginning of his career and during the American taking of Cuba, Leahy had met a Cuban colonel, a "tall, handsome, courteous soldier whose appearance would have been creditable in any army."[10] He recognized the brave record of the little British Gurkha soldiers who were stationed at Shanghai in 1900 and the bravery of Aguinaldo's troops as they fought American subjugation. Just as he praised the character and performance of the black American Consul at Corinto, James Weldon Johnson in 1912,

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[8] Leahy Diary, September 16, 1900, October 28, 1900, February 12, 1901, March 12, 1901.

[9] Leahy Diary, July 6, 1898.

[10] Leahy Diary, June 26, 1898.

Leahy in 1948 was impressed with black American Governor William Hastie of the Virgin Islands who Leahy found to be "a highly intelligent, very attractive man who is undertaking an extremely difficult task."[11]

Regardless of his relative sensitivity to the plight of those who were oppressed by American imperial expansion, Leahy was, in the final analysis, no less effective an agent of that imperialism than was an insensitive individual like Yates Stirling. The ideals and assumptions which both men shared with their leaders insured that the "inefficient, non-white, natives," who had the ill fortune to be born in lands which the Americans of those times wanted, for whatever reasons, would be conquered and subjugated. Their attitudes and weapons insured that, insofar as the territories which the Americans coveted and had opportunity to seize, it was a case of "America Über Alles."

In many ways Leahy represented the best of the military tradition of a democratic nation. Officially he was the non-political centurian whose only aim is to serve the interests of his nation as determined by his superiors. In another, unofficial manner, Leahy was privately a thinking, questioning individual who observed and recorded many of the iniquities which America inflicted on her new imperial wards in the name of economic advantage or strategic interest.

Leahy participated in interventions under four American Presidents. Each of these ostensibly had differing aims in both foreign policy and in their relations with vested American interests overseas. Yet their

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[11] Leahy Diary, August 29, 1900, February 1, 1901, March 12, 1901, September 1912, October 18, 1912, February 20, 1948.

on-the-scene policies uniformly resulted in the stifling of popular forces in the small nations in which Leahy saw American imperialism in action. The "hidden" unifying factor was the operation of their limiting assumptions concerning American relations with "others" who had the misfortune to be non-white and to control land, economic or strategic resources desired by America's leaders. These assumptions insured a rationalized disregard for the rights of the "natives" of America's new empire just as they had for "natives" within the United States. They were shared not only by every American President during the period 1897 to 1917, but also by other civilian and military leaders, anti-imperialists, religious leaders and much of the American public.

American expansionism was always conducted under such banners as "the white man's burden" or "the spreading of democracy." Yet, America, no less than her imperialist competitors proved to be an insufferable economic and psychic burden on the nations which she subjugated. United States intervention usually favored small comprador elites and was the major factor in eliminating any realistic chance that popular political forces would be allowed to rule their nations in a democratic manner. In each intervention United States leaders acted with differing "reasons" but their shared assumptions insured that non-representative comprador governments or American military regimes were established in those countries.

As an example, the practical result of the 1909-1912 American intervention into Nicaragua destroyed the hope of the Nicaraguan liberals of obtaining power in their own country against the overwhelming power of local compradors backed by U.S. money and arms. In the words of Dana Munro:

> The intervention intensified the already prevalent fear and mistrust of the United States in other Central American countries. On the other hand, for several years after 1912 the recognition of what happened to Mena's rebellion discouraged potential revolutionists....When disturbances threatened, the appearance of an American warship was enough to restore tranquility. The belief that the United States would intervene to uphold Constitutional governments helped the gro ps in power in each country to remain in power with little regard for the rights of their opponents, but it at least gave Central America an era of much needed peace.[12]

In another example, in the case of the Dominican Republic, when no Dominicans offered themselves as puppets in 1916, President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing established a military dictatorship under Admiral Knapp which ran the nation by means of Naval and Marine personnel.

The duality and conflict between Leahy's acceptance of America's unhindered right to use any necessary military measures to promote her own interests versus his sensitivity to the suffering of those who were the victims of American policies continued to the end of his career. From his earliest experiences in Cuba and the Philippines, he opposed the use of inhumane policies or maiming weapons. Leahy was repelled in September, 1944 upon visiting his brother, Commander Michael Arthur Leahy, who was in charge of the naval unit of the Chemical Warfare School at the Edgewood Arsenal, where toxic weapons were being developed. He

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[12] Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 215. Munro often apologist in tone and interpretation, at least recognized the brutality of the American intervention and its negative actual effect on any chance of democratic growth in the midst of the Central American republics, as long as Americans had the will and the power to intervene or to give tacit economic, political and military support to local comprador regimes. Typically, Munro "justified" American intervention because it made "an era of peace," i.e., "law and order" under American bayonets.

especially fought the use of the atomic bomb, a weapon which he put in the same inhumane category as poison gas. He felt that dropping the bombs on Japan was unnecessary, and he was later convinced that "the use of this murderous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan." He also feared that "...the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project." Leahy concluded:

> The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. We were the first to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to use it. There is a practical certainty that potential enemies will have it in the future and that atomic bombs will sometime be used against us.
>
> That is why, as a professional military man with a half century of service to his government, I come to the end of my war story with an apprehension about the future. These new concepts of "total wars" are basically distasteful to the soldier and sailor of my generation. Employment of the atomic bomb in war will take us back in cruelty toward non-combatants to the days of Genghis Khan....Perhaps there is some hope that its capacity for death and terror among the defenseless may restrain nations from using the atom bomb against each other, just as in the last war such fears made them avoid employment of the new and deadlier poison gases developed since World War I....[13]

However, the duality in Leahy's attitude reappeared when he concluded that, "until the United Nations or some other world organization can guarantee...that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic

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[13] William D. Leahy, I Was There, The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), pp. 440-42.

warfare, the United States must have more and better bombs than any potential enemy."[14]

[14] Leahy Diary, October 17, 1945; Leahy, I Was There, p. 442.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

There are several major weaknesses in the literature of American diplomatic history as it relates to America's dealings with the small, non-white countries which she "conquered" during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Insofar as they have shared the assumptions of those American leaders about whom they write, American diplomatic historians have usually taken an unconscious, ahistorical position of "advocacy" in examining and analyzing American relations with those nations. Including such historians as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dana Munro, they constructed a positively biased model, almost in spite of their own good intentions. To build and defend their model, they had to overlook, excuse or rationalize a series of American attitudes and actions in the foreign policy field and to downplay negative aspects of that policy. Their model postulated a benevolent, Christian, God-fearing United States. The actions of this "model United States" were assumed to be based on good intentions. These "advocate" historians could not bring themselves seriously to consider selfish or mercenary motives on the part of officials or behind-the-scenes makers of America's foreign policies. All of these were considered to be "gentlemen," beyond reproach or, as illogically, "innocent until proven guilty." Advocate historians insisted, for example, basing their conclusions more on official rhetoric than facts and actions, that American policy in the Caribbean was based more on "strategic" considerations than the dirty motives of dollar diplomacy.

The experiences of William D. Leahy and other witnesses indicates otherwise. Herein lies the flaw in the writing of America's diplomatic history--a stance of "advocacy" necessarily works against objectivity. The role of advocate or "defense lawyer" for America's leaders led historians with the best of intentions and consciences, to twist both their selections of facts and their analysis thereof and produce more propaganda and myth than history. Merely as an example, Samuel Flagg Bemis' The Latin American Policy of the United States was written from a flagrant "advocate position."

Bemis criticized Charles A. Beard, who in The Idea of National Interest, An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy partially based his conclusions critical of the Nicaraguan intervention on the sworn ex parte testimony of former high Nicaraguan official Toribio Tixerino, and Thomas Moffat, "a critical and discontented former United States consul-general in Nicaragua." Bemis never could bring himself seriously to consider the testimony of "natives" or of men like former Consul-General Moffat, who, in Bemis' eyes, had broken the "rules of the club" by testifying against the depredations of Knox and Diaz in Nicaragua. Bemis thus strongly contested Beard's emphasis on the apparent influence of private American business interests on the policies of their former associate, Secretary of State, Knox in Nicaragua. Bemis, rather, consistently chose to emphasize the more "acceptable" motive of strategic interest. Bemis at the same time criticized J. Fred Rippy's Nicaragua, Caribbean Danger Zone, also for minimizing the "positive" Central American treaties of 1907 and 1923, which in Bemis' opinion "explain the policy of the United

States more than does 'dollar diplomacy'." The treaties of 1907 and 1923, which Bemis felt "explained the policy of the United States" did, indeed, illustrate that policy, but in a negative sense. In Bemis' own pages, in The Latin American Policy of the United States, it is obvious that the negative policies and actions of the United States had led directly to the destruction of both of those agreements. The United States refused in 1916 to support the decision of the Central American Court of Justice against the one-sided American-imposed Knox-Castrillo Agreement, thus effectively destroying the influence of the Central American Court which had been established by the 1907 treaty. Similarly, the obstructionist tactics of the American dominated Nicaraguan government destroyed any chance of success of the 1923 agreements. Bemis, in extolling those two agreements well demonstrated his sustained capacity to overlook and misread evidence before his own eyes in order to fit his benevolent model of American foreign policy.[1]

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[1] Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), pp. 412ff. also quotes U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-ninth Congress, 2nd Sess. Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 15, Relative to Engaging the Responsibility of the Government in Financial Arrangements Between Its Citizens and Sovereign Foreign Governments (Washington, 1927), January 25, 27, 28, and February 1927, but criticizes Beard's use of the testimony of former Consul Moffat. Beard "discredited" Moffat by terming him a "critical and discontented former United States Consul-General in Nicaragua"; Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), pp. 171-80, Munro, like Bemis, a member of the "advocacy school" of American diplomatic history described (p. 178) how in 1907, "officials in the State Department had been discussing possible methods by which a popularly elected government that would respect the 1907 treaties might be installed" in Nicaragua. Characteristically, Munro did not seem to be bothered by the logical impossibility of "installing" a "popularly elected" government.

The realities of American foreign policy as seen by William D. Leahy and his associates on the outer edges of American expansion differed widely from the benevolent model of American diplomacy which was developed by Bemis and advocate historians. The corrective to "history as propaganda" is not, as has happened in the case of Cold War historiography, a counterattack by "prosecutors," but a new look from the viewpoint of on-the-scene witnesses in each instance to determine "what probably happened" and why.

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